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This thesis is concerned with Arendt’s political theory, particularly those
elements of it concerned with political institutions. It treats her work as
a response to a mis-conceptualisation of politics as being fundamentally
formed of rulership and command, which is to say that she opposes treating
sovereignty as an essential component of political practice.
What Arendt offers, as an alternative, is a full-ﬂedged account of how
politics could operate in the absence of sovereignty. This thesis argues that it
is a coherent picture, consistent across the course of her work. A particularly
important element of this consistency is the closeness of ﬁt between the
material which forms the basis of Arendt’s understanding of politics and her
account of political foundations.
To do so, the thesis begins with a discussion of Arendt’s concept of
‘action’, which forms the basis of her understanding of politics. One of the
most distinctive features of this is the importance of individual initiative,
understood as responsiveness to the already-given. This part of action is an
essential part of linking it harmoniously to those other elements of her work
which appear here.
Arendt’s work on ‘judgment’ is the focus of its own chapter; it is impor-
tant because judgment is Arendt’s conceptualisation of political discussion
modelled on opinion, which has previously been treated as a late-career de-
velopment, is here treated as consistent with and, essentially, an extension of,
certain features of action.
On the basis of this combined reading of action and judgment, it is possible
to read Arendt’s description of political foundations as an example of the same
kind of political activity. Contra Honig’s reading of the political foundation
as an opportunity for resistance, this thesis treats it as a political act which
invites the participation of later citizens.
Finally, an account of Arendt’s institutional thought is completed by
presenting her description of the ‘council system’ in combination with Thomas
Jefferson’s ‘ward system’. The two combine to form an example of political
organisation which both does without a reliance on sovereignty and maximises
opportunities for meaningful political engagement.Contents
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Introduction
This thesis is concerned with Arendt’s political theory, particularly her
institutional thought. In part, this is a matter of demonstrating the
basic continuity between Arendt’s concept of politics as ‘action’ and
her account of political institutions. It is also, therefore, an attempt to
show that Arendt’s work meets its own aims in a consistent manner.
Reconciling the two, or showing the latter to be the natural product
of the former, amounts to the same thing as demonstrating that Arendt’s
opposition to sovereignty does not amount to an opposition to stable
politics (which would, in any case, be self-defeating given her account
of politics). Her political thought combines, from The Human Condition
onwards, an interest in the possibility of individual human initiative
with a concern for the provision of a stable public realm. The former
may seem, at ﬁrst blush, to be a disruptive impulse at odds with
securing the latter.
Much of Arendt’s work, as it appears below, works towards showing
1Chapter 1. Introduction
that the two concerns are compatible; in doing so it also shows that
there is no need for an ultimate arbiter, a sovereign who stands insurer
against the possibility of a disorder which, Arendt’s work shows, is
hardly an inevitable result. The temptation to appeal to a sovereign is
not always an appeal to a particular ideal; in the case of the Declaration of
Independence, much of Arendt’s descriptive work rests on the importance
of avoiding any basis for legitimacy which is outside of the political
realm.
The chapter immediately after this one focuses on Arendt’s use of
the term ‘action’ as part of her effort to present politics in terms of
those characteristics of human experience which she holds political
philosophy to have either downplayed or neglected entirely. The reason
for this neglect, on her account, is that politics has often been treated in
terms analogous to ‘work’, to the construction of useful objects. Arendt
argues that this is the wrong basis on which to understand politics and,
through her discussion of different kinds of activity, provides ‘action’
as an alternative; this alternative informs her presentation of politics
without sovereignty.
It also makes it possible for Arendt to take other features of human
life to be contributory to an understanding of politics; foremost amongst
these is the temporal character of action, which recurs in the account of
political foundations. For any deed, it is the only through the responses
of others that the meaning is generated, that it becomes ‘action’ in the
fullest sense. The responses are not themselves determined by anything
but reﬂect instead the viewpoints and projects of other actors.
This last element will, as we shall see, be echoed in the development
of Arendt’s theory of judgment, which the third chapter introduces and
claims to be, fundamentally, continuous with her work on action. There
are two elements which lead from action to a discussion of the way
in which Arendt appropriates Kant on judgment: ﬁrst, that meaning
is generated after-the-fact; second, that this is constituted through the
responses of others. Arendt’s description of judgment contains both of
these possibilities, focusing as it does on the presentation of multiple
2opinions, each generated out of the differing viewpoints of the political
actors. These viewpoints are, by virtue of the effect they have on the
meaning and effects of any action, themselves forms of action. The
continued revisability of judgments is a necessary feature of continued
political activity; if there is a ﬁnal arbiter, then there is an end to the
political with regards to whichever event or person they are the ﬁnal
arbiter of. This has particular relevance to the discussion of foundations
as open-ended engagements which follows.
Chapter four expands upon the combined descriptions of action and
judgment to look at one particular political deed that Arendt engages
with at length: the American Declaration of Independence. Arendt takes
the creation of this document and its establishment as the foundational
moment of a new political order to be a supreme example of political
action. This example derives its importance from the mode in which
it is enacted; its authority is based, on Arendt’s reading, not on an
appeal to any ﬁnal arbiter outside of politics but on the faculty of action
itself, through the act of promising upon which it is based (and through
which it retains its authority).
Retention of authority for a political system is, insofar as it remains
a properly political system, contingent on it maintaining this same char-
acter of being an open-ended promise, one into which new members
are inducted on the understanding that the meaning of the promise is
as much in their hands as it is in the hands of other citizens, including
the founders themselves.
The ﬁnal part of this picture of a political system which renounces
sovereignty is the ‘council system’, presented in chapter ﬁve; the coun-
cils appear in On Revolution as an alternative to representative democ-
racy and party machinery.
Arendt combines this system of institutions, which has not received
much serious critical attention, with Jefferson’s theoretical plan for a
ward-based federal system. The two together indicate both Arendt’s
consistent commitment to a politics of this kind and those institutional
conditions which she thinks best support continued political engage-
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ment. What she presents in her use of these historical examples is a
ﬁne-grained federalism which does not involve an element of repre-
sentation; the more-general organisations to which ward-level councils
contribute members are formed not of agents dedicated to representing
views but those whose judgment is considered sound enough by the
ward-level organisations.
42
Arendt’s Phenomenology of the
Vita Activa
This chapter is concerned with the role of ‘action’ in Arendt’s work. The
aim is a full understanding both of what the concept signiﬁes and what
Arendt hopes to achieve by building it into her work. Her aim, I shall
argue, is to show that certain facts or qualities of human experience have
traditionally been neglected by political philosophy.1 These neglected
elements can be seen most clearly by comparing ‘labour’, ‘work’ and
‘action’, the three elements of the vita activa which appear together in
the The Human Condition. To that end, all three appear here.
Labour appears ﬁrst. It at ﬁrst appears to be concerned with the
production of the means of survival but Arendt has in mind something
more speciﬁc; in her description, production is joined by the act of
1Arendt objects to being referred to as a ‘philosopher’, rather than a ‘political
theorist’, at the beginning to an interview, on these grounds (Arendt: 1994c, p.2).
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consumption and the two feed into one another to form an endless
circle. Labour is like action in that neither, of itself, results in anything
permanent being created. Unlike action, however, labour does not
reveal anything of signiﬁcance about the agent who undertakes it.
Unlike labour, work does produce lasting objects, which have deﬁ-
nite uses. Our description of work (and the objects it produces) focuses
on the way in which it provides a stable referential structure between
persons by virtue of the roles and relations it makes available. Work is
unlike action because of this same feature: the purposes of use objects
do not, of themselves, admit much to be known about the users of
those objects.
Action here takes up three sections. The ﬁrst is concerned with
the ‘precondition’ of action, ‘plurality’, which is that distinguishable
human beings exist and that the distinctness of each is in principle
knowable. The second section on action addresses two qualities of it
(both of which stem from Arendt’s description of plurality): ﬁrst, that
action is necessarily dependent on the existence of others; second, that
the individuality humans are capable of is realised through spontaneity.
This second quality is the one which gives us some cause for concern; if
spontaneity is emphasised, there is a risk of Arendt seeming to celebrate
unruliness, an interpretation which would be hard to reconcile with
any concern with continuity of institutions.
Finally, the ‘products’ of action are presented: the disclosure of both
the agent and of the common world. The two work in tandem; what
action is ‘about’ is both at once.
Once the three elements of the vita activa are in place, two questions
remain to be settled. The ﬁrst is that of the theoretical nature of the
distinction, i.e. what exactly it is meant to signify that Arendt has
presented us with three separable ways to describe human activities.
The second is that of Arendt’s aim in presenting these distinctions, i.e.
a question of what is at stake if we think of politics one way or the
other.
To the ﬁrst question, we provide the following answer: Arendt’s
62.1. Labour
work is essentially one of phenomenology, which seeks to expose
neglected qualities of certain kinds of human activity. The distinction
she makes is not meant to be read as a taxonomic division of human
acts; instead, it is a call, as shall be shown below, to pay more attention
to certain elements of experience.2
The second is settled by following Arendt’s genealogy of the con-
ceptualisation of human activities, brieﬂy taking in the dangers she
ascribes to each of the ways in each mis-conceptualisation has taken
place; what is at stake is not just the description of practices but the
way in which that description forms a part of our practices, thereby
directing them.
Finally, a political institution is presented: the Athenian polis. Arendt
is sometimes taken to be in agreement with this way of organising
politics. With the aid of Tsao (2002), we look to the problems of the
polis and, crucially, show that they stem from features which Arendt
does not admire. (More will be said about the need to separate Arendt
and polis at the close of this chapter.)
2.1 Labour
‘Labour’ is the term by which Arendt indicates activities which have
the aim of preserving biological life; these activities share several char-
acteristics, each determined by this aim of serving those ‘natural’ needs
which are inescapable until “the death of [an] organism” (Arendt: 1998,
p.98).
The products of labouring activities—food the primary example—
are consumed, therefore destroyed, when used;
Their consumption barely survives the act of their produc-
tion...[a]fter a brief stay in the world, they return into the
natural process which yielded them either through absorp-
2In part this is a question of coming to value ‘certain elements of human experience’,
those captured together under the rubric of action.
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tion into the life process of the human animal or through
decay (Arendt: 1998, p.96).
The ephemeral products of labour need constantly to be produced
anew in order to continue sating demand; for this reason, the need for
production is constant, in line with the inescapability of the demands
themselves. This repetition further colours the temporal quality of
labour, which Arendt describes as ‘cyclical’, oscillating between pro-
duction and consumption “in accord with the ever recurrent cyclical
movement of nature” (Arendt: 1998, p.96). Being cyclical, the process is
endless, with no distinguishable beginning or end, either in the sense
of coming to a stop or in the sense of aiming towards any goal (Arendt:
1998, p.98); there is some sense that, for Arendt, these two senses of
‘endless’ are equivalent.3
The two ‘poles’ of this movement, ‘production’ and ‘consumption’,
feed into and enable each other;
This cycle needs to be sustained through consumption and
the activity which provides the means of consumption is
labour. Whatever labour produces is meant to be fed into
the human life process almost immediately, and this con-
sumption, regenerating the life process, produces—or rather,
reproduces—new “labour power”, needed for the further
sustenance of the body (Arendt: 1998, p.99).
As labour and consumption form a loop, neither is really primary;
there is, as Arendt goes on to say, the possibility of one wastefully
outstripping the other (Arendt: 1998, p.122).
Arendt’s characterisation of the ‘natural’ as a self-sustaining process—
including labour processes—treats parts of it as indistinguishable, un-
intelligible, parts of the whole cyclical process. In this context, the
3That this sounds horriﬁc is part of the point. See Pitkin (1998, pp.3–4); Pitkin has
compiled a paragraph’s worth of adjectives which Arendt attaches to her idea of ‘the
social’. The rise in importance of ‘the social’, understood as an action-less state of
conformism (Arendt: 1998, p.40), is eventually linked by Arendt to the ‘species life’
which is the concern of labour (Arendt: 1998, p.321).
82.2. Work
species-life replaces that of the individual organism as the discernible
object; “[in nature, there is] nothing but changeless eternal recurrence,
the deathless everlastingness of the human as of all other animal species”
(Arendt: 1998, p.97).4
Arendt holds that it is only via human intervention, which treats
“this tree or this dog, as individual things”, that a part of the natural
cycle can become a separable object rather than a process-component
(Arendt: 1998, p.98). The same applies, in so far as they are just
labourers, to human beings, who are fundamentally indistinguishable
in respect both to the need for labour’s products and the (essentially
skill-les) non-specialist role in securing them (Arendt: 1998, p.123). It
is not only the case that natural needs fail to differentiate one person
from another; the business of fulﬁlling those needs will not do the job
either. Considered only as animal laborans, humans neither create stable
objects nor become distinguishable agents.
2.2 Work
On Arendt’s view, labour’s cycle of production and consumption, with
its constant movement and lack of identiﬁable goal, is a “predicament
of imprisonment” which stands in need of remedy against its imper-
manence; this is the relationship of labour to work: the latter “redeems”
the former by “erect[ing] a world of durability” (Arendt: 1998, p.236).5
4The word ‘life’ appears in two opposed senses in The Human Condition. One is
that which appears here, which refers to ‘biological life’, in which regard any member
of the species is as good as any other. The other use of ‘life’ is in the sense of ‘life
story’ (Arendt: 1998, p.184) which appears below, p.27ff. The two senses, Arendt
holds, have entirely different relations to time; biological life is the “life cycle” of
endless movement (Arendt: 1998, p.96), described in this section. The most curious
element of Arendt’s contrast here is that she speciﬁcally mentions “birth and death”
as events which require “a world which is not in constant movement”, that is, one
which has the permanence resultant from human artiﬁce; with such an artiﬁce in
place, birth and death become the opposite ends of a life lived as a “strictly linear
movement” (Arendt: 1998, p.97). Though, as Arendt says, these remain natural events,
their meaning and distinctness comes only from the human element.
5The same redemptive relation repeats work and action but in that case, it is work
which is in need of redemption (Arendt: 1998, p.236).
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In order to ‘redeem’ the efforts of labour, work must operate accord-
ing to different logics and purposes; the products and experiences of
work are both to be different in kind from those of labour. The focus of
work is the kind of product which results from it; for this reason, the
products of work are the initial focus of this section.
‘Use’ takes the place of ‘consumption’ for the objects of work as
opposed to labour’; these are objects which are not destroyed in their
proper use (Arendt: 1998, p.136).
This, in turn, determines the way in which the worker relates to the
process of creation (and the subsequent use of his products). Unlike
the labourer, the workman has, for any given project, an end in sight
from the moment at which construction begins; in fact, it is only with
the workman and not the labourer that such an end can be supposed.
The end is the entire point of the work, determining it from the very
beginning; the work begins with either a physical model of the thing
to be created, or “an image beheld by the mind’s eye” of the same
(Arendt: 1998, p.140). In this sense, the end of the work, in the sense of
its coming to completion, is the telos established for it at the moment at
which the blueprints of the object have been drawn up. It is fulﬁlled
at the moment at which that particular object has been constructed
(Arendt: 1998, p.143). At that point, the blueprint is realised and there
is no further necessary change to the now-assembled essence of the
thing.
Both labour and work involve the creation of purposive things;
the hammer no less than the meal “immediately becomes [a] means
again”, a claim Arendt makes with reference only to the latter, as
part of an attempt to distinguish the two kinds of product. Whilst
this is obviously the case, each relates differently to the means which
they become; the consumable cannot, as Arendt tells us, sit around,
whereas the work-made object need not immediately become a means.
This potential separation justiﬁes, or at least goes some way towards
justifying, Arendt’s claim that the end of the work is realised fully
at the moment of its creation, something which is not true for things
resultant of labour (Arendt: 1998, p.143).
102.2. Work
As work-objects are not consumables, they can be accumulated to
provide a stable set of worldly objects. This accumulation of things
provides a stable set of common referents which, in total constitute
a man-made world (Arendt: 1998, p.134). By virtue of their perma-
nence, the products of craftsmen become part of the constitution of the
world in which men ﬁnd themselves, becoming independent of their
initial creator (and for that matter, original user), thereby obtaining an
“objective” character (Arendt: 1998, p.137).
The stability of the products of work, in contrast with the imperma-
nence of labour’s products, allows it to make a signiﬁcant contribution
to the creation of a human world; “the world, the man-made home
erected on earth and made of the material which earthly nature delivers
into human hands, consists not of things that are consumed but of
things that are used” (Arendt: 1998, p.135).6 The permanence of the
objects work produces allows them to “have the function of stabilising
human life” (Arendt: 1998, p.137), by providing the stable ‘objective’
reference-points which labour (or the merely animal life) cannot.
The key quality of work’s efforts in relation to the construction
of a world is the way in which it comes to ﬁx things into a certain
order; in explicit opposition to nature, it forces things to conform to
their purpose and, for the sake of repeatability, makes them do so
consistently.
The permanence of the work-objects, taken en mass, provide stability
in this way, providing reliable markers for navigation of the shared
world. This does not exhaustively characterise the way in which work-
objects can function this way, for the following reason. Not any old
long-lasting thing will do the job; the speciﬁcally man-made objects are
needed because even long-lasting natural features will not do. If things
like mountains were able to provide permanence, there would be no
pressing need for work’s products to provide points of reference (or
6This is taken from the very end of the chapter on labour. Two pages later, at
the very beginning of the ‘work’ chapter, the products of work “are mostly, but not
exclusively, objects for use” (Arendt: 1998, p.136). The non-use work object, although
Arendt does not mention it explicitly until forty-one pages later, is the work of art
(Arendt: 1998, p.167).
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such an emphasis on the different capabilities of labour and work in
relation to stability).
Along similar lines, it seems obvious that not just any accumulation
of manufactured objects could do the job; for someone who—somehow,
implausibly—had literally no understanding of a given object’s pur-
poses, that particular object could provide no stable referent at all. (It
would, to the mind for which it was not a purpose-related object, be
exactly like any natural thing encountered; to them, it would be an
opportunity to take something previously unknown and make it ﬁt for
a new set of purposes.)7
Understanding any object necessarily involves understanding the
network of relations of which it forms a part, as in Benhabib’s descrip-
tion;
when we visit ancient buildings, monuments, and cities, we
try to immerse ourselves in the world of those who have
lived in these buildings, who have carried out their activities
in them...To understand the world these past generations
have inhabited means learning the referential contexts, the
patterns of everyday use, the what and wherefore of their
activities. (Benhabib: 2003, p.108).
Coming to understand this context of use will at at the same time give
some familiarity with the users, or their daily habits and uses for the
objects at least. What understanding can be gleaned from the ancient
objects—except perhaps, for certain kinds of monument–of Benhabib’s
description cannot go much beyond this kind of knowledge. For now,
we will concentrate on the ‘positive’ claim, i.e. that knowledge of people
which can be gleaned from objects, including the relationship between
agent and object which this knowledge derives from. This will establish
what it is that work’s objects do when they contribute to a stable human
world.8
7It’s difﬁcult even to conceive of an object in these terms as being an object at all;
it is as though it has somehow dropped back into nature.
8In so far as the worker’s own role in the object is spent when construction is
122.2. Work
The stability of the work-world, in so far as it is the stability of the
world rather than the mere duration of things, is the stability of the
relations which these things are capable of sustaining: the relationship
of users of particular things to the things themselves, to each other as
fellow users and, ﬁnally, to the whole network of related trades and
uses.
Relations mediated through objects (and purposes) this way have a
particular character, as evidenced through the link, above, to ‘associated
uses’. Separation is another issue; it might seem as though any natural
object can perform this function just as well by physically occupying
a space. However, there is also the metaphorical sense of ‘separation’,
that which is a feature of object-related roles: inhabiting one role means
not inhabiting certain other roles.
The role-constitutive capacity of objects is good for the creation of
a stable world in so far as it differentiates individuals into particular
roles and thereby is able to create relations between them mediated
through the objects.
This mediation enables particular forms of interaction with world
and other but does so only because the forms of interaction are partic-
ular and circumscribed. Within this horizon, as Taminaux points out,
the options are quite limited;
the productive activity, or poiesis, is ruled by predictability as
a result of its very univocaity...the agent of the productive
activity is not required to reveal himself in his most singular
aspects, but only as exhibiting general skills. Therefore,
he is someone, but someone that anyone else might be,
someone not unique. He is one exemplar of a kind that
can be repeated...In short, poiesis prevents individualisation
(Taminiaux: 1991, p.113).
In so far as we only wish to consider human beings as examples of
complete, this is true enough. However, the work must, in any conceivable instance,
be undertaken with the ﬁnal usage of the object in mind, be it the construction of
everyday tools or of buildings.
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particular skill sets, or as users of created things, work is sufﬁcient.
What can be revealed about the agent who works? Only the skills
related to a task, which is to say that only the ability to adhere to the
pre-existing is exercised. Arendt refers to skills talents of this sort as
elements of ‘what’, rather than ‘who’, one is (Arendt: 1998, p.181). The
question of ‘who’ is the domain of action rather than work; in it the
individual is revealed (see below, section 2.5). With only work-relations
to guide them, the human being is ‘over-determined’, almost entirely
lacking in interpretive leeway.
2.3 Action 1: Plurality
The last element of the vita activa, which is the most important for any
discussion of Arendt as political theorist, is ‘action’, the description
of which is meant to show that there is an element to human exis-
tence other than the technical accomplishments of the craftsman or the
continuation of mere life.
This ﬁnal element of the vita activa is the subject of this section and
the two which follow it. It receives the most attention because it is the
most important of the three for what follows later in this thesis, on the
nature of political institutions. The description of it is divided along
the following lines: here, the ‘precondition’ of action, ‘plurality’, will
be detailed; in the next section, this is built upon with an account of
the ‘spontaneity’ of the actor and their interaction with others; ﬁnally,
the results of action appear, which are the combined disclosure of the
agent’s self and the world.
More so than for either labour or work, an explanation is needed
of the relevant ‘precondition’, i.e. what it is that makes activities of
that kind possible. This is how Arendt introduces the precondition of
action, ‘plurality’;
Action, the only activity that goes on directly between men
without the intermediary of things or matter, corresponds
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to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men,
not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world. While
all aspects of the human condition are somehow related to
politics, this plurality is speciﬁcally the condition...of all
political life (Arendt: 1998, p.7).9
By ‘plurality’, Arendt means something other than the kind of dis-
tinctness achieved, as above, in work roles, which are always such
that anyone, skill permitting, could ﬁll them. Roles of this sort are
also, vitally, ones which come with goals prescribed—they could not
function otherwise—whereas the kind of distinction of the kind here at
issue includes a goal-constitutive element.
‘Plurality’ consists of “the twofold character of equality and dis-
tinction” (Arendt: 1998, p.175), making its expression incompatible
with both the unequal relations necessary for work and the inherent
conformism of mass society. It will, perhaps, be no surprise that Arendt
has something very particular in mind for both of these terms.
‘Equality’ takes one, very minimal, meaning when it is ﬁrst intro-
duced: it is merely the condition which makes mutual understanding
possible (Arendt: 1998, p.175). Later, for the purposes of a public
realm, it has shifted to an artiﬁcially-created “equality of unequals who
stand in need of being “equalised” in certain respects and for speciﬁc
purposes” (Arendt: 1998, p.215).10
It is this latter meaning, rather than the minimal one, which ren-
9Note also that this, the ﬁrst occurrence of ‘action’ in The Human Condition, imme-
diately links action and politics.
10Kateb makes the following link between ‘equality’ and ‘rulership’;
“As for the egalitarian notion of human plurality, Arendt invokes the
Greek term isonomy and reads it to mean not equality of condition but a
condition that makes men equal. It is a condition of “no-rule”” (Kateb:
1983, p.15)
This link is obviously correct. For our purposes, what is interesting about the
relationship between rulership and Arendt’s concept of politics is the link between
‘initiative’ and rule. The step missing from these few lines from Kateb is that the
relationship of equality means that the notion of rule is to be left out of politics on
Arendt’s account.
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ders a public realm incompatible with relationships structured around
command.11
As for ‘distinction’: Arendt’s claim is that the human being is the
only kind of thing which, in addition to communicating basic needs,
can “communicate himself and not merely something” (Arendt: 1998,
p.176). It is only through “speech and action” that this communication
of ‘who’ one is can be possible; “they are the modes in which human
beings appear to each other, not indeed as physical objects, but qua
men” (Arendt: 1998, p.176). One important element of this, addressed
in more detail below (section 2.4), is the sense in which human agents
are autonomous, capable of initiatives of their own.
2.4 Action 2: Context and Initiative
Plurality leads to two particular qualities of human interaction which
would not be found if persons were limited to biological functions, or
even if they had in addition to those only the rote tasks of work. These
are, ﬁrst, the ‘web of relations’ composed of the unique individuals
with whom an actor interacts and, second, the capacity for initiative on
the basis of which the actor’s distinctness—and therefore, the web of
relations—can be formed.
Action adds, because of the ways in which actors respond to one
another, a non-objective element to the world: the “web of relations”,
a “subjective in-between which is not tangible” and grows only out of
“acting and speaking” (Arendt: 1998, p.183).12
11We might push the stronger claim that the ﬁrst sense is also incompatible with
these relationships even as it enables them because the treatment of the subordinate in
fact removes their capacity to direct themselves. This would certainly be compatible
with Arendt’s understanding, as it captures something like her claim that life without
action would not be a properly human one (Arendt: 1998, p.176).
12This kind of inter-relation is not supposed by Arendt to be entirely divorced
from the “physical, worldly in-between”; it grows in part out of this, for all human
intercourse is supposed to contain as an, “integral part”, some element of disclosure
(Arendt: 1998, p.182). As regards the ‘amount’ of disclosure generated by each of the
three different kinds of activity, it is easiest to treat them as occupying a sliding-scale
162.4. Action 2: Context and Initiative
As Arendt refers to one’s insertion in the web of relations as being
like a ‘second birth’ (Arendt: 1998, p.176), Benhabib takes the very
reasonable step of explaining the relationship between this ‘second
birth’ and the web of relations by reference to literal birth. In the case
of a actual birth, “even before the child is born, members of its family
construct a “web” of stories and relationships into which it will be
inserted” (Benhabib: 2003, p.112). As well as the actual relations (in the
sense of relatives), this includes the expectations held for the newborn;
“We all begin life inserted into narratives, stories, and web that were
spun before us” (Benhabib: 2003, p.113).13
One element of this web is that it provides the necessary context
into which one can act; this is a corollary of the dependence of the
actor on others. It does so by providing a set of pre-existing identiﬁable
persons (and relationships between them) to act into.14 As this context
is provided by other (potential) actors, each of whom is as free as
any other in the way they respond to action, action takes on a certain
unpredictability;
with labour obviously revealing the list. It might also plausibly be thought that the
deﬁciency of, for example, labour is not merely that it is minimally-disclosing but
speciﬁcally that it does not expose the incapacities of an agent. There is also, of
course, the risk that it conditions the labourer themselves. This grows into another
set of relations, a “second, subjective in-between [which] is not tangible, since there
are no tangible objects into which it could solidify” (Arendt: 1998, p.183). This is the
‘web of human relations’ and it forms a sort of excess to relations based purely on
intermediary things with pre-determined uses. If this web is spun out of essentially
every interaction (to greater or lesser degree), then Arendt must hold something like
the view that it is either not possible or at least exceedingly difﬁcult for an agent
to adhere exactly to such usage-based roles without an excess consisting of their
own ‘personal’ approach to them. She in fact regards this disclosing side-effect as
inevitable, eliminable only at the cost of “transform[ing] men into something they
are not” (Arendt: 1998, p.183). (Given the context of this comment as part of a
disagreement with ‘materialism’, I suspect the transformation in question to be into
some kind of automata.)
13More on this below, p.27.
14This includes the dead as well as the living; their “deeds and words” live on
after them (Arendt: 1987, p.40) by virtue of the interconnectedness of even those
persons who are not directly acquainted with one another. To suppose otherwise
would involve some very odd claims about the way in which past actors could ﬁgure
in the lives of the living, claims which would make the transmission of historical
accounts either impossible or entirely void of affective qualities.
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The disclosure of the “who” through speech, and the set-
ting of a new beginning through action, always fall into an
already existing web where their immediate consequences
can be felt...It is because of this already existing web of
human relationships, with its innumerable, conﬂicting wills
and intentions, that action almost never achieves its purpose
(Arendt: 1998, p.184).
This unpredictability is the result of the equality of people, each of
whom has the same capacity for action; no actor could fully predict any
other unless they could also control them.
The dependence of the actor on the web, then, is true in two senses:
ﬁrst, it provides a backdrop against which new action is possible;
second, the existence of any relationships at all guarantees witnesses
and potential respondents (the character of whom will be coloured by
just what forms the relationships take).15 These actors are together
responsible for constructing the story which is central to the actor’s
identity; there is no human-independent ‘objective’ standpoint available
for this.
This proliferation of independent perspectives in turn relates to
another feature of action which distinguishes it: the spontaneity of
the actor, the capacity to initiate something new (Arendt: 1998, p.177).
This capacity is central to Arendt’s concept of action; “To act, in its
most general sense, means to take an initiative, to begin” (Arendt:
1998, p.177). The kind of beginning which Arendt means by this has a
distinctive character to it;
This character of startling unexpectedness16 is inherent of
all new beginnings...The new always happens against the
overwhelming odds of statistical laws and their probabil-
ity...The fact that man is capable of action means that the
15This will be laid out more fully in the next chapter, on judgment.
16This is one of the features which sets this kind of beginning apart from that of
a craft project; there is, barring misfortunes, nothing terribly startling involved in
making.
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unexpected can be expected from him, that he is able to
perform what is inﬁnitely improbable (Arendt: 1998, p.178).
This quality of action is what makes revolutions possible; it is also
what makes the distinction of actors possible. Both of these possibilities
rest on the capacity for the new to which ‘initiative’ refers. The same
capacity for new beginnings, when contrasted in this way with the
regularity of the natural, has a certain ‘interruptive’ quality to it.
This ‘interruptive’ quality is not limited to the description of action
found in The Human Condition. Arendt’s essay “What is Freedom?”
contains a very similar description, including a comparison to miracles
(Arendt: 1993f, p.169).17 There, the process of history is presented
alongside the processes of nature as something to be overturned by
action; “Once man-made, historical processes have become automatic,
they are no less ruinous than the natural life process” (Arendt: 1993f,
p.168). We can add a third item to the list of patterns action may
disrupt: “society”, which requires of its members that they conform to
predictable behaviour (Arendt: 1998, p.40).
Though Arendt does not always resort to a comparison between
miracles and action, the language in which action is described does
not stray far from a comparison between the predictable regularity
of natural laws and the potential for something unforeseen to break
in against them. One example is Arendt’s conference presentation,
“Labour, Work, Action”; “What man inserts with word and deed into
the company of his own kind is uniqueness...[which] is unconditioned”
(Arendt: 1987, p.39).
This idea of spontaneity, particularly the references to the ‘miracu-
lous’, leads to a seeming, if not actual, problem: understood only this
way, action is an explosively disruptive element which is detrimental
to—perhaps incompatible with—any kind of stability.18 On this read-
17Markell (2010b, p.66) uses this as example of this descriptive habit.
18It’s also hard to reconcile this with the existence of a stable set of relationships;
This is supported, perhaps, by Arendt’s claim that action is capable of creating new
relationships; “[it] always establishes relationships and therefore has an inherent
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ing, the initiative which actors are capable of becomes something to be
managed and controlled rather than enabled (which makes Arendt’s
project into a vindication of precisely that understanding of politics
which she argues against by distinguishing action from work).
Is this, in fact, the best way to treat action, particularly the contrast
between action’s spontaneity and work’s rigid stability? If it is, then
action is something to be contained and managed but this does not
ﬁt with Arendt’s attempt to re-conceptualise politics as action, which
is hardly written as if a warning against a looming and un-noticed
danger.19 Nor would it even seem as though such a warning would be
worth sounding given this passage;
Yet while the various limitations and boundaries we ﬁnd in
every body politic may offer some protection against the in-
herent boundlessness of action, they are altogether helpless
to offset its second outstanding character: its unpredictabil-
ity (Arendt: 1998, p.191).
Admittedly, the ‘boundlessness’ of action may—perhaps, should—be
mitigated by political institutions;20 this only amounts to the claim that
any one particular actor ought not to be able to reach everyone. This is
as much a function of the other actors as it is the institutions they ﬁnd
themselves in; one sense in which action is constrained by the web of
relations must be the capacity to thwart others. To believe otherwise,
one would have to believe either that the institutions themselves would
somehow automatically check action without further effort, or that
tendency to force open all limitations and cut across all boundaries” (Arendt: 1998,
p.190). If these new relations are to mean anything, they must be generated at the cost
of whatever was pre-established. Political revolutions which overthrow previously-
existing orders seem the paragon example of just such a change in relationships. This
is the business of chapter 5. An attempt to deal with the ‘problem’ of initiative is the
root cause of the problems of the polis; see below, section 2.8.
19The notable exception to this is Arendt’s claim that “Modern natural science and
technology...seem actually to act into [nature, therefore] have carried irreversibility
and human unpredictability into the natural realm, where no remedy can be found to
undo what has been done” (Arendt: 1998, p.238).
20For a contrast between Arendt and an ‘agonic’ view of politics which celebrates
just the potential disruption of action, see Villa (1999a, p.119).
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action was an irresistible danger. Neither of these thoughts seems like
a good ﬁt for Arendt’s work and we must look to a different, more
plausible, reading of ‘initiative’ to avoid them.21
This reading is provided by Markell (2010b); this paper appears
three times in this chapter. Here, it appears as a means of illuminating
the reading of ‘beginning’ which makes most sense within Arendt’s
work. In section 2.6, it contributes, more brieﬂy, to the discussion of
the vita activa’s internal division (though (Markell: 2010a) has more
to add there). Finally, it appears below (in section 2.7) in relation to
the motivations for Arendt’s project because the way in which Markell
describes action-as-beginning goes against one of the views of politics
which Arendt argues against.
How, then, is the initiatory element of action to be understood?
Markell claims that treating it “as the power to break with a series,
change direction, or act differently” is incompatible with some of
Arendt’s own characterisations of action (Markell: 2010b, p.67). He
turns to a description of the role of historian22 which appears in
Arendt’s “Understanding and Politics”, which we repeat here in slightly
abbreviated form;
our worst fears and best hopes will never adequately pre-
pare us for what actually happens - because the moment
even a foreseen even takes place, everything changes
...each event in human history reveals an unexpected land-
scape of human deeds, sufferings,23 and new possibili-
ties...It is the task of the historian to detect this unexpected
21In part, this is a question of consistency; the idea of initiative as a rupturing
event, undetermined by any prior events sounds like—may in fact depend on—an
idea of free will as undetermined by any worldly fact. This is a view which Arendt
dismisses; in its place, she presents an idea of ‘freedom’ as synonymous with public
participation, presenting this as the original meaning of the term (Arendt: 1993f, p.14).
22When we ourselves turn to the account Arendt gives of the way in which the
American Revolutionaries invoked their own continuity with their colonial history,
we see this understanding implicit within that account. See below, p.156.
23This combination of ‘doing’ and ‘suffering’ echoes that of Arendt (1998); “To do
and to suffer are like opposite sides of the same coin, and the story that an act starts
is composed of its consequent deeds and sufferings” (p.190).
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new with all its implications in any given period and to bring
out the full power of its signiﬁcance (Arendt (my ellipses
1994b, p.320), quoted in Markell (2010b, p.67)).
As Markell notes, this passage is incompatible with thinking about the
question of ‘unexpectedness’, or of a beginning, in terms of “cause and
effect”; instead “something changes in a different register” (Markell:
2010b, p.70). This ‘register’ is the one in which we respond—or at least,
in which we can respond—to our experiences as something other than
“caused states of affairs”; instead, we can experience the actions of others
as “meaningful events, features of a world” and, most importantly,
“occasions for response” (Markell: 2010b, p.70).
This last is the most interesting element of Markell’s reading, one
worth dwelling on; it leads to an understanding of action in which
the actor is dependent upon the responses of others, something which
features in the account given of ‘self-disclosure’ which is laid out in
the section which follows this one. It also points towards the temporal
structure of action; “what lends [a beginning] its eruptivenss...[is] our
attunement to its character as an irrevocable event, which also means
as an occasion for response” (Markell: 2010b, p.75). This places the
signiﬁcance of any deed solidly after it has been completed (perhaps
very far after), rather than before; action is, in essence, something which
happens by looking backwards. The sense in which this ‘happens’
includes determining whether what has been done constitutes a new
beginning or not;
There is no way to undo what has been done, no way not
to suffer it—but you can do more than merely suffer it: You
can take it as your point of departure. You can, in short,
begin. Taking these two points together: what makes an
act an instance of beginning? That, against its background,
someone begins. What makes that a beginning? That it
becomes an occasion to begin—and so on (Markell: 2010b,
p.75).
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On Markell’s reading, this makes the pre-act intentions and attitudes
out of the picture of determining whether a given act is ‘action’ in any
sense (Markell: 2010b, p.76). This ﬁts very well with Arendt’s repeated
emphasis that the meaning-generative element of human interaction
lies in the consequences. This is something we revisit below; see p.27ff.
But, in one sense at least, Markell’s reading goes beyond this claim to
add that Arendt’s discussion of ‘unpredictability’ “also applies to the
very status of action as action” (Markell’s emphasis removed Markell:
2010b, p.76). Finally, this builds to what may by now be obvious: it is a
“public matter” which acts should count as beginnings; i.e. it is only the
participants themselves who can determine which acts are instances of
action. This last claim, which is surely right, reappears below as part of
our discussion of the nature of Arendt’s labour-work-action distinction
and so will be treated in more detail there; see section 2.6.
Does this reading ﬁt with the web of relations any better than if
‘beginning’ is read as an ‘eruptive event’? It does; for one thing, it ﬁts
well with much of what Arendt says about the ‘aftermath’ of action
in The Human Condition, both in terms of its reach and the ease of
predicting it.
In one passage, Arendt directly refuses to treat the unpredictability
of action’s consequences as merely a product of there being several
persons involved (Arendt: 1998, p.190). Even if one were to act in a more
limited grouping, she claims, this would not make things any easier to
predict; “the smallest act in the most limited circumstances bears the
seed of the same boundlessness...sometimes [even] one word” (Arendt:
1998, p.190).24 This only really makes sense if the respondents are seen
as able to respond in a way which reﬂects their own understanding (or
‘point of view’), an understanding which can only become apparent
as a consequence of their response.25 When Arendt declares that the
24Arendt muddies the waters here, with this claim: “‘action and reaction among
men never move in a closed circle and can never be reliably conﬁned to two partners”
(Arendt: 1998, p.190). This suggests what she almost immediately denies: that it is a
matter of the number of persons involved which makes consequences unpredictable.
25This is at least as true of the respondent’s self-understanding as it is of the
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unpredictability of action is “not simply a question of inability to
foretell all the logical consequences of a particular act, as which case
an electronic computer would be able to tell the future” (Arendt: 1998,
p.191), this points to the same understanding; humans need not be in
any sense radically free of causality in order for this to be true of them.
The contrast is between that on the one hand and the innumerable
consequences which become weaved into a life story by virtue of inter-
actor interaction on the other (Arendt: 1998, p.192).
The relationship between web of relations and newcomer can also
be seen by returning to Benhabib, to her use of birth to explain the
insertion of the new into the world. Returning to this shows that
Arendt’s point about the insertion of the newcomer into the world, as
with the insertion of the newborn, is really not such an extra-ordinary
claim at all.26
Recall that Benhabib’s description included the expectations that
parents (or others) have for the life of that newborn; “The mother may
want a son who will become the great pianist she missed becoming [,
or the father] may want a daughter who will care for him in his old
age” (Benhabib: 2003, pp.112–113). The wishes of the child, once it
has reached maturity, may very well fail to correspond to the stated
wishes of the parent.27 Perhaps it is even a truism that, should a
child choose some other path, it will be from those others which are
understanding any other may have of them; this is clearly part of Arendt’s view of
action (Arendt: 1998, p.179).
26The account, below, of what we may take to be the aim of Arendt’s work rest in
part on intuitions of this sort.
27Even in the case in which the child and parent concur on the matter, there is some
question as to just what counts as fulﬁlling such a plan. In the case of the pianist, this
is particularly obvious; the mother’s wish cannot be that the child become the exact
pianist she herself did not become, for that would be an almost meaningless wish.
Rather, she might wish for the child to be an accomplished pianist; this would be
perfectly compatible with that child—for reasons either of taste or skill—becoming
accomplished in musical directions which mother would not herself have pursued.
Unless the mother is especially doctrinaire about music, it will not be possible to
specify fully what it would mean for the child to live the life the mother would wish
for them; this is an exact parallel of the claim made about promising below, in section
4.2.
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available within—and conditioned by—the social and cultural context
to which they belong, rather than something entirely unimaginable
prior to their having chosen it. It is the fact of their having chosen
(or fallen into) particular ways of living that can be surprising, or
even unpredictable, rather than the sheer fact that a certain form of
life should be possible. In either conformity to or rebellion against a
parent’s wishes, the existing possibilities constrain and enable certain
alternatives (indeed, even in the case of rebellion, it may well be that the
parent provided this alternative themselves, almost as if by accident).
2.5 Action 3: World- and Self-Disclosure
There are two inter-linked results of action, of ‘deeds and speech’:
one is the disclosure of the acting person, the other the disclosure of
the world.28 The two are necessarily connected in Arendt’s work; the
description of the world, or of how it appears, is at the same time the
expression of how it appears to the particular person who speaks and
acts.29 If only the ‘objective’ element mattered, if it were only a matter
of reporting the facts of the matter, there would be no place for the
element of action which could “answer to the question asked of every
newcomer: “Who are you?”” (Arendt: 1998, p.178). For there to be
a question, there must be some other person who can ask it of the
‘newcomer’; this suggests some need for proof of a self through deeds.
It is via Arendt’s description of ‘the public’ that self and world are
linked. That something is publicly-perceptible is, for Arendt, constitu-
tive of its reality;
28This revelatory element is, as suggested above, also present in activities which
are primarily concerned with the creation of objects, or even maintenance, so long
as the agent is free in adopting whichever tasks they engage in; these happen to be
fairly limited revelations of character, leading only to knowledge of the agent’s choice
amongst non-novel ends and their competence in recognised skills.
29The focus on this element of action is, in part, an attempt to show its essential
continuity with the account of judgment which arises in Arendt’s later works. There
too, what appears is not just ‘the world’ but ‘the world as it appears to a particular
person’.
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For us, appearance—something that is being seen and heard
by others as well as by ourselves—constitutes reality. Com-
pared with the reality that comes of being seen and heard,
even the greatest forces of intimate life—the passions of
the heart...—lead an uncertain, shadowy kind of existence
unless and until they are transformed, deprivatized...into a
shape to ﬁt them for public appearance...The presence of
others who see what we see...assures us of the reality of
the world and ourselves (Arendt: 1998, p.50).30
What counts, then, towards the reality of the self is what can be ex-
pressed to others. The same is true of the world itself; “[t]he only
character of the world by which to gauge it is its being common to all”
(Arendt: 1998, p.208).31 Arendt places this sense of common experi-
ence as the epistemological basis for conﬁdence in sense-data; without
it, Arendt holds we could not be sure that sense-data are not mere
“irritations of the nerves” (Arendt: 1998, p.209).
A similar manoeuvre underlies the relationship between what one
feels and what one expresses; what one thinks and feels can be trans-
formed, either by art works or by discussion, thereby achieving “a
kind of reality” they would not have left if left unsaid (Arendt: 1998,
p.50).32 This is not a terribly high bar for transformation but it does
30There is a second sense in which Arendt uses the term ‘public’ in the same section;
in that case the word is used as a noun, equivalent to “the world” as the common
experience of “the fabrication of human hands, as well as to affairs which go on
among those who inhabit the man-made world together” (Arendt: 1998, p.52).
31The invocation of “common sense” which follows on the same page is a clear
precursor of Arendt’s appropriation of Kant on judgment. For this reason, much of
what will be said in chapter 3 can be read as pertaining to this passage in The Human
Condition.
32This section’s concern with the ‘revelatory’ element of action makes for a marked
contrast with the emphasis of the prior section. What comes to the fore here is the
communicative element; there is some risk of it sounding as though action consists
of an actor stating themselves out loud repeatedly, perhaps to a passive audience.
Speech certainly is an important element of action;
without the accompaniment of speech, at any rate, action would not
only lose its revelatory character, but, and by the same token, it would
lose its subject, as it were...Speechless action would no longer be action
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evidently alter the character of the feelings; what is expressed becomes,
in effect, an object of the shared world and, for that reason, subject to
the perspectives and reactions of those others to whom one appears.
What is made public therefore undergoes a further transformation:
in exchange for its greater reality or salience, it becomes something
which is determinable by a community of actors, rather than the origi-
nating individual alone. Whatever one chooses (or feels compelled) to
display need not be received in the same spirit as it is intended.33 This
leads us to the most salient feature of the self-disclosure which Arendt
describes, the feature by which the agent comes to depend on others:
the life story of any given actor is not made by that actor (Arendt: 1998,
p.184).
Although the life story of the actor is composed out of their deeds,
they do not themselves determine the meaning which comes to be
formed out of those deeds (Arendt: 1998, p.184).34 Because of this
quality, the story of a life—therefore, the self it discloses—is not formed
immediately but as the result of several deeds, considered in light of
one another;
The only “somebody” [a life story] reveals is its hero, and it
because there would no longer be an actor (Arendt: 1998, p.178).
Though speech is an important component, it is speech in conjunction with action
which appears relevant here; Arendt continues by linking it to the statement of an
actor’s intentions (Arendt: 1998, p.179). The alternative she offers is that of the “brute
deed” conducted which, lacking speech, does not become “relevant” until the actor
identiﬁes himself with his deed (Arendt: 1998, p.179).
33Arendt settles on pain as the most private of all experiences, claiming it “cannot
assume an appearance at all” (Arendt: 1998, p.51). This somehow does not seem
quite true; in spite of how one subjectively experiences particular pains, there must
be something communicable about them, or there would not be any words in the
language with which Arendt could claim that pain did not appear. It may be that all
expressions of pain necessarily leave the essence of it untouched but we can often
form a very good idea of what is meant when pains are described.
34It is not as though somebody other than the agent is the author of the life story;
“Somebody began it and is its subject...but nobody is its author” (emphasis added
Arendt: 1998, p.184). This is something more than the claim that one does not control
how’s ones own deeds are received; no-one else really has control over it either. This
lack of authorial voice is one of the points on which, as we shall see below, the polis
differs from Arendt’s own concept of action.
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is the only medium in which the originally intangible mani-
festation of a uniquely distinct “who” can become tangible
ex post facto35 through action and speech. Who somebody is
or was we can know only knowing the story of which he is
himself the hero—his biography, in other words; everything
else we know tells us only what he is or was (Arendt: 1998,
p.186).
The actor is not completely helpless in this process, of course; for this
to be the case, he would have to be entirely irrelevant to whatever
story was nominally about him. Kateb describes the relationship this
way: “There would be no stories without us. We are their matter”
and notes that attempts to deliberately live to a certain meaning are
doomed to failure (Kateb: 1983, p.14).36 (It might be more accurate to
say that such attempts are doomed not to have no meaning at all but
to have a meaning which is entirely unﬂattering.) This is, essentially, a
corollary of Arendt’s claim that the meaning of an act, or a whole life,
“can reveal itself only when it has ended” (Arendt: 1998, p.192); both
Kateb’s comment and Arendt’s point to the dependence of the actor on
other persons insofar as they make ‘meaning’ something generated in
response to—rather than in advance of—a deed.
Arendt refers to this process as ‘disclosure’—or as ‘manifestation’
in the passage taken as a block quote above—a term which does not ﬁt
well with the role of other actors in the constitution of a life story. These
terms carry the connotation of there being something ‘already there’
to be put on display; this passage suggests that ‘construction’ would
35That the actor’s efforts are described in these terms, with the meaning of them
apparent only after the act—perhaps only after several related acts—is what matches
action with judgment.
36Kateb includes a reference to a passage in Arendt’s “The Concept of History”
which attributes to Vico the view that the “contemplative, backward glance of the
historian” sees better what is realised through deeds than the actors involved are
capable of (Arendt: 1993b, p.77). In Arendt’s Vico (and Hegel, for that matter), this is
a claim that “higher aims” are realised without the actors’ knowing it, aims which
ultimately ‘make history’. In The Human Condition, Arendt presents the same claim
about the historian’s greater knowledge but does so in her own voice in that instance,
instead of presenting it as someone else’s view (Arendt: 1998, p.192).
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be a better term than ‘disclosure’, though this has the disadvantage
that it implies some manufacturer at work. Arendt’s own choice of ‘life
story’ here is far from perfect, for essentially the same reason: stories
have authors. This imperfection leads to Arendt making clear that the
“distinction between a real and a ﬁctional story is precisely the that
latter was “made up”” and that the “real story...has no visible or
invisible maker because it is not made” (Arendt: 1998, p.186).
This last claim, combined with the importance of consequences
for the constitution of stories, makes the determination of an act’s
meaning entirely post hoc; it is not something determined ahead of time,
then displayed with its meaning ready to hand.37 One consequence
of this claim is that it contributes to a sense of Arendt’s work as a
coherent whole; one way in which it does so is by defusing certain
apparent tensions between the individualistic and co-operative elements
of Arendt’s work, particularly in the form this tension is presented in
Passerin d’Entrèves’ reading of Arendt.
Passerin d’Entrèves’ reading of Arendt on action includes a series
of short sections in which he addresses several readers of Arendt
in turn, discussing their responses to Arendt’s work. In so doing
he constructs a list consisting of, among others, Parekh, Canovan,
Habermas, Jay and Kateb; what makes a set of these theorists is that
each detects a tension in Arendt’s work, albeit a different one in each
case (Passerin d’Entrèves: 1994, pp.83–84). These include, for example,
Canovan’s concern that Arendt’s includes a tension between ‘elitist’ and
‘democratic’ tendencies and Habermas’ claim that Arendt’s concept of
power would be much improved had Arendt’s enthusiasm for the polis
evaporated (summarised on Passerin d’Entrèves: 1994, p.84) Passerin
d’Entrèves claims a further tie unites these theorists. Each of the
tensions they diagnose, he claims, stems from the same “fundamental
tension in [Arendt’s] theory between an expressive and a communicative
model of action” (Passerin d’Entrèves: 1994, p.84).38
37The ‘mechanics’ of this appear in the next chapter.
38These terms are taken from “Benhabib’s reformulation of Habermas’ categories”
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Rather than look at the causal links between the ‘fundamental’
tension and those identiﬁed by the theorists Passerin d’Entrèves groups,
the object for now is the nature of the ‘fundamental’ tension itself.39
Whilst the claim that this is a tension does not come good, it does
illustrate the way in which the actor’s self-disclosure works.
The ‘expressive’ element Passerin d’Entrèves identiﬁes is that side of
action which “allows for the self-actualization of self-realization” of an
agent, reliant on norms of “recognition and conﬁrmation of the self and
its uniqueness” (Passerin d’Entrèves: 1994, p.85). This, we have already
encountered. The other element, the ‘communicative’, takes the aim of
“reaching understanding” through symmetrical relations between equal
subjects (Passerin d’Entrèves: 1994, p.85). This too has been encoun-
tered, though it above featured as the prerequisite of the ‘expressive’
element; the communicative element creates the relationships which
form a public realm, on Passerin d’Entrèves’ account, because it is the
source of norms of reciprocity (Passerin d’Entrèves: 1994, p.84).
What is it which creates a tension between these two elements of
action? For one thing, they seemingly take different objects, so long
as the ‘expressive’ element is taken to involve a passive audience, one
which merely needs to recognise the actor without having to contribute
anything themselves in response. This is part of Passerin d’Entrèves’
picture of action, drawn from Sheldon Wolin’s understanding of the
political community as an audience for the storyteller who the actor
relies on; “in other words, behind the actor stands the storyteller, but behind
the storyteller stands a community of memory” (Passerin d’Entrèves: 1994,
p.76).40 This makes those who witness—later, those who remember—an
actor passive parts of the process, in a manner not present in all of
Arendt’s description of action. On the model which casts the commu-
of types of act (Passerin d’Entrèves: 1994, p.85).
39Passerin d’Entrèves holds that readings of Arendt have focused mainly on the
‘expressive’ half of the pair and that this is the cause of much of the criticism of her
work (Passerin d’Entrèves: 1994, p.65).
40See the section on the polis, below, for a similar view of action. Passerin d’Entrèves’
account itself clearly draws on the polis for this image of the community as mere
audience.
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nity as an audience, it is at least implicit that the actor becomes an
author; we have already seen that Arendt holds that there is no author—
hence, no authorial authority—to declare the ﬁnal meaning of an action
in advance. Interpreting action as ‘expressive’ risks undermining this,
as it casts the ‘recognition’ which is key to this element as if it is the
expression of something ‘within’ the actor, latent and waiting merely to
be recognised. This will not do; the passivity of the audience is in stark
contrast with the reading explored, immediately above, with the aid
of Markell. It also runs against the way in which we will characterise
the nature of the distinctions between labour, work and action in the
section following this.
2.6 The Nature of this Division
Having now seen what distinguishes labour, work and action from
one another, it is time to see what the form of this distinction is to
amount to.41 This includes settling whether the three are meant to be
mutually exclusive, i.e. if a single deed can potentially be described
under each of the three rubrics without distortion. Something like
this choice has been necessary since very soon after the publication
of The Human Condition; a 1959 review42 offers either “three distinct
classes of activities” or “three elements that can be found, at least
potentially, in any activities” (Frankel: 1959, p.422), with the claim that
it is not possible to decide which of the two Arendt intends. Somewhat
more recently, Hinchman and Hinchman present the problem this
way; “the key concepts [Arendt] employed to clarify political realities—
“labor,” “work” and “action”–are themselves shrouded in obscurity
in respect to their origin and epistemological status” (Hinchman and
Hinchman: 1984, p.185). The solution advanced in that paper, which
41One recent paper, Markell (2011), splits the distinction into two component
relationships: labour-work and work-action, in order to emphasise the way in which
work relates differently to the two other elements of the vita activa. For the sake of
space, references here will be to the distinction between the three, taken as a unit.
42Found via Markell (2011).
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we turn to below, is to examine the links between Arendt’s work and
the phenomenological tradition exempliﬁed by Husserl and Heidegger.
Based on the discussion of ‘beginnings’, above, it may already be
obvious that non-exclusivity is the preferred reading. This makes best
sense of the potential interpretation of any deed as a new beginning.43
It also matches with what we are soon to say about the kinds of person
for who the distinction might be of use.
The alternative to this would be to treat labour, work and action as
non-overlapping categories, such that any given deed could be ﬁled
into on or another of the three. On this account, it becomes a matter of
correctly cognising which of the three any particular deed belongs to,
which conﬂicts with the interpretive liberty we have earlier posited. It
also struggles against Arendt’s claim that self-disclosure is a by-product
of all actions “even when [agents] wholly concentrate upon reaching an
altogether worldly, material object” (Arendt: 1998, p.183). It could only
be otherwise, Arendt claims, if men were actually to become automota
(Arendt: 1998, p.183).44 What is the relevant difference between the
automaton and the man? The former does not choose its tasks; the
latter is, at least nominally, able to choose what he does. This is what
allows a revelatory quality, however minimal, to inhere in any thing
which a human undertakes. Choosing which profession to enter, or
which means to use to survive, is hardly a grand choice but, so long as
it is a choice, may reveal some sense of a particular person’s preferences,
or what they take to be a tolerable life.
To treat labour, work and action as non-exclusive also goes some
43It also matches rather nicely with the way in which exemplars function for
judgment; anything may be taken which the judge feels will illuminate a matter.
There is no reason this need be something which originally aimed at the same thing
as the judge, or even that aimed at being remembered. See below, section 2.8.
44The reference here to ‘objective’ suggests—though it does not force this
conclusion—that the potential overlap in question is only between work and ac-
tion, as labour’s description does not essentially contain a reference to anything
objective or worldly. If it is conducted purely privately, as if entirely unobserved, then
it could not disclose anything about an agent. However, the comments which follow,
regarding the choices an agent makes, can apply to labour so far as it is not entirely
forced and un-free.
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way to avoiding a pertinent concern raised by Markell about building
a “conceptual speciﬁcation” of political engagement (Markell: 2010a,
p.95). Markell’s concern is that, if we treat Arendt’s chosen task as
categorising activities, we cast her into a role with which she would
presumably not be entirely comfortable;
understood [as a question of what ‘counts as’ political ac-
tivity], the question ascribes to the theorist who answers
it, no matter how egalitarian his or her commitments, a
certain kind of supervisory expertise over the manifold of
human activities—an expertise that might remind us of
the theoretical knowledge claimed by...the Platonic “states-
man,”...[who] assigns those tasks to those who do perform
them (Markell: 2010a, p.95).
The danger of this—of assuming a theoretician’s view from ‘outside’ of
politics—is that it assumes a perspective it takes to be superior to that
from ‘within’ politics.45 Markell’s concern is that, from this perspective,
it is possible to say to participants (or potential participants) what it
is that they have done should count and what should not; if this is
done from the position of theory, rather than participation, then it is an
entirely one-directional business, rather than a dialogue.
Markell suggests that, in place of this ‘conceptual speciﬁcation’,
Arendt is in fact best read as advocating “an enriched description” of
politics, one which attends to those elements of the practice which are
distinctive (Markell: 2010a, p.95). This avoids the potential problems
just outlined; it also involves attempting to remain faithful to the
events—and the participants’ experiences—themselves.46
Seen in these terms, Markell’s reading approximates to that ad-
vanced in Hinchman and Hinchman (1984). They take the conceptual
45That Arendt wishes to avoid anything outside of the public realm assuming the
role of a standard for public business is evidenced in her reading of the Declaration of
Independence; see below, subsection 4.7.4.
46Elsewhere, Markell describes the same dichotomy with speciﬁc reference to
the “signiﬁcance of events”, which cannot be adequately comprehended from the
perspective of disengaged theory (Markell: 2010b, p.80).
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obscurity of Arendt’s work to result from a neglect of the relation of
Arendt’s work to Heidegger’s (and, via his, to Husserl’s). To get a
sense of what this move entails, what follows is a capsule account of
Hinchman and Hinchman’s attempt to remedy this neglect.
The ﬁrst interpretive step is a brief account of Husserl’s work; Hinch-
man and Hinchman focus on his opposition to the Kantian division
of phenomena and noumena, where the latter is taken to be the ‘real’
world which stands behind the realm of actual experience (Hinchman
and Hinchman: 1984, p.187). Husserl’s work discards the noumenal
element to focus entirely on phenomena; “But since [these] no longer
stand in contrast to any putative “noumenal world”, whatever knowl-
edge we can obtain about them counts as objective in the fullest sense”
(Hinchman and Hinchman: 1984, p.187). Given what we have already
said in this section about Arendt’s project, the lineage should be reason-
ably clear already. But there remains one element of (the Hinchmans’)
Husserl’s project that touches on the understanding of Arendt outlined
above: it contains the claim that “phenomenological experience” gives
rise to “a more fundamental...stratum of experience” than the natural-
scientiﬁc account would give (Hinchman and Hinchman: 1984, p.188).
This is an obvious parallel with the opposition, recently discussed,
between the theorist’s categorising of political activity and attentiveness
to political actions in themselves.47
From Husserl to Heidegger, to complete the picture of Arendt’s
inheritance as a phenomenologist. Hinchman and Hinchman provide
this summary of that indebtedness;
we argue that [Arendt’s] fundamental judgment about Hei-
degger’s thought remained strikingly consistent. In most
of her mature writings she silently appropriated and de-
veloped many of Heidegger’s most signiﬁcant insights, yet
from beginning to end she simultaneously criticized his al-
leged isolation from the world of human affairs (Hinchman
and Hinchman: 1984, pp.188–189).
47This contrast will become clearer in the next section, once Arendt’s complaints
against the tradition of political philosophy are outlined.
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As the concern here is not with problems of Heidegger’s work, the
focus will largely remain with the constructive elements of his inﬂu-
ence on Arendt. This includes some continuity with Husserl’s project,
most notably the attempt to avoid reducing the relationship between
person and world to one of cognition but to recognise ‘knowing’ as one
amongst several different ways of relating to the world (Hinchman and
Hinchman: 1984, p.190).
As cognition is demoted from being the primary mode of relating
to the world, so the possibility of relating to the world in other ways
is raised, ways which rest on an understanding of human beings as
fundamentally enmeshed in the world as something other than de-
tached observers (Hinchman and Hinchman: 1984, p.191). A parallel
to the Kantian a priori categories of experience is used to refer to this
relationship between person and world: “existentials” (Hinchman and
Hinchman: 1984, p.190).48 To be enmeshed in the world in this way is
to live in a “space within which physical things take on their mean-
ing as part of [that] world” (Hinchman and Hinchman: 1984, p.191);
the contrast here is with the world understood primarily in terms of
physical dimensions.
Seen in the context of this usage of Heidegger, Arendt’s ‘labour’,
‘work’ and ‘action’ can be seen as ‘existentials’, in the sense that they
“seek to illuminate what it means to be-in-the-world” rather than func-
tioning as abstracted “empirical generalizations” (Hinchman and Hinch-
man: 1984, p.197). One consequence of seeing them this way is that
they are things which, under certain circumstances, can become rare
or more difﬁcult or even impossible to engage in. Treating the three as
existentials also ties Arendt’s project back to the element of Heidegger’s
which focuses on the direct, experiential qualities of worldly engage-
ment. This makes the experiences of an agent central, though this does
not stretch so far as to make an agent’s self-report exhaustive, as the
48The Hinchmans’ list of “existentials” in Heidegger: ““care” (the general rela-
tionship of [a person] to its world)”; “anxiety” and “fallenness” (Hinchman and
Hinchman: 1984, p.190).
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Hinchmans point out; “It is always a root principle of phenomenolog-
ical investigation that we distinguish what actually appears to us in
experience from the way we think and speak about what appears in
subsequent reﬂection” (Hinchman and Hinchman: 1984, p.197).49
This returns us to Markell (2010a); that paper, too, reﬂects on the
experiences of actual political actors, emphasizing that they form a cen-
tral part of Arendt’s description of the American Revolution (Markell:
2010a, pp.98–99). There are two elements to this description: ﬁrst, that
the revolutionaries found no need to use theory in the interpretation of
their experiences; second, that they found—to their surprise—that they
enjoyed themselves (Markell: 2010a, pp.98–99). They themselves, having
discovered that they enjoyed public life, were not able to admit this;50
for this, Arendt blames “the weight of the entire Christian tradition”
(Arendt (1990, p.33) quoted in Markell (2010a, p.99)). This, presumably,
derives from the Christian concern with the ‘next world’ at the expense
of this one, which Arendt regards as a cause of ‘worldlessness’ (Arendt:
1998, p.54).
As Markell points out, this points towards a mismatch between
the experiences the revolutionaries themselves have and the accounts
they are able to give of them (Markell: 2010a, p.99). If the actors
are not themselves able to fully articulate their experiences, then the
work of the phenomenologist cannot be to uncritically reconstruct
their accounts, taking them at face value. Instead, their efforts are to
include some reconstructive element, which operates not only ‘against’
theories (or ideologies) which distort experience but also against the
own actor’s partial recollections. This does not sound so very different
from the ‘historian’ who appears above on p.21, or from the storyteller’s
reconstruction of meaning out of actions (Arendt: 1998, pp.191–192) or,
ﬁnally, from the account of the judge, who is the focus of the chapter
immediately after this one. Each of the three shares two characteristics:
49If all that counted was the ﬁrst-personal account of an agent, Arendt’s concern
regarding conceptual drift would lose some of its force.
50Arendt does not specify if it is that they could not admit it ‘to themselves’ or to
others.
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ﬁrst, that some interpretive effort is necessary; second, that there is no
pretence to ‘objectivity’.
There is an alternative way to treat the labour-work-action distinc-
tion: as if Arendt is proposing a set of ‘categories’, in the Kantian sense,
through which to understand what humans do. This is a reading ad-
vanced, in quite brief form, in Tsao (2002), a paper we return to below in
discussing the polis. Tsao’s reading also treats labour, work and action
as non-exclusive, denying that Arendt’s work is an attempt to provide a
“deﬁnitive taxonomy of possible activities”, (Tsao: 2002, p.102). Though
we have already agreed to that last claim, our path to this denial differs
from Tsao’s; his characterisation of Arendt’s distinctions as ‘categories’
does not quite capture her project as well as the views we have already
encountered.
Tsao’s example of how the labour-work-action distinction is to work
is a “wage-earning artisan”, whose efforts he claims can be seen in
terms of labour, of work and of action (Tsao: 2002, p.101). The artisan’s
business takes on, depending on the focus of the description, the colour
of each of the three species of activity; it conforms to the “particular
explanatory logic and temporal dynamic” of each;
Insofar as he works, his craft will yield a ﬁnal result, a lasting
product that will persist in the world apart from its maker;
the activity ends when its intended design is fulﬁlled. Inso-
far as he labors, though, the singular, teleological sequence
is subsumed within the ongoing rhythm of effort and rest,
our artisan’s daily grind...He may be [anonymous whilst
working and labouring but] no such anonymity is possible
insofar as he acts: if he is to share his tools, say, or carry
out a contract, his fellows must be able to recognize and
keep track of his doings as a distinct individual (Tsao: 2002,
p.101)
The most obvious consequence of taking this example as it stands is that
almost any conceivable activity could stand as an example of labour,
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and of work, and of action; this does not entirely efface the distinctions
between the three activities, since each still convincingly maps onto
a distinctive element of our ‘waged artisan’s’ efforts. If we wanted to
maintain a hard distinction between each of labour, work and action,
then that may well be possible within the description that Tsao gives
us. Certainly, the elements of the ‘waged artisan’ which correspond to
labour and work are easy enough to consider separately (indeed, Tsao
does himself); to earn wages is, for the sake of continued life, quite
essential but also immaterial to the actual procedure of construction
that one is able to procure a livelihood by means of the work.51 As
easy as the separation of the two may be, it does not settle on the real
trouble with Tsao’s example.
It does, however, involve a particularly low bar for what is consid-
ered ‘action’, or to put it anther way, what deeds are considered capable
of revealing someone’s character. The two acts Tsao gives as examples
only need the waged artisan to be physically distinctive enough that
he can be reliably identiﬁed, whereas not much of his character (or life
story) need be revealed by either lending tools or signing contracts. He
can remain relatively anonymous52 within both of these examples, so
long as our interest is only in the successful completion of either. The
revelatory character which is possible would stem from the character
in which he concludes either; lending begrudgingly, say, or completing
a contract more diligently than he was bound to. Either of these would
exceed the needs of the ‘objective’ interaction; neither is necessary for
success of either.
This understanding of action is also mainly forward-looking; it relies
on the future continuity of the same agent, rather than piecing together
a story about his past deeds to establish a sense of who he was, in excess
51Arendt does complain of work becoming engaged in as if it were labour; her
complaint is as much about the transformation of the products into consumables as it
is about the process itself (Arendt: 1998, p.230).
52Later in the same paper, Tsao says that “action must “contain” the agent’s identity
somewhat in the sense that a bank check must bear a valid signature for it to be
recognised as such” (Tsao: 2002, p.104). Even this admittedly deﬂationary reading of
action has more to it than his initial ‘waged artisan’ example.
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of any particular deed. This is suggestive of the main problem with
Tsao’s reading of Arendt as a “a great deal closer to...Kant [than she is
to Aristotle]” (Tsao: 2002, p.102). The comparison with Aristotle can be
set aside; what is of interest is what follows from treating Arendt as
offering a (roughly) ‘Kantian’ theory when she divides the vita activa.
This is the understanding of Kant which Tsao works from;
Kant had sought to derive a priori principles valid for any
possible experience solely from the way our cognitive facul-
ties [rather than the world ‘as such’] must organize all such
experience. The relevant sense of ‘possible’ for Kant is thus
‘possible to understand’: any object we perceive or event
we experience is fundamentally structured by ineluctable
constraints to our understanding itself. So too for Arendt,
though her categories apply at a lower level of abstraction,
namely to the possible forms of speciﬁcally human activity
in the world. In other words, her abstract theses concern-
ing essential attributes of labour, work, and action derive
from what she takes to be the fundamental (and numerically
ﬁnite) ways in which we are able to comprehend the basic
kinds of continuity and change that human beings are able
to effect (Tsao: 2002, p.102).
Given this understanding of Kant—as well as this understanding of
Arendt—it is peculiar to characterise Arendt as dealing in categories
at all. The difﬁculty is as follows: categories necessarily condition
the world as factors of cognition. The claim that our understanding
of events conditions the way that we see them at least escapes any
risk of regarding the events themselves as carrying within them their
meanings, or the logics by which we can understand them. Linking
Arendt to Kant in this way does, however, still change the relationship
of observer to act. Above, we followed Markell to claim that even the
ontological status of an act was determined through the way in which it
was responded to, placing the status and meaning of any event entirely
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post hoc. If Arendt’s work presents us with categories, then it becomes
an involuntary matter which deeds we do or do not understand as
instances of action, as instances of beginning something new.53 One
trouble with this view is that it seemingly makes it possible for there
to be ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ interpretations and responses to an act. To
regard responses as dependent on cognition returns—at the extreme,
at any rate—the initiative entirely to the deed itself.
What remains is to see why Arendt holds this articulation of the
vita activa is worth producing. That is the work of the next section.
2.7 Why the Division Matters
This section turns to the question of why Arendt thought the articu-
lations she makes within the vita activa are necessary. The answer to
this involves two claims: ﬁrst, that Arendt holds the distinctions she
makes to have been generally neglected; second, that the concepts of
politics which this neglect leads to have had some particularly bad
consequences. The worst of these is totalitarianism, though it is not the
only deleterious arrangement to appear in Arendt’s work. The polis
stands alone in the section which follows this because it is an institution
which is often taken to be on the same side as Arendt.
When Arendt introduces her use of the term vita activa and its three
constituent elements, she does so with a brief genealogy of the term,
which begins with the claim it is “as old as (but not older than) our
tradition of political thought” (Arendt: 1998, p.12). The term begins life
not as a Latin but as a Greek term, the “Aristotelian bios politikos which
retains the meaning of “public-political” engagement at least as late as
Augustine (Arendt: 1998, p.12). In this early stage, the term signiﬁes
“only the realm of human affairs, stressing the action, praxis, needed to
establish and sustain it” (Arendt: 1998, p.13).
53I suspect that, ultimately, this reading would lead us back to treating action as
something interruptive in the way we have above tried to dismiss. Tsao does go
on to claim something along these lines; his Arendt wants to provide a notion of
human ‘freedom’ which supplements the causality of the natural realm (Tsao: 2002,
pp.102–103).
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This meaning is later joined, in Arendt’s genealogy, by non-political
modes of engagement with the world; “the term vita activa lost its specif-
ically political meaning and denoted all kinds of active engagement
with the things of the world” (Arendt: 1998, p.14). It is this version of
the term, rather than the ‘exclusively political’ version which predates
it, which remains in place for the remainder of Arendt’s work.
Arendt ties this development from one version to another to the
end of the “ancient city-state”, an historical development in which
“what it once meant to be a citizen” was forgotten and so the signiﬁcant
difference between that kind of world-engagement on the one hand
and labour and work on the other became obscured (Arendt: 1998,
p.14). From here, she claims that the distinctions between the three
disappeared, mainly by the demotion of politics to the level of the
other two (Arendt: 1998, p.14); she matches this development to a
corresponding increase of regard for the dignity of the vita contemplativa,
which came to be seen as the only genuinely free life (Arendt: 1998,
p.14). This assessment of contemplation as a superior way of life to
politics is one which she pointedly ascribes to philosophers themselves,
who come to see freedom from political activity as fundamentally the
same as freedom from the need to labour, or to work (Arendt: 1998,
p.14).
The term vita activa, therefore, is one which is taken from use
external to the active life and belongs instead to the detached viewpoint
of the contemplative life; it sees, in place of the differences between
activities, each as necessarily unquiet and therefore a risk to the quiet
needed for contemplation (Arendt: 1998, pp.15–16). Arendt’s use of
the term is, in reply to this, not an attempt to change the meaning of it
but “rather the hierarchical order inherent in [the term’s use] from its
inception” (Arendt: 1998, p.17). In performing this reversal, Arendt’s
aim is to move from the great distance at which all activities are seen
only in terms of their unquiet to consider more carefully the differences
between them (Arendt: 1998, p.17).
The damage which Arendt’s work seeks to undo by this move is
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that caused ﬁrst by conceiving of politics in terms of work rather than
action and, later, the treatment of all activities solely in the mode of
labour.
To conceive of politics, or public business of any sort, as though it is
analogous with work is to try to “escape the haphazardness and moral
irresponsibility inherent in a plurality of agents” (Arendt: 1998, p.220).
The trade is between plurality and predictability, which will not appear
as a trade at all to anyone who wishes to escape the haphazardness of
action which has been so prominent in earlier sections of this chapter.
The earliest example of this trade is the “philosopher-king” of Plato,
who reduces the “perplexities of action” to “solvable problems of
cognition” (Arendt: 1998, p.221).54 With the problems of public life
reduced in this way to a matter of ‘seeing clearly’, the full distinction
between, on the one hand, the one who knows the correct acts and,
on the other, those who merely follow them becomes possible (Arendt:
1998, p.222). The former need not pay heed at all to the motives
and goals of the latter, who have by that move been placed into a
subordinate role and, therefore, entirely outside of the class of people
who may make use of their own capacity for beginnings. Rulership
becomes a part of the vocabulary of describing political institutions;
The hallmark of all such escapes is the concept of rule, that
is, the notion that men can lawfully and politically live
together only when some are entitled to command and the
others forced to obey. The commonplace notion in Plato and
Aristotle that every political community consists of those
who rule and those who are ruled...rests on a suspicion of
action (Arendt: 1998, p.222).
The ‘statesman’ stands, in a sense, outside of politics and, in so doing,
removes the possibility of politics for others.
54This desire to escape the unpredictability of dealing with independent actors
on an equal footing is, Arendt holds, a signiﬁcant motivation for much of political
philosophy (Arendt: 1998, p.222).
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This ties back to our earlier discussion of beginnings as a feature of
action; Markell’s discussion of initiative is part of a sustained demon-
stration that Arendt’s use of the term is opposed to precisely this idea
of rule as a necessity component of politics-related vocabulary (Markell:
2010b, pp.64–65). The need for this attention to the vocabulary used to
describe politics is that any description “involves an interpretation of
the world” (Markell: 2010b, p.64); any interpretation of human events
will, at the same time, condition the way in which things are done. For
this reason, Arendt’s work, with its focus on world-interpretation, op-
poses the “positive valence” attached to the notion of rule by presenting
an alternative concept of politics (Markell: 2010b, p.64).
Importantly, Arendt’s strategy is not to contrast a concept of rule
with an opposite (but equal) concept of no-rule; instead, her aim is
to show that this pairing is fundamentally a misguided attempt to
understand and to shape politics (Markell: 2010b, p.65). This leads to
Arendt’s emphasis of different elements of the experience of politics.
The capacity for individual initiative, including the competing wills
and goals, forms an important part of the opposition to rule conceived
of as a singular over-riding will. If Arendt was content to let the
understanding alone and merely to advocate a change in the occupier
of rulership, she would not have described it as a problem that the
French Revolution effected just such a change (Arendt: 1990, p.74).
This concept of politics, as work driven by a singular vision, or
towards a particular plan, is the one present for much of political phi-
losophy. The other erroneous understanding of politics which Arendt
discusses is that which derives from labour; this is a more recent devel-
opment.
The development in question is the resumed importance of the vita
activa with labour assuming the role of fullest prestige and “life...itself
as the ultimate point of reference...and the highest good” (Arendt:
1998, p.313). The initial mechanism by which Arendt holds this to have
taken place is quite subtle; it is in part the result of a loss of faith in
non-earthly immortality (Arendt: 1998, p.320). The above-mentioned
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worldlessness of the Christian world-view conditions the response to
this loss of a hereafter; what modern man returns to is not this world
but to himself (Arendt: 1998, p.320);
The only contents left were appetites and desires, the sense-
less urges of his body which he mistook for passion...The
only thing that could now be potentially immortal...was
life itself, that is, the possibly everlasting life process of the
species mankind (Arendt: 1998, pp.320–321).
This shares with the above problem that it takes something to be de-
terminant for public business which is not itself public, is perhaps not
even sensibly displayable in public at all. It adds something new to
this: whereas work is at least nominally about providing something
permanent and enduring, there is no sense in which anything lasting
can be built on the basis of natural drives endlessly demanding ever
more. The nightmarishness of the scenario Arendt presents culminates
in the total disindividuation of this driving force; it becomes reiﬁed
into a “natural force”, something which subsumes individual needs
and faculties completely (Arendt: 1998, p.321). This, in the end, ren-
ders superﬂuous every detail which does not serve “life’s metabolism
with nature” unless it can be cast—as Arendt’s example of Marx’s
understanding of Paradise Lost shows—in terms which make them a
species-speciﬁc peculiarity (Arendt: 1998, p.321).
There are two dramatic examples of this process in Arendt’s work.
The ﬁrst is the French Revolution, the second her reading of totalitarian-
ism. To the former ﬁrst: the French Revolution was undone, in Arendt’s
account, because of the involvement in it of the ‘social question’, the
problem of poverty;
poverty is abject because it puts men under the absolute
dictate of their bodies, that is, under the absolute dictate
of necessity...It was under the rule of this necessity that
the multitude rushed to the assistance of the French Revolu-
tion...and eventually sent it to its doom...When [the poor]
442.7. Why the Division Matters
appeared on the scene of politics, necessity appeared with
them...freedom had to be surrendered to necessity, to the
urgency of the life process itself (Arendt: 1990, p.60).
This analysis is obviously of a piece with that found towards the end
of The Human Condition; what this passage adds is the explicit contrast
between the pressing needs of the body and the opportunity to construct
lasting political foundations.55
This sense of unstructured chaos, brought about by some novel idea,
is also a part of Arendt’s description of totalitarian movements. In
“Ideology and Terror”, a chapter added to the second and subsequent
editions of The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt makes a comparison
between two competing ideas of law. The ﬁrst, which is the more
recognisable, is of law as “lawful government and legitimate power”
(Arendt: 2004a, p.595). Against this stands the conception of law as
‘natural law’, to which totalitarian regimes appeal as the basis for their
efforts; the “Law of History or the Law of Nature” (Arendt: 2004a,
p.595) is called upon to legitimize regimes of this kind. ‘Laws’ of
this form are treated as underlying laws of reality, which determine
the path of history, to which persons must conform; “Totalitarian
lawfulness...applies [them] directly to mankind without bothering
with the behavior of men” (Arendt: 2004a, p.595).
Because a law of history is taken to be primary, it is also taken
to be self-legitimating and, for that reason, the automatic victor over
any actual law contrary to it (Arendt: 2004a, p.595). The parallel
between this and the ‘necessity’ of the body which appears in the French
Revolution is clear enough; to this it adds the totalitarian movement’s
claim that it is transformative of “the human species into an active
unfailing carrier”, rather than mere sufferer, of the law in question
(Arendt: 2004a, p.596).
This points towards the difference between totalitarianism and mere
dictatorship; the laws ‘perceived’ as underpinnings of history in this
55This informs Arendt’s antipathy, (see p.195ff.), towards Jefferson’s discussion of
the ‘content’ rather than the ‘form’ of his ward system.
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way are “laws of motion”, a difference which conditions whatever
actual laws the totalitarian regime may enact (Arendt: 2004a, p.597). To
the extra-political as a source of ends is added a strongly destabilising
element.
What links all of these problems is that each takes something from
outside of a public realm—something which is therefore immune to
debate–and institutes it as the aim of public business. The institution
which is the subject of the following section does not have quite the
same problem, as we shall soon see.
2.8 Arendt and the Polis
The aim of this section is to disassociate Arendt’s account of the Athe-
nian polis from her account of politics as such.56 This is necessary for
one reason: to separate the two so that the unpleasantness of the former
does not infect the latter. It is desirable for another: an Arendt who
is not infatuated with the polis is a more consistent thinker of political
institutions.
The polis arises as a response to the unpredictability of action and
the ‘frailty of human affairs’; for the Greeks, this ‘frailty’ is not simply
one inevitable element of the human condition but a problem to solve
(Arendt: 1998, p.192). We have already encountered, via Markell, this
particular difﬁculty the actor has in getting his actions recognised as
exactly the actions he wishes to have performed.
56For the sake of brevity, ‘the polis’ will be used as shorthand for ‘the polis as Arendt
describes it’. The same is true for references to ‘the Greeks’ and so on. There is some
question as to how accurately Arendt’s polis is even meant to match the historical
polis. Tlaba, for example, treats Arendt’s polis as a;
(deliberate) historical ﬁction...as Stephen J.Whitﬁeld suggests. Arendt
ignores the historical material which shows that there was a considerable
mixing of politics and economics of the public and the private...[and]
that the Greeks engaged in politics in order to gain and protect their
wealth (Tlaba: 1987, p.40)
See also Villa (1999c, p.247–248n.7), which argues against treating Arendt’s polis as if
it were meant to be historical fact rather than “ideal type”.
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This becomes a problem for anyone who, in Arendt’s description,
“consciously aims at being “essential”, at leaving behind a story and
an identity which will win “immortal fame”” (Arendt: 1998, p.193).
Her Greeks have entirely grasped the self-disclosing element of ac-
tion; “No doubt this concept of action is highly individualistic...It
stresses the urge toward self-disclosure at the expense of all other fac-
tors and therefore remains relatively untouched by the predicament of
unpredictability” (Arendt: 1998, p.194).
Achilles is Arendt’s exemplar for this tendency, presented as having
ensured his fame by dying at the right moment; he “remains the
indisputable master of his identity...because he withdraws into death
from the possible consequences...of what he began” (Arendt: 1998,
pp.193–194).57 In Arendt’s account, aiming towards a particular fame
as Achilles does requires the actor to treat the whole of their own life
as something they themselves have made even as they lived it; in so
doing, the actor must consciously try to take hold of all of the possible
consequences of their deeds.58
Even with this supreme effort, the actor “who delivers into his
narrator’s hands the full signiﬁcance of his deed” remains entirely
reliant on that narrator’s efforts as a propagator of that story (Arendt:
1998, p.194).
The polis exists to offset this difﬁculty,59 to “offer a remedy for
57Arendt links the introduction of this particular idea to the impossibility of deter-
mining if someone has achieved eudaimonia until after they are safely dead (Arendt:
1998, p.192); in that idea, as with much of what follows, there is something approxi-
mating the claim that it is impossible to know for sure how something (or someone)
has turned out before the thing in question has come to a halt and ceased to take on
new signiﬁcances.
58There are two conceivable ways to manage unintended consequences as part
of this attempt: the ﬁrst, to ensure control over the interpretation of them, so that
they might appear in a particular (favourable) light; the second, to instead ensure
blame was assigned somewhere other than oneself. Either requires, for consistent
application, a signiﬁcant degree of control over witnesses as well as oneself. This
degree of control over how one appears is something which Arendt claims is not
possible (Arendt: 1998, p.192).
59The other advantage of the polis is that it provides, presumably by gathering
together so many keen to be remembered, a constant opportunity for great deeds
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the futility of action and speech” which does not depend on the co-
operation of poets (Arendt: 1998, p.197) or, for that matter, anyone
other than the polis participants themselves. This is, Arendt claims,
“as though the men who returned from the Trojan War had wished to
make permanent that space of action which had arisen...to prevent
it perishing with their dispersal” (Arendt: 1998, p.198). In its way, the
solution has an admirable simplicity about it: simply refuse to disperse.
If this refusal were the total of the remedy for the futility of action,
then it would not be at all problematic (it would also be an extremely
low-impact response). The problem is the structure which is built
upon this refusal to disperse; in order to set an action’s meaning into
something unchangeable, it must remove several of the features which
make action distinctive. To see why (and how), we will turn to Tsao
(2002).60 Thus far, we have enough of the purpose of the polis in mind
to move to consider why the institution has appeared as a problem in
Arendt-related literature. Before separating Arendt and polis, we take a
brief survey of the ways in which the latter has caused problems when
taken to be an object of enthusiasm for Arendt.
Two things must be true in order for the two to need separating:
ﬁrst, there must be some consensus that the two are not separable;
second, that some negative consequence is avoided by demonstrating
their separability.
We look to the question of ‘consensus’ ﬁrst and ﬁnd that there is
indeed some tendency to treat Arendt as broadly pro-polis. Kateb (1983,
p.1), for example, begins a chapter on action by referring to the closing
passage of On Revolution, in which Arendt has Theseus assume the
(Arendt: 1998, p.197). The easiest-seen downsides of this element would be a lasting
fatigue at the constant need to perform matched with the desire for ever-more-
extraordinary excellence.
60The objective of the Achilles-type actor is, speciﬁcally, to make the story ‘unchang-
ing’; what follows from that (causing the troubles, below), is that it must make it
unchangeable by other actors. What this actor aims for is something like this: to place
the deed and its meaning entirely outside of the realm of the political at the moment
of its completion. This is essentially similar in aim to the ‘constatives’ which appear
in the discussion, in subsections 4.7.4 and 4.7.5, of political foundations as something
to be avoided.
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role of “spokesman” for Athens and praise the polis for making life
bearable (Arendt: 1990, p.281). The place of this passage in the book
is alongside a more modern conception of the joys of public life, one
which she claims is “perhaps too ‘modern’, too self-centred to hit in
pure precision the centre” of the experience (Arendt: 1990, p.281). At
best, this suggests only that the modern experience is too self-focused
to capture the fullness of the experience.61
In The Human Condition, the institution again appears, alongside the
Roman res publica, as “guarantee[s] against the futility of individual life,
the space protected against this futility and reserved for the relative
permanence...of mortals” (Arendt: 1998, p.56). In this case, too, Arendt
builds a contrast between ancient and modern, with Adam Smith
the representative of the modern; Arendt has him present “public
admiration” as if it is a consumable good, “of the same nature” as
money (Arendt: 1998, p.56). Clearly, this is a very different conception
of ‘recognition’, one which does not recognise it as generative of any
sense of permanence.
Recognising that the polis—along with Ancient Rome—and the
modern institutions which appear in Arendt’s work are different in
kind, Kateb suggests that “[Arendt] simply added another passion”
rather than abandoning her earlier enthusiasm for the Greeks (Kateb:
1983, p.7). To account for this difference, Kateb suggests two forms of
political action, “ancient and modern”, the former focused on heroic
deeds, the latter on “more modest, almost nameless” participation in
public affairs (Kateb: 1983, p.7). Kateb keeps this separation in mind
once he moves to discuss the putative problem of the ‘content’ of action;
“Whenever the Greek polis occupies the center of Arendt’s reﬂection, the
question of the content of political action does not seem to be acceptably
answerable” (Kateb: 1983, p.17). The distinction seems to disappear
shortly after; both ancient and modern forms of political action become
61This is, as we see below in this section, precisely the problem with the polis as
well.
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ﬁxated on “constitutional issues” and no other matters (Kateb: 1983,
p.18).62
The above only establishes, at worst, that for Arendt to have a
favourable view of the polis she would have to have held (and not
necessarily at the same time) two differing concepts of action which
are hardly irreconcilable with each other. Something more is needed to
demonstrate the unpleasantness of the polis. A very thorough account
of what is wrong with the polis is found in Pitkin (1981, p.330ff.), a
paper which lists the problems with the institution (and those that
enable it) in considerable detail. This will form the bulk of the case
against the polis, though some other complaints will follow in briefer
form after Pitkin (1981) is done with.
Pitkin’s main concern is the division of private and public in
Arendt’s work (Pitkin: 1981, pp.336–337), so much of the description of
the polis focuses on settling how concerns are divided between it and
the private household.63 Pitkin’s account of the polis is of a hollowed-
out institution which is both unpleasant (being blind to the injustice it
relies on)64 and hollow in a self-defeating way;
62Villa’s account of the ‘content’ of action also claims it to be ‘constitutional’ but
claims that this term should be understood in a “broader” sense than as referring
merely to a constitutional document (Villa: 1999a, p.118). (Villa refers to this as “the
Greek rather than the more restricted American sense” (Villa: 1999a, p.118).) The
‘less restricted’ sense of the term sees politics as able to take in—to make objects of
discussion out of—much more than just the legal side of arranging public business
(Villa: 1999a, p.119); it would;
be citizenly action aimed against the state and other forces that threaten
to restrict or overturn the pluralistic and (politically) egalitarian terms
of association the constitution sets out (Villa: 1999a, p.118).
Such efforts would necessarily take in rather more as potential objects of discussion
than the polis as it appears below (Particularly in Pitkin’s account) would seem capable
of addressing.
63Pitkin’s critique of Arendt on the grounds of justice is not limited, however, to
engagement with the polis; it also takes in Arendt’s account of the French Revolution
(Pitkin: 1981, p.334–335). The paper makes one issue of the two elements of Arendt’s
work: the exclusion of certain persons from politics and of certain kinds of injustice
from political discourse (Pitkin: 1981, p.335). The two are in fact separate problems
for Arendt (or for readings of Arendt); we have already encountered that related to
the French Revolution, above on p.43. It is in relation to the polis that claims about
the exclusion of certain classes of persons are made.
64Lindahl has a related concern; his 2006 paper focuses on the conception of
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On this account, I suggest, one cannot even make sense of
politics itself; even for those admitted to its beneﬁts, it can
be no real beneﬁt. To see what I mean, put two questions to
Arendt: What keeps these citizens together as a body? And
what is it they talk about together, in the endless palaver in
the agora? (Pitkin: 1981, p.336).
We have already see the preliminary answer to Pitkin’s question, above:
what they talk about all day in the polis is themselves.65
The last question, that of the subject of discussion, is elaborated
upon by Pitkin; economic questions are excluded to avoid the taint of
the social and law is excluded because of a Greek conception of it as
a pre-political act of fabrication (Pitkin: 1981, p.337).66 If we accept all
this, the polis does, as in Pitkin’s description, “resemble [an assembly
of] posturing little boys clamouring for attention” and reassurance of
their own reality (Pitkin: 1981, p.338).67 This gives our preliminary
answer to Pitkin’s question: what they talk about all day in the polis is
themselves.
Given this antipathy towards the polis, two responses are possible:
either somehow redeem the polis or else distance Arendt’s description
law (as nomos) underlying the polis (and treating this as, essentially, Arendt’s view
of law). Lindahl combines the ‘spatiality’ of this conception of law with its pre-
political character; “reducing bounded space to a precondition of politics amounts to
depoliticizing the spatial unity of a political community” (Lindhal: 2006, p.885).
65This is, perhaps, already an indication that something has gone wrong in the
Greek case; the world will still have to feature, if only as background to some deed
or other. If only the self-revelatory aspect is given its due, the tendency would be
to approximate something like the worry about ‘subjectivity’ which Arendt has in
regards to modernity.
66This part of the Greek view is especially troubling for the account advanced here;
the main thing which it excludes from politics is the very act of founding which
is the focal point of chapter 4. In On Revolution, the act of founding is central to
the experience of politics. If Arendt agrees with the Greek view, relegating it to
the pre-political, then there is an inconsistency between that book and The Human
Condition.
67See also Dietz (1995, pp.23–26) for a review of criticisms of Arendt along similar
lines, of which most take the polis as evidence that Arendt writes in support of male
dominance at the expense of women. This review takes in the line from Pitkin (1981,
p.338) that Arendt’s writings celebrate machismo, or display for its own sake.
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of the political from the way in which the polis appears (in her work).
It is the second path we shall take, drawing on Tsao (2002),68 a close
reading of The Human Condition which presents the differences between
Arendt’s theory and the polis’ practice.69 Tsao’s article is, in essence, a
demonstration that the understanding of politics which animates the
polis is not the same as that which animates Arendt’s work. This gap
is far from immediately evident, which accounts both for it largely
remaining neglected and for Tsao’s use of the (slightly expanded)
German-language version of The Human Condition to bring it more fully
to light (Tsao: 2002, p.100).
The interest for this thesis is in the way in which the demotion of
the polis changes the apparent character of Arendt’s work taken as a
whole; it makes Arendt’s work on the American revolution and the
councils come into clearer focus, free of any hint that she may see in
them some nostalgic re-enactment of Athens. Further consequences of
Tsao’s reading of the polis are presented at the end of this section.
The most telling of these is that, in order to cope with a seemingly
overwrought fear of the inﬂuence of poets, the duty of remembrance is
transferred into the realm of politics itself; this displaces the possibility
of later generations deciding for themselves what is worth remembering
(or even the terms in which to remember it);
That is, the perceived threat against which the polis is or-
ganized, so to speak, is simply the fear that succeeding
generations might arrive with projects of their own—and
ideas of their own about what would be worth remembering.
If the philosophers’ failed remedy to the frailty of human
affairs had implied a wish to renounce the capacity for ac-
68Tsao (2002) starts with an epigram, a quote from W.H.Auden; “Miss Arendt is
more reticent than, perhaps, she should be, about what actually went on in this public
realm of the Greeks”.
69Pitkin (1981) and Tsao (2002) address many of the same passages in The Human
Condition; the difference is entirely the way in which they take those passages to relate
to the remainder of Arendt’s view of action.
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tion...the would-be remedy the polis represents turns out
to be much the same (Tsao: 2002, pp.113–114).70
In the language we above borrowed from Markell, the aim of the polis
is to make responsiveness something which the participants no longer
need; they merely inherit the list of things to remember and the correct
manner of remembering, which leaves no room for their own new
deeds. They are excluded from political participation and have become
an audience at best. As Tsao makes clear, this is of a piece with the
‘philosopher’s solution’, which tries to remodel politics as a whole as a
species of production; “If anything, it is worse: while the philosophers
want to renounce action altogether, the self-styled heroes of the polis
want to foist that renunciation on everyone but themselves” (Tsao: 2002,
p.114).
The ‘polis hero’, since he is afraid that his story will be supplanted
by later projects, may well (though need not) believe that the list of
things which a group can remember is somehow limited and, further,
that the addition of new deeds must be at the expense of others. In
addition to this, the ‘hero’ must believe either that those later deeds
will somehow have no reference within them to his own—which is
to say he does not share Arendt’s conception of the interconnection
of actors—or that only the entire bulk of his story must be preserved
in order for him to count as remembered.71 In short, he treats action,
especially self-disclosure, as a zero-sum game.
This makes the polis as deeply unattractive—even from a different
70One curiosity in this ‘solution’: why exactly were the Greeks so very afraid of
relying on poets remaining faithful that they were willing to entirely up-end praxis
itself? It’s far from clear that setting up the polis as they had could possibly be better
(even on their own terms) than employing dedicated repeaters of sagas, etc. One
plausible motive could be to keep later generations from doing anything which could
excel the efforts of their ancestors, supplanting them in popular memory.
71One alternative to the view implicit in the hero’s is provided in the next chapter,
in the form of judgment. It answers to many of the deﬁciencies summarised in this
paragraph and the ease with which it ﬁts with action supports Tsao’s contention that
Arendt and the hero are working from different conceptual bases. See the paragraph
following this one as well, for the ultimate consequence of the hero’s project of the
polis.
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angle—as Pitkin’s picture of it. The last element to consider is the
particularly striking way in which the institution refuses the possibility
of change; Tsao’s translation of Arendt’s Vita Activa provides something
which is left implicit in the equivalent passage of The Human Condition;
the past is not to be remembered through the continuity of
time as the past, with the awareness of a temporal distance,
but instead is to be directly maintained in a perpetual present,
in a temporally unchanged form (Tsao’s translation; Arendt’s
emphasis Tsao: 2002, p.114).
This is, perhaps, just another way of stating that there can be no new
projects if the polis is to function as intended. The polis, to function
in this way, cannot even achieve the cyclical movement of labour; it
achieves only stasis, ﬁxity like that of a use-object. Unlike the use-object,
however, there is no prospect of its intended use coming to an end. This
reverts to an understanding of politics which Markell argued (above)
Arendt’s concept of action was directly opposed to.
2.9 Conclusion
On the basis of the above, we know what is at stake for Arendt in setting
out her redescriptive project: a vision of politics which is separated out
from notions of rule. The way in which Arendt separates out work and
action leads to just this. The distinction between labour and action also
contributes, forming the backdrop for the construction of identity in
public, as well as the need for human efforts (understood in terms of
work and action together) for the creation of any kind of continuity.
How does the above relate to the work of the following chapters?
The badness of the polis lies in the way in which it inadequately re-
lates participants to their predecessors, making the former merely the
memory-keepers for the latter. ‘Judgment’, the subject of the following
chapter, provides an alternative to this relationship, one which allows
for the element of initiative in action in a way which would also perform
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the commemorative role which the polis ultimately failed to. Judgment
combines what we above called the ‘initiatory’ and the ‘context-related’
elements of action and, for that reason, is of a piece with the use of
Markell above.
The deﬁciencies of the polis also provide a comparative measure for
the merits of other arrangements of political institutions in Arendt’s
work. This contrast will be most obvious when the polis is compared
to the place of the founding act in Arendt’s account of the American
Revolution.72
Before encountering the structural contexts which Arendt attaches
to this vision, we will turn to consider the other faculty which has a
role to play: judgment.
72The way in which the Greeks of the polis lay down the ‘correct’ interpretation of
events parallels Honig’s discussion of ‘constative’ elements of founding (see subsec-
tions 4.7.4 and 4.7.5). What the Greek actors seek is, in Arendt’s own description, to
establish the essence of what has been done, to place it out of the reach of other’s
opinions. The American Revolution, on the other hand, will be seen to leave deciding
the essence of the act within the realm of the properly political.
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Judgment
The last chapter closed with, amongst other things, the polis; this
leads to the following question: how is the political actor able to
combine sensitivity for their inherited context with their own capacity
to undertake new projects? The polis represented one failure to balance
these two considerations, subordinating the entire public realm to the
initial project of the founders. Failure in the other direction, which
might arise in response to something like the project of the polis, would
involve actors in somehow refusing anything inherited, in a spirit
of rebellion. Whilst the former problem leads, until it collapses, to
ossiﬁcation, the latter would be destructively self-defeating for any
actor interested in an identiﬁable self.
Any middle course between these two extremes would allow the
actor to take on a constructive relationship to the past without thereby
being entirely determined by it. In the previous chapter, we saw that
an actor was entirely dependent on the interpretation of their deeds by
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others, both for the meaning of the deed itself and for the self of the
actor; this indicates the starting point for an approach to the past which
is neither wholly destructive nor concerned with slavish adherence. In
short, what is needed is a way for the actor to relate to the acts of others
(including those no longer present) which matches the characteristics
of action.1
This chapter will show that it is Arendt’s work on ‘judgment’ which
ﬁts this criterion, providing a way for actors to make use of the past
in a way which allows them to treat it—to treat speciﬁc characters and
events which they take from it—much as they would treat the deeds of
their contemporaries. Part of this treatment of judgment is showing that
it is, as it will be treated here, continuous with ‘action’ as found in The
Human Condition, an expansion of certain elements present there rather
than something radically new in Arendt’s later work. In particular, this
builds on the backwards-looking elements of action, the interpretative
work which is done by other actors in order to assemble a life story out
of a set of deeds; the difference which results from making ‘judgment’
a part of the picture, we shall see below, is that it frankly admits that
the life-story is never a ﬁnished product, even if the life itself has long
since ceased.
What are the qualities of judgment which makes it suitable for the
political? The most important is that it functions as a means of thinking
about the past and discussing it which permits some dignity to the
proliferation of differing viewpoints and the opinions they generate.
The turn to judgment marks a commitment to the value of ‘opinion’ as
a component of the public realm.2
1For an argument that Arendt’s turn to judgment is an attempt to ‘tame’ action,
see Villa (1992, p.287ff). For a reply to the same, see Honig (1993b). Honig’s answer is
that there are other “practices [and] institutions” in Arendt’s work which will achieve
the same, with certain kinds of action numbering in the list Honig gives (1993b, p.529).
This thesis takes a different route to Honig’s paper. Whilst it is true that “action in
concert, promising [and] forgiving” (Honig: 1993b, p.592) do have a stabilising effect,
the continuity between action and judgment presented here shows that a certain kind
of stabilising effect is inherent in action as such or, to put it another way, that all
action is ‘action in concert’.
2For the distinction Arendt draws between opinion and truth, see Arendt (1993d,
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subjective. It elevates opinion from the mere expression of subjective
preferences, which could not form the meaningful basis of a public
realm; at the same time, it avoids the elements of the world which
are objective, which are not subject of opinion (and resists treating all
questions as if they are matters of objective fact).3
The main source for discussing Arendt’s view of judgment is the
posthumously-published Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, which
takes Kant’s Critique of Judgment to be a work of political philosophy
(Arendt: 1982b, p.9).4 Arendt acknowledges that Kant’s use of judgment
pertains to the aesthetic, rather than the political;
he discovered this phenomenon [of judgment founded on
common sense]...when he was examining the phenomenon
of taste and hence the only kind of judgments which, since
they concern merely aesthetic matters, have always been
supposed to lie outside the political realm as well as the
domain of reason (Arendt: 1993c, pp.221–222).
Arendt’s appropriation of Kant on judgment undoes the ﬁrst restriction,
the complete dis-similarity of aesthetics and politics, without challeng-
ing the second (if by ‘reason’, we take her to refer to something like
‘calculative or technical rationality’).
The use of Kant stands in for the third volume of The Life of the Mind
which Arendt had barely begun to write at the time of her death (Beiner:
p.237ff). See also, below, the discussion of the same contrast in the context of the
Declaration of Independence p.4.7.4ff.
3In relation to this, Habermas’ reading of Arendt, with its attendant faults as
discussed by Canovan, is illuminating. See below, section 3.4.
4For a discussion of how closely Arendt’s reading of the Critique reﬂects that book,
see Dostal (2001). He describes her reading not only as “unorthodox” but also as
“violat[ing] not only the letter but the spirit of Kant’s philosophy” (p.140). On the
basis of this understanding, Dostal takes Kant to be unsuitable for Arendt’s project
(p.139) and offers his own “more orthodox” reading of Kant (Dostal: 2001, p.140).
That Arendt’s appropriation of Kant is in keeping with her aims is a substantial,
though backgrounded, claim of this chapter pursued through showing the similarities
between judgment and action.
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1982, p.89). Based mainly on Arendt’s reading of Kant, there are three
important features of judgment: ﬁrst, that ‘imagination’ is an integral
part of using it; second, that judgment is concerned with speciﬁc
historical incidents and individuals which function as ‘exemplars’;
third, that judgment is reliant on a sensus communis, a ‘community
sense’, which links actors and makes mutual understanding possible.
Each of these three features is the focus of one section in turn.
3.1 Imagination
Imagination contributes to judgment by functioning as a preparatory
faculty, “making present what is absent” (Arendt: 1982a, p.79). It does
so in two senses: ﬁrst, it allows recall of currently-absent objects;5
second, it makes it possible to “make present to the mind what is
absent from sense perception” (Beiner: 1982, p.80). This is the role
which is the more interesting one for our purposes here; it is the focus
of much of what follows.
This element of imagination isn’t only necessary for the sake of
judgment;
The role of imagination for our cognitive faculties is per-
haps the greatest discovery Kant made in the Critique of
Pure Reason...the same faculty, imagination, which pro-
vides schemata for cognition, provides examples for judg-
ment (Arendt: 1982a, p.80).
This parallel provides much of the shape of Arendt’s description of
imagination; the way in which it contributes to one is fundamentally
the same as the way it contributes to the other. It is not, ultimately,
identical; there is more freedom involved in the kinds of judgment
imagination contributes to in the aesthetic (and political) case than in
the case of cognition.
5This is not just a matter of recall, though that is one half of the matter; Arendt
allows also that one can imagine what has not yet passed (Arendt: 1982a, p.80).
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For this reason, it is best to start (as Arendt does) with the way
imagination helps cognition; it does so by connecting “sensibility” to
“understanding” for whichever object has our attention (Arendt: 1982a,
p.80). Arendt’s example is a table, for which the sensible element is
merely a recognition that some object is present; the understanding has
the concept ‘table’ (Arendt: 1982a, p.80).
Imagination provides this link by grouping together the relevant
details into a “schema”, an image synthesised to the concept (Arendt:
1982a, p.81). This is a process of recognising which features are nec-
essary for some thing to count as an instance of a particular kind of
object (Arendt: 1982a, pp.81–82). The object itself is compared to the
schema, which is “something like an image” even whilst it eludes exact
speciﬁcation (Arendt: 1982a, p.82).6 Matching an object to the concept
in this way is a ‘determinate judgment’ (Arendt: 1982a, p.83). (The
importance of this name for the process comes in its contrast with
‘reﬂective judgments’, below.)
One ﬁnal thing relies on this relationship between objects and their
schema: the communicability of particular objects; Arendt’s example
is of the need to know ‘bridge’ in order to know what is meant by
‘George Washington Bridge’ (Arendt: 1982a, p.83). All “agreements and
disagreements” are dependent on, as Arendt puts it, our “talking about
the same thing” (Arendt: 1982a, p.83). Something like this need for
commonality recurs below in reference to judgment, most notably in
subsection 3.5.4.
Thus far, the discussion has only been of the commonalities between
cognition and aesthetic judgment. It is now time to focus on what
differentiates them, beginning with the differing relationship between
object and concept involved in each. This in turn determines the
different functions of schema and exemplar.
The kind of judgment involved in determining objects, as with the
6To be clear: it is not that Arendt holds that one has some sensory experience and
then applies imagination to it; imagination is involved in each perception from the
beginning (Arendt: 1982a, p.84).
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table above, is ‘determinant’; the kind of judgment which features in
Arendt’s account of politics is ‘reﬂective’. For the former, the operation
is one of ‘subsuming’ a “particular under a general rule”; we perceive
the relevant universal ‘in’ the object. In the case of reﬂective judgment,
the rule is derived from the particular (Arendt: 1982a, p.83), rather than
discovered in it. The difference, Arendt says, is that the former involves
“subsuming under a concept” and the latter “bringing to a concept”
(Arendt: 1982a, p.83).
The importance of this distinction is that, in the case of reﬂective
judgment, there is not a pre-existing cognitive element which determines
the correct rule to assign any given particular to. The force of this
distinction will become clearer over the course of the explanation of
exemplars, which follows in the next section.
3.2 Exemplars
Exemplars are different from schema in a few important respects,
though both have the same function with regard to their respective
faculties, as material to be worked on in some way.
The difference between the two relates largely to the relationship
which Arendt wishes to establish between particularities (rather than
generalities) and politics. The schema is a highly-abstracted idea,
derived from a set of particulars with the irrelevant or individuating
details removed.
A generalisation from men to Man would not be appropriate for a
politics of individual self-revelation. Resolution of individuals into their
socio-biological schema, should such a thing exist, would be no better.
Attempting to describe, say, one of the Caesars by pointing to a type
‘Caesar’ or ‘ambitious Roman’ would be sorely lacking in explanatory
power. We have already seen how Arendt thinks philosophy has tended
to commit this sort of error, though her main concern is not so much
the lack of detail as the disindividuating tendency as such. Reduction
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of people to a schematic person necessitates stripping out the most
interesting qualities of each, leaving us with only the common biological
facts, plus, perhaps, some vague idea that humans tend to value such-
and-such a thing. It would also leave us with a schema which we could
only sensibly call ‘human nature’, one which is in danger of becoming
prescriptive as well as descriptive.
This concern informs Arendt’s turn towards exemplars as units of
material for judgment, which match in temperament to the distinc-
tively individual outbursts Arendt calls ‘action’. Instead of relating the
particular instance ‘back’ to a schema in order to reach generalities,
the exemplar somehow “contains in itself...a concept or general rule”
(Arendt: 1982a, p.84). There is also a spontaneity to declarations of
judgment, which are made “without any derivations from general rules”
(Arendt: 1982a, p.84). The example Arendt uses to explain this process
is the judging of a person’s courage or otherwise. In her example, the
Greeks would discuss courage with the example of Achilles in ‘the
backs of their minds’ (Arendt: 1982a, p.84).
The use of Achilles as an example is not intended, then, as a
stepping-stone through which one can then reach the elusive schematic
courageous man. Instead, the unit of analysis and the original ‘item’ are
fundamentally the same object. They are not quite identical, however;
...I can talk about Napoleon Bonaparte as a particular man;
but the moment I speak about Bonapartism I have made an
example of him (Arendt: 1982a, p.84).
The difference between the individual and the example generated from
them is presumably the difference in focus on their characteristics. The
example is, after all, being used to explicate some other feature, such as
courage, rather than as a straight-forward biography. The relationship
between these two ‘things’ is rather different than that between things
and their schema. In the latter case, there are two distinct objects, the
latter amalgamated from a survey of that type of object (Arendt: 1982a,
p.82). People and the exemplars they relate to are demonstrably the
same base ‘object’, else the example would generally fail to instruct.
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One important, likely the most important, aspect of using examples
for explicating a ‘concept or general rule’ is that examples are in some
sense ‘valid’. When Arendt discusses exemplary validity, she discusses
the need to use examples with which an audience will be familiar to
some degree (Arendt: 1982a, p.84). This is obviously important, as it’s
no use elaborating something with reference to Bonapartism if the other
party in the discussion doesn’t know who Napoleon was, as Arendt
illustrates the point (Arendt: 1982a, p.84).
However, there is another qualifying characteristic for examples
which she does not address. This is the question of their qualitative
relevance, the match between the person chosen as exemplar and what
they are supposed to be examples of. This is an issue to which Arendt
does not direct her attention but, this is perhaps because the answer is
relatively obvious: the aptness of a particular exemplar is not something
which can be determined in advance but will always be a matter of
discussion even after some exemplar or other is chosen. Attention to the
judgments of others includes attention to the possibility that one might
choose an inapt judgment, either one which is not the best available
or one which, at the limit case, simply does not display the relevant
qualities. If it were possible to now this fully in advance of discussion,
there would be no need at all to discuss an exemplar, to make public
one’s thoughts on them save through simple proclamation. There is
a parallel here with the way in which Arendt reads the preamble to
the Declaration of Independence; the only way to specify in advance
the meaning of that document would be to control the reception and
interpretation of it (see below, section 4.7).
3.3 Sensus Communis
We now turn to describe the sensus communis, a term Arendt has
adapted from Kant’s Critique of Judgment to denote the capacities which
make judgment possible (Kant: 1987, p.160). The commonality of judg-
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ment consists in assuming it to be “a sense shared” by others, such that
we take account of those others’ views as we make our own judgments
(Kant: 1987, p.160).
Arendt’s version of sensus communis differs from Kant’s in two sig-
niﬁcant ways. The ﬁrst change is the more subtle, though it eventually
comes to have signiﬁcant effect. This is the change from Kant’s treat-
ment of sensus communis as a set of transcendental condition to Arendt’s
treatment of it as something more ‘concrete’. In Beiner’s ‘rereading’
of Arendt’s use of Kant, he recognises that Arendt engages in some
strategic choices of source (Beiner: 2001, cf.p.93) but also regards the fol-
lowing de-transcendentalising move from Arendt as a mistaken reading
(Beiner: 2001, p.96);
One judges always as a member of a community, guided by
one’s community sense, one’s sensus communis (Beiner: 2001,
p.96).
We shall see the difference this makes between the two kinds of sensus
communis very shortly.
Arendt’s other interpretive manoeuvre is to focus on one element of
Kant’s description at the expense of two others. This is the list of three
components of the sensus communis Kant gives:
The following principles may serve to elucidate its principles:
(1) to think for oneself; (2) to think from the standpoint of
everyone else; and (3) to think always consistently. The ﬁrst
is the maxim of an unprejudiced, the second of a broadened,
the third of a consistent way of thinking (Kant: 1987, pp.160–
161).
Arendt’s interest is almost exclusively with the second element of the
list, which reﬂects her interest in the interactive element of judgment
and brings judgment more obviously in line with the communicative
elements of action. Thinking without prejudice may just as happily be
considered prerequisite to, or function of the destructive processes of
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thinking. It may also be a natural consequence of taking into account
the views of others, providing those others have different prejudices
and one can weigh them against each other.
The concern with mental consistency was mainly covered by Arendt
in her discussion of conscience in Arendt (1972a). There, she claims
avoiding self-contradiction and a variety of similar imperatives was
only of interest to the very few, to those who lived largely in thought.
It cannot, therefore, commonly function as a moral restraint. This
pessimism is the reason she does not emphasise mental consistency in
relation to judgment. It may also be that she simply isn’t that interested
on what goes on within the political agent, given her earlier statements
about the difﬁculty of knowing the internal processes either of ourselves
or others.
This emphasis combines sympathetically with the change in sensus
communis from transcendental conditions. The down-played aspects
seem more like preconditions for stringent thought as such, while the
idea of needing to take account of others’ opinions implicitly encour-
ages thoughts of groundedness in the world. Left as a transcendental
precondition, it would instead look more like the minimum condi-
tion of communicability which was present in Arendt’s discussion of
imagination.
To make it ‘concrete’ is to make it about the actual opinions of
particular others. It remains an exercise of the imagination, however,
whereby one attempts to account for the potential opinions of others
in order to arrive at a “general standpoint”, as Arendt translates Kant
(Arendt: 1982b, p.71).
The use of ‘general’ rather than ‘universal’ is reﬂected in the possi-
bility of there being more than one sensus communis, one per community
and the hypothetical sensus one has as a member of the human race
(Arendt: 1982b, p.72). From this, it becomes obvious that one’s member-
ship of a community is equivalent to saying one shares in that particular
sensus.
What this leaves open is the possibility that involvement in a par-
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ticular sensus communis is a matter of degree. This would make better
sense of thinking of one’s common sensus with the rest of humanity
being ‘vague’ or ‘weak’, language to which the language to which the
de-transcendentalised version seems to lend itself quite well. Beiner de-
scribes sensus-communities as a “series of expanding concentric circles”
and the tighter circles can easily be thought of as the more signiﬁcant
to set-members (Beiner: 2001, p.96). Logically, this ought to be related
to how easily one can ﬁnd examples for judgment that other members
of a given community can usefully work with.
Arendt very brieﬂy contrasts this enlarged mind with an “enor-
mously enlarged empathy through which one can know what actually
goes on in the mind of all others” (Arendt: 1982b, p.43). She conﬂates
this somewhat with the idea that one might take the enlarged mind to
be the simple adoption of another’s prejudices (Arendt: 1982b, p.43),
a sort of mental tourism which is not identical with empathy. This
claim hints at the compatibility of judgment with the elements of action
which focused on communication; in place of hypotheses about an
internal life, the most obvious candidate—both as object of judgment
and as means of understanding the judgments of others—is the actual
deeds of fellow actors.
That last feature is what returns this element of judgment both to
the use of exemplars and to the responsiveness of action; judgment
forms a part of the response to the latter and, in so doing, makes use of
the common store of exemplars which contribute to a sensus communis
in order that the response be readily communicable.
3.4 Judgment as Communication
Given the prominence of the communicative element of judgment (and,
hence, of action), something needs to be said in regards to Habermas’
reading of Arendt, which emphasises the same element but does so
in a way which, as Canovan’s commentary on Habermas shows, dis-
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torts Arendt’s project. The way in which this distortion works brings
Arendt’s work closer to Rousseau’s in a way which starkly exposes
the interpretive damage done; Canovan’s comparison of Arendt and
Rousseau appears as the second half of this section to demonstrate
just this. The move to Rousseau is a move to a more extreme version,
verging on caricature, of what follows if we take Habermas’ Arendt
seriously.
First to Habermas. He recognises that Arendt’s work includes
attention to the distinctness of political action as ‘praxis’ (Canovan:
1983b, p.106)7; much of what, in Canovan’s brief summary of his view
(1983b, p.107), appears in Habermas’ understanding of Arendt matches
with what has been said in the previous chapter, about action.
This alternative conceptualisation of action which Habermas sees
in Arendt’s work emphasises the communicative element of political
action;
Arendt...understands power as the ability to agree upon a
common course of action in unconstrained communication
(Habermas: 1994, p.211).
This is unobjectionable, so long as ‘unconstrained’ is taken in a plain
language understanding. Later in the same work, Habermas charac-
terises Arendt’s work as interested in “unimpaired intersubjectivity” as
a feature of action (Habermas: 1994, p.215), which matches with the
account of judgment given here.
The problems arise, as Canovan points out (1983b, p.109), on the
basis of Habermas’ criticism of Arendt. There are two closely-related
points: ﬁrst, that Arendt refuses to treat “the process of reaching
agreement as about practical questions as rational discourse”; second
that, contra Arendt, Habermas takes there to be “a cognitive founda-
tion...for common convictions” (Habermas: 1994, both p.225). This
7Canovan’s reference is to an address Habermas gave in 1980 but elsewhere,
he says much the same thing; Arendt’s work “serves to systematically renew the
Aristotelian concept of praxis” (Habermas: 1994, p.214).
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part of Habermas’ reading is characterised by Canovan as “a complete
misunderstanding”; ﬂawed because it is “excessively intellectualist”
(1983b, p.109).8 In his reversion to ‘rationality’ and ‘cognitive founda-
tion’, Habermas discards Arendt’s commitment to plurality. He has
only one brief account for how differing convictions can arise; they can
result from “systematically restricted [systems] of communication” and
are thus “illusory” (Habermas: 1994, p.225). The correct response to
unwelcome illusions is to demonstrate their illusory nature, that is, to
cure the victim of them.
For Canovan, the error is that Habermas is concerned with com-
munication at the expense of Arendt’s interest in action (1983b, p.108)
but this doesn’t quite capture the essence of the problem; it is not
inconceivable that someone should be interested in action as well but
wish it to be based on some rational decision-making process. Or,
conversely, it is conceivable to be concerned primarily with the quality
of communication without thereby seeing rationality as the necessary
grounding. Something of the danger of Habermas’ reading of Arendt
is revealed by turning to a different paper by Canovan.
Canovan (1983a) is an extended comparison of Arendt and Rousseau,
including one difference which is relevant to the discussion of Haber-
mas just encountered: Rousseau’s ‘General Will’ (p.290ff.). The relevant
feature of this part of Rousseau’s work is that it has a combinatory, uni-
fying effect; the General Will forms part of the creation of a “collective
personality”, a “device for turning a multitude into one” by means of
a “social compact” (Canovan: 1983a, p.290).9 By this mechanism, the
8As part of her efforts here, Canovan says that Arendt “can certainly be criticized
for not...trying to work out by what criteria it can be established that one political
opinion is an improvement on another” (Canovan: 1983b, p.109). But conceding this
already gives too much away to a Habermas-like attempt to force rationality to be
given as a grounding for politics; any criterion given at all must ultimately itself be
reduced to this if it is to stand as arbiter ‘above’ a particular political situation. Instead,
the answer is to avoid this ‘supervisory’ role for the philosopher; what constitutes
‘better’ or ‘worse’ opinions is something which would have to be settled from within
the public realm.
9Arendt’s discussion of distinctive types of social contract appears below in section
4.4. Rousseau and Arendt both make contracts central to their understanding of
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“chaotic and conﬂicting wills of the subjects in their private capacity”,
become a singular will “in their public capacity, as citizens” (Canovan:
1983a, p.290). The differentiating qualities and private interests are to
suborned to this unifying will, which concerns itself with the public
good.
On Canovan’s telling, Rousseau’s plan rests on an assumption: “that
any citizen thinking rationally about these shared interests must come
to the same conclusion as any other”; the comparison she uses is
to draw out the quality of this agreement is an arithmetic problem
(Canovan: 1983a, p.291). If, as she says, the General Will is a matter of
“rational deduction”, then “there must be a right answer, and popular
deliberations may not be the best guide to it” (Canovan: 1983a, p.291).
Via the difﬁculty of ensuring anything better than majorities for
measures by vote-counting, Canovan’s description takes us to the logical
outcome of supposing that only one interest, that of the General Will
as “constructed entity”, unites the citizens;
a single rational man can work out what the General Will
requires without any need for real public deliberations. In
a perfect republic the assembled citizens would be mere
clones, all speaking with one voice. (Canovan: 1983a, p.292).
What relationship does this have to Habermas, or Canovan’s own com-
mentary on Habermas? It stands as a reductio. If the important thing is
to secure the rationally-optimal answer, then public deliberation hardly
seems like the best option. Of course, Habermas is instrumentally com-
mitted to discussion as a part of will-formation but the combination of
the two requires one to believe in something like the rational solubility
of conﬂicts about public goods. The image here is, even if one starts
from the assumption of several competing viewpoints, of convergence
on the one correct viewpoint. This does not require Rousseau’s seeming
hostility to factions and differentiable citizens; merely the commitment
to the idea that there is a rational answer to be had will do the job.
foundations, though we shall see that Arendt’s preferred form takes on quite different
characteristics and derives from quite different aims.
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The way in which Arendt has structured judgment does not match
with this picture; convergence along lines of rational agreement does not
feature. To return to the concerns which feature in Canovan’s discussion
of Habermas, this is not to say that Arendt holds convergence as such
to be impossible, which would be a quite fantastic claim to reconcile
with any of her examples of politics. Rather, there are two points: ﬁrst,
convergence on emotional grounds is a distinct possibility; second,
convergence is not always necessary. In the urgent case where action
simply must be taken, there is no need to regard those who counseled
something contrary to the ﬁnal result as irrational; it is enough that
they have given way. To regard them also as having held the ‘wrong
answer’ is an unnecessary insult best reserved only for those genuine
hopeless cases with whom dialogue is anyway impossible.
This risk of irreconcilability leads into another discussion, one re-
lated to the stability of a public realm.
3.5 The Inﬂuence of the Spectator
With a basic explanation of judgment in place, it is now possible to
examine the most salient difference between Arendt’s and Kant’s ex-
planation of the sensus communis. It will also be possible to address
Beiner’s “Interpretive Essay” on Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, in
which he claims that Arendt’s concept of judgment signiﬁcantly devel-
ops over the course of her career, with the latter version dropping out
of the public realm as such. These are, in fact, closely related concerns;
the changes in Arendt’s concept of the sensus communis make possible,
indeed necessary, a public role for the judge even as he appears in later
works by Arendt.
This section begins with the way in which Arendt differs from Kant
regarding the sensus communis. Kant presents the sensus communis as:
“...a sense shared [by all of us], i.e. a power to judge that
in reﬂecting takes account (a priori), in our thought, of
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everyone else’s way of presenting [something], in order as it
were to compare our own judgment with human reason in
general...(Kant: 1987, p.160).
For Kant, then, sensus communis signiﬁes a capacity common to all
humans qua humans; it is “the very least that we are entitled to expect”
from others (Kant: 1987, p.160).
In Arendt’s reading of Kant, sensus communis has come to signify
something different, tied to particular communities rather than just to
the community of humans as such. Beiner illustrates this change with
reference to Lecture Thirteen (Beiner: 2001, p.96), which Arendt begins
by declaring sensus communis equivalent to “community sense”, which
she contrasts with a “sensus privatus” (Arendt: 1982b, p.72). The manner
in which one escapes this isolation, the incommunicability of sensa-
tions, is dependent on the enlarged mind but Arendt’s presentation
emphasises communicability between speciﬁc individuals;
one can communicate only if one is able to think from the
other person’s standpoint; otherwise one will never meet
him, never speak with him in such a way that he under-
stands (Arendt: 1982b, p.74).
This particular comment could by itself almost be read merely to echo
Kant’s interest in the preconditions of judgment if it did not lead into
Arendt linking the communicability of pleasures to choosing “one’s
company” (Arendt: 1982b, p.74). This consideration would not be
possible if Arendt had treated sensus communis in the same way as Kant.
In Kant’s account, there is no real choice involved; the dividing line is
between those who are able to engage in the (singular) sensus communis
and those who lack this fundamental capacity. It is simply not possible
to connect with the latter category, so there is no question of choosing
company there.
This ‘company choosing’ claim occurs shortly before Arendt claims
that judging always occurs as part of a community, “guided by one’s
community sense” (Arendt: 1982b, p.75). As with company-choosing,
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this claim makes no real sense if talking about a universal capacity or
transcendental condition. Arendt does link this to the idea of humanity
as a whole as a community and thus to an idea of the world citizen
in Kant (Arendt: 1982b, p.75). The link, though, is not mainly to the
third Critique but to “Perpetual Peace” (Kant: 2001, pp.103,105). Where
Kant does talk of an “...as it were, original contract dictated by [our]
very humanity” in the Critique of Judgment it is clearly ﬁgurative rather
than literal; it is immediately made clear that this does not make the
determinant of ‘successful’ communicability of judgment the society of
the judge (Kant: 1987, p.160). Instead, the inﬂuence of one’s immediate
social surroundings would, on Kant’s account, ﬁgure amongst the
temptations to resort to local prejudice at the expense of comparing
one’s judgment with “as it were...human reason in general” (Kant:
1987, p.150). Even if this is as much ﬁgurative as the ‘original compact’,
it does at least point to Kant’s hope that the judge is able to escape
parochialism.
In Kant’s account, then, the potential communicability of taste is
grounded in the universality of the sensus communis as a human capacity
rather than any empirical qualities of particular humans. In altering this
and relating ‘community sense’ to the empirical community to which
a judge belongs, Arendt has made successful communication of taste
between any two (or more) individuals dependent on some fact about
the relationship between the two which places them in a ‘community’,
thereby enabling them to share a ‘community sense’. Since this is not,
except in the extreme case, a community of all humans, 10 there must
be something which differentiates member from non-member for any
given community. In order to be relevant to the judge, this fact must be
such that it orients the community sense in some way.
10This community is surely meant only ﬁguratively by Arendt, as much as it is
meant to guide both actor and spectator; “...one is supposed to take one’s bearings
from the idea, not the actuality, of being a world citizen...” (Arendt: 1982b, p.76).
Further, the world citizen is presented as the conclusion of Arendt’s analysis of the
‘original compact’ in Kant, which she herself takes to be “a mere idea, regulating” our
judgments and conduct (Arendt: 1982b, pp.74–75).
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Uncovering the best candidate for the creation of such a community
brings us, in the following subsection, to Beiner’s analysis of Arendt’s
changing conception of judgment, in which the later version for the
judge is disassociated from politics. The change to an ‘empirical sensus
communis’ in place of Kant’s transcendental conception stands against
this interpretation by providing a politically-relevant role for the judge
even when not considered an actor in any straightforward sense. The
‘web of relations’ which appeared in The Human Condition (Arendt:
1998, p.184) as a necessary component of the background for action
is now, explicitly, the business of the judge, who maintains it as part
of maintaining the possibility of a communicable sensus communis.
Demonstrating that this, or something very much like it, is a role the
later judge is suitable for is the work of the remainder of this section.
3.5.1 Beiner’s Developmental Thesis
Beiner treats Arendt’s concept of judgment as developing signiﬁcantly
enough over the course of her theorising that it can be divided into two
reasonably distinct forms. Much of this chapter has drawn on Lectures
on Kant’s Political Philosophy, which Beiner places amongst those later
works in which the distance between judge and public realm is found.
Before demonstrating the judge’s continued usefulness to the public
even in these later works, it will be necessary to detail Beiner’s analysis
of the differences and continuities of judgment across the course of
Arendt’s work.
Beiner begins by setting out the context within which the late writ-
ings on judgment are found; the unfulﬁlled plan to produce a volume
on judgment as the third part of The Life of the Mind. In this role, judg-
ment was to settle the ‘impasse’ with which the volume on willing
ﬁnished; the “abyss of freedom” (or of “pure spontaneity”) and the
philosophical tradition’s inability to represent it (Arendt: 1978b, p.216).
Even Augustine, with whom Arendt closes the volume, can only offer
an argument which is “somehow opaque”; Arendt’s Augustine presents
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the fact of birth as also making humans able to introduce the genuinely
new into the world (Arendt: 1978b, p.217). According to Arendt, all
this reveals is “that we are doomed to be free...” and able only to like
it or to escape to some form of fatalism (Arendt: 1978b, p.217). This
is “the impasse, if such it is,” that judgment is introduced, without
particularly high hopes, to solve; Arendt suggests it “at least may tell
us what is involved in our pleasures and displeasures” (Arendt: 1978b,
p.217). This is what links judgment to the rest of The Life of the Mind and
“to the basic problems that impelled Arendt to write” that work (Beiner:
1982, p.90). These include the problems of Eichmann’s thoughtlessness
(Arendt: 1978a, p.4) and of the potential to look at the world as though
anew following the “demise of metaphysics” (Arendt: 1978a, p.12). The
former is in part the effect of the latter for Arendt; see for instance,
“Thinking and Moral Considerations” (Arendt: 2003, pp.159–161).11
That Arendt had come to treat judgment in terms of its place in the
life of the mind makes sense of the way in which it has changed in
her later works. This change presents Beiner with “a further difﬁculty”
for his project of reconstructing Arendt’s thoughts on judgment in the
absence of the volume of The Life of the Mind which would have been
devoted to it (Beiner: 1982, p.91);
...beginning in 1970 we can detect a subtle but important
reorientation. In [Arendt’s] writings up until the 1971 es-
say “Judgment and Moral Considerations”, judgment is
considered from the point of view of the vita activa; in her
writings from that essay onward, judgment is considered
from the point of view of the life of the mind. The emphasis
shifts from the representative thought and enlarged mental-
ity of political agents to the spectatorship and retrospective
judgment of historians and storytellers. The blind poet, at
11This piece and the introduction to “Thinking” begin in remarkably similar man-
ners; “it seems to me so presumptuous that I feel I...” occurs in the initial paragraph
of both pieces and leads to a “justiﬁcation” of her chosen subject Arendt (2003, p.159)
and Arendt (1978a, p.3). Both ‘justiﬁcations’ feature Eichmann prominently.
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a remove from the action and therefore capable of disin-
terested reﬂection, now becomes the emblem of judging.
(Beiner: 1982, p.91)
This last claim is drawn directly from Lectures on Kant’s Political Philos-
ophy, where the spectator’s distance forms the basis of his ability to
see “the play as a whole” whilst the actor’s view remains “partial by
deﬁnition” (Arendt: 1982b, pp.68–69).
This much of Beiner’s analysis is not in dispute; the position from
which Arendt approaches judgment has changed, occasioned by a
change in her interests. This is responsible for those differences which
cause Beiner to divide Arendt’s concept of judgment into “two more
or less distinct phases; early and late,” (Beiner: 1982, p.92). Reﬂecting
the differing foci of these two phases, he refers to them as “practical
and contemplative”, respectively (Beiner: 1982, p.92). These two forms
of judgment dwell in two entirely different worlds according to Beiner,
“the world of praxis [and] the world of contemplation” (Beiner: 1982,
p.92).
The contentious element of Beiner’s analysis is, in effect, an attempt
to treat these two as entirely separable; in “what [Beiner] calls her
“later” formulations, [Arendt] is no longer concerned with judging as a
feature of political life as such” (Beiner: 1982, p.92). Beiner contends
that demonstrating that Arendt does not have two different concepts
of judgment would require “an account of precisely why, in her last
writings, judging as an activity is placed exclusively in the life of the
mind instead of being assigned a more equivocal status” (Beiner: 1982,
p.92).
Even though this version of judgment is an attempt to resolve
an ‘impasse’ between “human freedom and the faculty of willing”
(Beiner: 1982, p.93), this does not in itself make judgment the exclusive
concern of the contemplative, as opposed to active life; “embracing
human freedom...seeing it as bearable for natal and mortal beings
like ourselves” (Beiner: 1982, p.93) is at least potentially a concern
of those who make use of it. Indeed, the participant in politics will
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be keenly interested in both “the unavailability of and the need for
critical thinking” and “the redemptive powers of human judgment”,
both of which appear on Beiner’s long list of the themes of Lectures
on Kant’s Political Philosophy (Beiner: 1982, p.93). The list begins with
questions of “meaning or worth”, of evaluation (Beiner: 1982, p.92); all
of these are questions which form part of public discourse. They are
also considerations which affect conduct.
This thesis is not concerned, sadly, with the development of judg-
ment in Arendt’s thought in itself, with which no-one can reasonably
argue; the concern, instead, of the following subsections, is to show that
the distinction between judge and actor does not banish the judge from
the public realm. Demonstrating this, without reducing judgment’s dis-
tinctiveness relative to action, will involve showing that the judge has a
different contribution to make to public life. This begins by establishing
that, even if we take Beiner’s ‘blind poet’ as the model, judgment need
not be a solitary business.
3.5.2 The Interaction of Judges
Demonstrating that there is some interactive element to judgment will
now begin by showing that Arendt takes interaction between judges
to form some part of the process of judging. This is the ﬁrst step in
understanding the part that solitude has to play in judgment.
What follows is a comparison of the ways in which withdrawal
from public similarly ﬁgures in both ‘early’ and ‘late’ judgment, which
illustrates some continuity between the two forms; the solitary quality
of judgment is not entirely restricted to ‘late’ Arendt, nor is the role of
imagination signiﬁcantly different between the two forms.
In ‘What is Freedom?’, which features in Beiner’s group of ‘early’
judgment-related works, the judge is already able to function if “com-
pletely isolated while forming an opinion” because he can continue to
take absent others into account (Arendt: 1993f, p.242). This is function-
ally identical to the role of imagination in constructing the “possible
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rather than actual judgments of others” as part of judgment in Lectures
on Kant’s Political Philosophy (Arendt: 1982b, p.43). In the earlier of these
two pieces, the solitude of the judge seems optional. In “Thinking”,
however, the “withdrawal from direct participation [in an act]” is a
necessary part of judging but this withdrawal is not from the realm
of opinions as such (Arendt: 1978a, p.94). In this case as well, it is
imagination which maintains the judge’s ability to attend to the others
they have withdrawn from temporarily.
This encourages the idea that judging is an entirely solitary business,
in which the judge is present only with imagined ﬁgures derived from
the companionship from which they have excluded themselves. This is
not, of course, to say that the judge is entirely alone for every step of
forming a judgment.
Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy contains the claim that “Specta-
tors exist only in the plural...[they are] always involved with fellow
spectators” (Arendt: 1982b, p.63). The best way to make sense of this
claim is to take the spectators to be interacting at some point in the
process of judgment; indeed, their existing in a plurality could never
be discovered otherwise. There are two possible points of interaction if
we take the opinion-forming section of judgment to be undertaken in
seclusion; one before and the other after this point in the process.
Listing the interactive elements of judgment is not an attempt to
deny that there is a certain quality of being alone with oneself which
is a necessary part of judgment. In ‘The Crisis in Culture’,12 Arendt
claims that there is an element of self-disclosure to judgment, a disclo-
sure which “gains in validity to the degree that it has liberated itself
from merely individual idiosyncrasies” (Arendt: 1993c, p.223). The
idiosyncrasies in question must include inherited prejudices which can
be thought of as merely the idiosyncrasies of others. These must be kept
in mind by the judge, for they may well be relevant parts either of the
others with whom one shares the public realm or the subjects one must
12Beiner categorises this essay as an ‘early’ appearance of judgment (Beiner: 1982,
p.93).
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judge. Considered in this light, judgment seems more similar to action;
in both cases, there is a need to pay heed to the context within which
the individual in question operates without this becoming determinate
of their deeds. This leads in both cases to the responsibility of the indi-
vidual alone for their judgments and actions. We might arrive at this
last point in relation to judgment by considering the context of Arendt’s
reﬂections on judgment as a response to Eichmann’s ‘thoughtlessness’
(Arendt: 1978a, p.4).
It makes most sense to begin with a discussion of such interaction
as may be fruitful for the judge before they have withdrawn to ponder.
For now, this will need to include only the potential for knowledge
of, as it were, their peer judges. Considerations of wider context will
have to be let alone for the time being, to be addressed as part of the
interaction between judge and actor.
The plurality of the spectators is also manifest in their differences
prior to the event in question, in regard to their individual characters.
Also relevant will be the perspective afforded each judge, by dint of
what other relevant acts they might have witnessed or, so to speak, the
‘position’ they ﬁnd themselves in relevant to the act. This would be in
keeping with one of the most obvious ways in which members of any
audience differ; not everyone can share the same seat.
Unless some knowledge of these differences is available to the
judges, they will be unable to meaningfully consider the potential
opinions of others. The most obvious source of this information is the
prior opinions of those same other judges. Some degree of interaction
thus forms the beginning of the process of judging.
The other element of interaction is that which takes place after
judgments have been formed in private. In the eighth session of Lectures
on Kant’s Political Philosophy, Arendt summarises the preceding two
sessions with the claim that;
The importance of the occurrence (Begebenheit) is for [Kant]
exclusively in the eye of the beholder, in the opinion of the
onlookers who proclaim their attitude in public. (Arendt:
1982b, p.46).
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The ‘occurrence’ in question is the French Revolution, which formed
the focus of the session immediately prior to this claim. There, a
lengthy quotation of Kant includes the claim that the real importance
of the French Revolution lies in the “the mode of thinking of the
spectators which reveals itself publicly...even at risk that this partiality
could become very disadvantageous for them if discovered”(Arendt:
1982b, p.45). This places the publicity of the spectator as perhaps the
central feature of their response to, in this case, the French Revolution.
It is this which reveals the “moral character” of mankind and thus
constitutes the meaning of the event (Arendt: 1982b, p.46). Peculiarly,
the spectators’ “sympathetic participation” shape, rather than merely
reveal, this meaning (Arendt: 1982b, p.46).
There are two elements of this passage by Kant which are relevant
here and they combine in an interesting way. The ﬁrst is that, in this
instance, Kant’s focus is on the enthused commentary surrounding
the French Revolution rather than the event itself. Kant is, in effect,
treating the commentary as an event of interest in its own right, albeit
one dependent on the event of the Revolution itself.
The second element is that Kant’s commentary is about the meaning
of the event, which, without the “sympathetic participation” of the
spectators, “would be altogether different”, Arendt claims, “or simply
nonexistent” (Arendt: 1982b, p.46). The meaning in this case is the
sympathetic interest in itself, “proclaimed in public”, which “inspires
hope” that there will come a “cosmopolitan existence” in which “all the
original capacities” of humans can be realised (Arendt: 1982b, pp.46–
47, the last two are Arendt quoting Kant). In the same way that the
spectators of the French Revolution create a meaning out of that event,
Kant has created a separate meaning out of the fact of those spectating
as such, a meaning they themselves would not, perhaps, recognise so
long as they focus only on the event of the Revolution.
In dealing in the ‘meaning’ of the spectators, Kant is performing
basically the same act in relation to them as they have performed in
relation to the French Revolution itself; Kant himself functions as a
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spectator in this case. In so doing, he is dependent on the publicity of
his subjects. In turn, he has made public his own views as a spectator.
Proclamation, then, forms an important part of the spectator’s—
therefore the judge’s—activity. Without it, Arendt’s later claim that
“the public realm is constituted by the critics and the spectators” (Arendt:
1982b, p.63) could make no sense at all. Publicity makes available the
thoughts of the spectator both to his immediate peers and to anyone,
such as Kant, interested in the community of spectators as such.13 It
must indicate that the judges make public the results of their delibera-
tions, even if it does not indicate much about the manner in which they
present them or respond to those actual judgments of others in relation
to their own imaginative visiting.
So far, only the interaction of judges with judges has been shown
to be a feature of Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy’s version of
judgment, without showing that this has any effect on the actors upon
whom the judges pass comment. Unless some such effect can be shown,
then judge and actor will remain isolated from each other, denying the
possibility of public inﬂuence for the judge-as-such. Without the claim
that judges proclaim their opinions, or that they form the public realm
(Arendt: 1982b, p.63), then judging would be a private affair, with any
disclosure of the results forming a separate instance of public action.
3.5.3 The Actors’ Need for an Audience
Having established that the judges together constitute a public realm,
the next necessary step is to bridge the gap between judges and ac-
tors. There are alternatives to establishing such a link, though the are
unpalatable. One obvious solution is to take judges on the one hand
and actors on the other to be engaged in entirely different things; this
might include, for example, taking the concept of the public realm to
have changed in Arendt’s work such that it was not contiguous with
13This availability of spectators to public discourse is as much an availability to
men of action as it is to those wishing treat the spectators themselves as a spectacle.
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with the thing referred to as ‘public realm’ in The Human Condition.
There is no evidence to suggest this particular development in Arendt’s
views and, indeed, any hypothetical version of it could only look very
peculiar.
This is particularly obvious when considering the importance of
speech both to the public realm presented as the realm of action and
to that created by and amongst the judges. At the very least, it would
be peculiar to suggest two entirely separate sets of speech, one para-
sitic upon but not acknowledged by the other. This would be rather
like ﬁlm-makers and ﬁlm critics co-existing without the former ever
acknowledging the latter or the volume of tickets sold per ﬁlm. Suppos-
ing such a separation is implausible and, in the individual case, only
appears in Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy as the loss of sensus
communis as a symptom of insanity (Arendt: 1982b, p.70).
As well as the link between judges, the interaction of judge and actor
is at issue; unless there is some such demonstrable link, then the two
sorts of activity cannot together form a public realm. There is some risk
that the two would seem disconnected, as it is not immediately obvious
how ‘late’ Arendt makes mutual inﬂuence possible. Understanding
how such an interaction between the two activities can function will
reveal the role of the judge, or ‘spectator’ in public life.
Arendt’s description of the spectator emphasises their role in the
structure or preconditions of spectacles as such; “no one in his right
mind would ever put on a spectacle without being sure of having
spectators to watch it” (Arendt: 1982b, p.62). This claim occurs in
opposition to the idea that the spectator is secondary (Arendt: 1982b,
p.62); the necessary presence of others for action is expanded from
Arendt’s conception to explicitly include those who are not (yet), in a
particular case, direct participants. It is “the judgment of the spectator
[that] creates the space without which no [beautiful] objects could
appear at all” (Arendt: 1982b, p.62).
In addition to this ‘structural’ necessity, the spectator is implicated
in the speciﬁc conduct of the actor, whose desire for fame makes him
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“dependent on the opinion of the spectator” (Arendt: 1982b, p.55). In
addition, then, to creating the space in which action is possible, the
spectator becomes the ﬁgure through which the public is able to ensure
the immortality of the actors. Both effects rely on the distance of the
spectator from the action, which makes a view of the whole available
to them. The same detachment also makes the actor, as an individual,
dependent on the spectator as the medium through which his fame can
be assured (Arendt: 1982b, p.55).
For this relationship between spectator and actor to hold any inﬂu-
ence over the actions undertaken, a few other qualities are necessary
components of the activity of spectating. The ﬁrst is that the spectator
must have a limited capacity to attend, coupled with some at least some
control over how that limited attention is directed. If spectators attend
to all things, or attend to some things at random (or under the direction
of some other force), there is nothing particular that actors need do to
secure the ﬁrst step on the path to fame.
Further, an actor will have to resort to a ‘scatter-shot’ approach
to action unless he has some means of determining what acts might
accord with available spectators. In Arendt’s discussion of ‘taste’ as
part of the process of creating art works, we ﬁnd the means of such
a detection, though she does not give taste exactly this role. She
introduces taste as a counterpoint to ‘genius’, the productive capacity,
in order to establish Kant’s “subordination of genius to taste” (Arendt:
1982b, p.62). In this cause, Arendt quotes Kant’s claim that taste, here a
form of judgment, “is the discipline (or training) of genius; it clips its
wings...gives guidance...brings clearness and order [into the thoughts
of genius;]” (Arendt: 1982b, p.62; Arendt’s ellipses and parenthetical
addition). The genius is able, by means of taste, to make communicable
the otherwise “ineffable element in the state of mind” (Arendt: 1982b,
Arendt quoting Kant, p.63). This communicability relies on the actor
retaining their faculty of taste even as they act (Arendt: 1982b, p.63);
in this there is continuity of function with judgment as it appears in
Arendt’s earlier work.
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The degree to which taste constrains and enables action depends on
how restricted a sense ‘communicability’ takes. If it only signiﬁes that
the expressions used take the form of a currently-available language,
or that gestures are used in their normal fashion, then nothing much
at all is ruled out. This, however, is clearly not the meaning of com-
municability which is operative here, as the genius in this discussion
is concerned with putting into words that which would otherwise be
difﬁcult to communicate (Arendt: 1982b, p.62). Action deals in meaning,
so must successfully convey something rather more than the correct use
of common language if it is to count as successful, i.e. the successful
use of taste by an actor leads to the successful deployment of meaning
in public.
This applies as much to the interpretation of a deed as it does to
its being noticed at all. Ultimately, the only way for the actor to be
safe in establishing his self-interpretation as authoritative would be for
him to be sovereign over not only the audible responses of others but
their views as well. The closest analogue for this level of control which
appears in Arendt’s work is the polis. Judgment completes the picture
of politics against the limited picture the polis holds to, on precisely this
count.
3.5.4 ‘Building’ a sensus communis
The potential inﬂuence of the judges over their contemporary actors
is joined by a further means by which they may contribute to the
future shape of a public realm; it is through the shaping of the sensus
communis that they determine the potential and limits of discourse.
This is an inﬂuence which extends to future generations via selection
both of exemplars and of the terms in which those exemplars are
discussed. This inﬂuence is exerted not only over future actors but
also future judges;14 it is through the effect on later judges that the
ﬁeld of proﬁtable and explicable action is determined. This can effect
14Including the, as it were, judging element of actors in relation to their own action.
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public discourse only so long as the three-place relationship between
actor, judge and sensus communis is maintained. Additionally, it is only
because of Arendt’s ‘empirical’ version of the sensus communis that this
relationship is constitutive of political community in the manner which
will now be detailed.
The continuity of the sense of the political community is at stake
in the capacity of the judges to preserve their opinion for the sake of
future political participants. Demonstrating that this is the case will
have ﬁnally provided the most important answer to Beiner’s claim that
the judge comes to have nothing to do with politics in ‘late’ Arendt.
Demonstrating that this is the judge’s part in politics will rest on
both the link Arendt describes between the judge and their community
and some of the qualities of politics found in her earlier work.
Any given judge, Arendt tells us, must judge as part of the commu-
nity to which they belong (Arendt: 1982b, p.75). Until now, the notion
of what differentiates political communities has not been explicitly
addressed here; linked as it is by Arendt to “one’s sensus communis
(Arendt: 1982b, p.75), it is an obvious move to consider the relationship
between the two more fully. The two are presented as coeval without
any indication if one is the foundation or cause of the other. It may
just as well be that Arendt wants to treat ‘belonging to a particular
community’ and ‘sharing that sensus communis’ as the same fact stated
in different ways.
The question, then, of how a sensus can differ is also the question
of how communities can differ. At this point, it is important to specify
that ‘community’ is taken to signify ‘political community’15 and that
this affects the set of what can be admitted as relevant.
One such exclusion is set out in Arendt’s “Truth and Politics”, which
is principally concerned with the mismatch between truth and political
conduct. Arendt presents ‘fact’ (as a species of ‘truth’) and ‘opinion’ as
contrasting opposites (Arendt: 1993d, pp.238–239). Factual truths assert
15Similar considerations could, with little adjustment, probably pertain to other
kinds of community.
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their validity in a way unsuitable for politics; Arendt ascribes to them
a “element of coercion” which contributes to the formation of habitual
“tyrannical tendencies” in “professional truthtellers” (Arendt: 1993d,
p.239). Truths, of either the factual or rational variety, are “beyond
agreement, dispute, opinion, or consent” (Arendt: 1993d, p.240) and
thus unsuitable material for politics. Opinions, by contrast, form a good
ﬁt with the politics described in Arendt’s work; they operate in the free
discourse of politics, in a manner such that the accumulation of, and
negotiation between, ever greater numbers of opinions and perspectives
sheds further light on the objects of discussion (Arendt: 1993d, p.242).
When more than one competing ‘truth’ is brought to market, however,
the mode in which they are asserted makes negotiation between them
impossible without admitting them to be opinions in disguise.
This is not to say that Arendt sees no place at all for matters of fact
in relation to politics or opinion; “factual truth must inform opinions”
(Arendt: 1993d, p.242). As Arendt pictures it, this inﬂuence is strictly
one-way. The facts form the basis for opinions but are not themselves to
be affected in return by developments in opinion (Arendt: 1993d, p.239).
Considered in terms of exemplars, the relevance of this distinction
becomes obvious; the meaning of the exemplar is a matter of opinion,
free for public discourse, whereas the minimally-descriptive facts of
their deeds can not change without them becoming a different exemplar
altogether.
The contrast between the non-negotiability of truth and the ne-
gotiability of opinion holds the key to truth’s inappropriateness as
substantial part of the formation of a sensus communis. Where any
group holds some particular thing to be unalterably true, then they
place that thing outside of the public realm; if they also declare accep-
tance of it as pre-requisite for membership of that realm, then they have
placed the political in a subordinate position. This is only a problem
in the event that a group takes a particular sort of statement to be
an unalterable truth; a normative or religious claim, say, would be
‘truths’ of this problematic sort. Both of these sorts of claim ﬁt Arendt’s
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characterisation of ‘rational truths’ rather than facts, because they are
‘truths’ arrived at by reﬂection (or revelation) (Arendt: 1993d, p.230).16
Empirical facts do not generally seem to be problematic in this man-
ner, though it is at least conceivable that some extreme case, such as
Holocaust denial, could be construed as an irreconcilable near-total
failure of sensus communis between the two sides. Here, however, facts
are not in conﬂict with opinions but with organised denials of them.
The closest match to this in ‘Truth and Politics’ is the fragility of facts
against organised power or falsehood (Arendt: 1993d, p.231).
Because of Arendt’s ‘thin’ view of facts, they cannot be constitutive
of a community; agreement is to be readily expected to the kind of
minimal report that Arendt offers as an example of factual truth. This
is an anonymous ofﬁcial’s claim to Clemenceau that, whatever is said
about the ﬁrst World War, “they will not say Belgium invaded Germany”
(Arendt: 1993d, p.239). Facts of this sort are simply not interesting
enough to factor in political discourse as anything other than starting
points for questioning the reasons or causes of events. The fact itself,
as an object to commonly assented to, cannot differentiate between
reasonable communities.
Because the sensus communis is composed only of opinions, which
are generated by the judges and spectators of the public realm, its shape
is in part determined by the contributions of those same judges. The
fuller picture is that facts sit at the level of substrate in relation to these
opinions. The survival of these opinions is assured only so long as they
remain living concerns for at least some proportion of a community.
So long as they do survive, they provide the longest part of the ‘tail’
of results of any action; the actor relies on them to secure as lasting a
fame as is possible.
To treat actors and judges as separate, as differing in kind from
one another, would require some means of determining a cut-off point
16One of Arendt’s examples of something which is presented in this manner is “the
true standard for human conduct that Plato’s philosopher is supposed to bring back”
(Arendt: 1993d, p.230).
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(either abrupt or gradual) at which ‘actor’-type responses become
‘judge’-type responses. There is no clear way in which to differentiate
between the two or even to regard any ‘out loud’ interpretation as
action, or potentially so. The responses of others, in turn, to this
response, determines the status of a deed as action, as we saw above;
so too for judgments. An accretion of judgments accepted as apt will
form a vital part of the pool of responses to any act; they will also form
a link across time to prior acts which, had they attracted less attention,
would have slipped into obscurity.
This will, in turn, affect the list of exemplars and actions which will
be available to later actors and judges via the accumulated opinions
of them which have survived as part of the sensus communis. Access
to common facts cannot alone constitute an sensus communis; the layer
of evaluation and interpretation of those facts must also be held in
common for there to be a continuity of sensus communis.
This in turn determines the ﬁeld of action which can be accommo-
dated within the same sensus communis by creating the set of referents
which may be reliably used in attempting to understand the mean-
ing of those new actions. In addition to this comprehension-related
effect, there is also the selective or discriminatory factor of judgment to
consider.
This rests, in part, on the way that Arendt relates taste to choosing
one’s company (Arendt: 1982b, p.74). A similar suggestion, in more
detail, is found in “The Crisis in Culture”;
From the viewpoint of this common experience [of kinship
discovered through similarity of judgments], it is as though
taste decides not only how the world is to look, but also who
belongs together in it. If we think of this sense of belonging
in political terms, we are tempted to regard taste as an
essentially aristocratic principle of organization (Arendt:
1993c, p.223).
This ‘principle of organisation’ operates implicitly in any judges’ ex-
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amination of events before them, largely as expressed by their choices
regarding what constitutes an event ﬁt for public discussion. Whilst the
enlarged mentality attributed to the successful judge guards against
excessively narrow views, there is no suggestion on Arendt’s part that
it constitutes an attempt to take all events into account for the sake
of seeming ‘objective’; it would contradict both Arendt’s attribution
of a self-revelatory aspect to judgment (Arendt: 1993c, cf.p.223) and
her notion that choice is at work in judgment (Arendt: 1982b, cf.p.74).
Indeed, if we take seriously the analogy between judgment and taste,
this would be quite preposterous; as Arendt says, “taste and smell are
discriminatory by their very nature” (Arendt: 1982b, p.66).
Whilst we have already seen this selective element in relation to
the judges’ interaction with their peer actors, without determining
the basis on which the judge makes their judgments. If the sensus
communis is taken seriously, it can only be that the above-mentioned
selective function takes its grounding from the sensus communis and
therefore from those exemplars available to the judge. This includes any
valuations which are common currency in relation to those exemplars.
Some similarity between one’s actions and those who are established
exemplars within one’s sensus communis serves two closely-related
purposes. The ﬁrst is related to the explicability of the action; for a thing
to attract comment it must be intelligible and the easiest guarantee of
this to look to those who are discussed. It will be clear to the actor both
who is considered worth discussing and the issues or topics which form
part of public discourse. The other element is the evaluative-predicting
quality which is an obvious part of any meaningful discourse. This
includes an understanding of which features or actions of an exemplar
are held praise-worthy and usefully amenable to emulation.
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3.6 Conclusion
With these qualities of judgment in mind, the next chapter turns to
consider the act of founding a new polity. What role does judgment
have in an enterprise of that sort? It takes on what might seem a dual
aspect: for the founders themselves, it provides, as in the example
of Jefferson’s treatment of colonial history (see below, p.154), a way
to place the new endeavour into a certain context, a story; for those
who come later, inheriting a political system, it provides the means
to generate a relationship both to the founders and to other citizens
operating in the same context. At the same time, these two aspects are
fundamentally identical; the founder’s use of judgment to place himself
within a context is as much an inter-subjective process of agreement as
the later citizen’s. The former is even, of course, subject to the latter;
insofar as judgment forms a part of the actor’s life, it is as open to
reinterpretation as any other act.
The American Revolution, treated in this way, is an example of
judgment operating which predates Arendt’s lectures on Kant but
conforms to their general shape; the historian’s perspective merges
with—becomes?—that of the active citizen in the competing claims
which relate both to the act of foundation. This chapter relates to the
next in the following way: this one details the ‘method’; the next details
the ‘subject matter’. But the next chapter is also a demonstration of
both this chapter and the one preceding it, an account of the faculties
there discussed in use, at it were.
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The Act of Founding
The two previous chapters have detailed the elements of human ex-
istence which make politics possible. This chapter is concerned with
what happens when Arendt’s understanding of politics is turned to
political institutions, speciﬁcally the ‘foundations’ of a political system.
This chapter ﬂeshes out what it means to think of politics on the basis
of Arendt’s understanding; to do so, it addresses what relationship a
political actor can have to the political system they belong to. This is
primarily concerned with the manner in which the actor relates to the
founding act upon which begins the political system. This will look, in
the account below, much like a combination of ‘action’ and ‘judgment’;
the initial act of founding is not ﬁnished so long as the system they
found stands; those who follow take from the founding both material
for judgment and, at the same time, the opportunity to act.
This chapter is also an attempt to decide what it would mean for
political foundations to be themselves properly political. This is as
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much a matter of the manner in which the system is grounded as it is a
matter of how those who inherit it relate to it. The question is how a
political foundation is possible which avoids the problems of the polis
by providing a different relationship between founder and citizen, one
which leaves open the possibility of further new initiatives.
Preserving the possibility of engagement of this kind requires that
the foundation of the system is a political practice, without other
grounding; it must be politics all the way down, as in Arendt’s reading
of the Declaration of Independence. This avoids reducing the system of
politics to a system dedicated to some particular aim or other; the
alternative would be to settle at the moment of foundation what will
count as politics, or as a project of the right kind.
In order to understand the possibility of politics founded in this
way, it is necessary to begin with the form of action on which it can be
based: the capacity to make promises. This capacity, which also acts
as guarantor of the individual’s own continuity, functions as a way of
actors binding themselves to one another which does not rely on some
surrendering to the command of others. This will be combined with
Arendt’s account of ‘power’ before turning to consider how politics
could be founded in this manner.
Once this is settled, the chapter turns to the main example of foun-
dations in Arendt’s work: the Declaration of Independence. The aim
will be to show how this document—itself an exemplary instance of
action—can inform a politics which takes it as foundational. The main
interlocutor here is Honig, who sees in the Declaration and in any
foundational act at all exactly those elements which Arendt attempts
to leave behind by specifying in detail what can count as a political
foundation. This reading denies that such an element persists and that
the interaction between foundation and actor is more co-operative in
nature. This leads, ultimately, to the question of what kind of material
the founding action provides.
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4.1 Politics without Mastery
The two sections following this one detail, respectively, ‘promising’
and ‘power’ as they appear in Arendt’s work in relation to political
foundations. The justiﬁcation for turning to these is the business of
this section; it is at base the same reason which motivates Arendt’s
particular uses of both concepts. This reason is the need to avoid one
particular form of anti-political organisation based around relationships
of command and mastery or, to put it another way, a work-like attitude
to the division of political responsibilities.
In the ﬁrst instance, this constricts the range of possible manners in
which a founding-group can initiate a new public realm, not least by
making explicit that a group of equal individuals be involved, rather
than a Legislator-ﬁgure who exists to bestow the laws on an entirely
passive people.1 Instead, the people themselves, conceived of as politi-
cal actors, need to initiate the political for themselves; in order to do so
some extra safeguard is needed against the unpredictability of action
which does not breech Arendt’s strictures on political admissibility. In
order to understand Arendt’s description of political foundations, it is
necessary to understand what she means by ‘the faculty of promising’,
which is the basis of foundations in her work.
The potential for such a relationship between promising and found-
ing arises because of Arendt’s sharp delineation of the boundaries of
the political; this division protects politics by refusing justiﬁcation from
anything external to it, in terms either of a pre-political foundation or
of a telos beyond politics. What is needed, therefore, is a stabilising
element which is in some sense a part of politics, compatible with a
plurality of actors. For these reasons, we turn to the conception of
promising; its usefulness here rests solely on its ability to perform this
role, in relation both to individuals and to institutions, without relying
on anything external to politics.
1A concern rather like this one also animates the discussion of Arendt’s distinction
between types of social contract, here presented in section 4.4.
93Chapter 4. The Act of Founding
In order to demonstrate that promising is suitable for this role for
these reasons, this section begins with a description of what could
be considered the ‘basic’ form of promising introduced in The Human
Condition. With the features and purpose of promising in view, it will
be possible to consider the use of promising on a larger scale, as part
of Arendt’s attempt to ﬁnd a politically-legitimate form of foundation.
Presenting promising in this way is the simplest way of doing so,
conducted for the sake of that simplicity rather than in order to make
any claim about a hard division between the sorts of promises which
individuals make only for themselves and the sort which generate a
structure for the public realm.2
Promising is not the objective but the method by which a public
realm can be secured without recourse to non-political structures. The
objective, rather, is to use promising as a means of securing the con-
tinuance of ’power’ as well as of an institutional support. By ‘power’,
Arendt means something very particular3, namely the capacity for
the free co-operation of political actors (Arendt: 1998, p.200),4 thereby
excluding from the term a number of phenomena that we might other-
wise regard as manifestations of power. For now, only the differences
between Arendt’s conception and a command-related conception will
be considered. Whilst her nomenclature will be adopted in the fuller
description of her concept to follow, it will not yet as it would make
distinguishing between these two ideas of power ungainly at this point.
As well as forming part of Arendt’s general method of elucidation by
developing conceptual distinctions, her strict deﬁnition of power is mo-
2Keenan’s analysis includes the claim that must be some such additional factor
for the kind of promise used in an act of founding, as promising alone would not
otherwise be able to do the job (Keenan: 2003, p.94). No such ‘addition’ will be
supposed here, not least because any of the promises which could be relevant to the
public realm seem to be of a sort which is broadly very similar to the sort of promising
which could form a foundation. Further, the idea that promising, as bedrock to the
ability to make compacts, is related to the foundation of organisations is already
found as part of the description of promising in The Human Condition (Arendt: 1998,
p.244–245).
3Lukes calls it “an interestingly idiosyncratic concept of power” (Lukes: 1974, p.59)
4A full description of which is the business of section 4.3.
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tivated by an attempt to set out a mode of co-operation which matches
the political. In order to do so, she must show that the plausibility
of some system, founded on promising, which combines individuals
without making commanders of some and obedients of others. This
accounts for a great many of the qualities of power (as Arendt uses the
term) which might otherwise remain inexplicable, as well as the very
narrow way in which she constructs power.
Examples of the conceptions of power which do not ﬁt Arendt’s at
all can be found through the entirety of Lukes’ Power: A Radical View,
beginning with his quotation of Dahl’s “ ‘intuitive idea of power’ as
‘something like this: ‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get
B to do something that B would not otherwise do.’ ” (Lukes: 1974,
pp.11–12). This element of the conception of power continues through
all those that Lukes surveys, however else they develop in response to
one another (Lukes: 1974, p.25). His own deﬁnition of it differs from
the preliminary understanding taken from Dahl by specifying that A’s
power over B is a matter of A affecting B “in a manner contrary to B’s
interests” (Lukes: 1974, p.34).
In Disch’s summary of these kinds of conceptions of power, which
Disch takes Arendt to be writing against, she uses the catch-all label of
“the Archimedean ideal of power as leverage” (Disch: 1996, p.48). That
concept of power is related, by Disch, to an ideal of individual strength
as power (Disch: 1996, p.46); when Disch introduces the idea that this
makes of power something akin to ‘leverage’, she has hit upon a word
which neatly captures the form of relationship that Arendt wishes to
separate from her conception, the relationship of A and B in which, in
schematic form, the power of A over B can cause B to act differently
than he otherwise might.5 This is a relationship which sees the one
person exerting force which is multiplied by the passive and entirely
predictable movements of the lever used, which would in this case be
none other than obedient followers.
5Lukes’ conception includes that of modiﬁcation in more subtle ways, including
the potential shaping of B’s range of desires or goals by structural limitations (Lukes:
1974, p.34–35). It is perhaps the most signiﬁcant weakness of Arendt’s account that it
is so difﬁcult to place precisely these forms of coercion within it.
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A focus on the way in which this makes B the manipulable agent of
A in this context makes plain why Arendt felt it necessary to specify the
impossibility of calculating power prior to its manifestation; “leverage
is calculable, power in relationship6 is uncertain”, as Disch glosses the
distinction.
4.2 Promising in The Human Condition
Promising and forgiveness appear together in The Human Condition
as two faculties with important roles in public life; forgiveness is con-
cerned (primarily) with the past and promising with the future of
political agents. Both faculties are intimately linked to politics, being
either “[two] of the potentialities of action itself” (Arendt: 1998, pp.236–
237) or faculties which “correspond...closely to the human condition
of plurality” (Arendt: 1998, p.237). This latter claim does not seem to
suggest entirely the same relationship as the ﬁrst between action on
the one hand and promising and forgiving on the other. Whether the
two are sub-types of action or distinctive somethings which happily
share many characteristics of action proper seems not to matter so
long as they are taken to be full elements of the political. Together,
they are the only “moral precepts” which “are not applied to action
from the outside...[but] are like control mechanisms built into the very
faculty” of action (Arendt: 1998, p.246). For reasons that will shortly
become clear, Arendt’s public realm cannot exist without something
like promising to give it continuity through time; the alternative would
be a public altogether unable to secure either the lasting fame of actors
or any coherence at all. It could not even be a public in this case, as the
6There is one, perhaps quite minor, complaint regarding Disch’s use of ‘relation-
ship’, as in the sentence prior to this, to signify fundamental differences between
leverage-type power and Arendtian power; “Power...exists only in relationships with
[others]” (Disch: 1996, p.48). It is clear enough in context that Disch must mean by
‘relationship’ something like ‘relationships involving notional equality’, for the means
by which one person can make an obedient lever or fulcrum of another is of course a
relationship also, albeit one with a radically different character.
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great deeds would become essentially private acts without a continuous
stage for their performance. Standing against this, as the condition
of possibility for “continuity, let alone durability of any kind, in the
relationships between men” is the capacity of promising (Arendt: 1998,
p.237).
Generating consistency in this manner is also a prerequisite of
continuity in relation to the individual political actor; without it, the
persona created would differ day-to-day, or even action-to-action, in
a manner which undermined the very possibility of action generating
meaning or a story about a person. Avoiding this mess is the purpose
for which Arendt gives the faculty of promising; “The remedy for
unpredictability, for the chaotic uncertainty of the future, is contained
in the faculty to make and keep promises” (Arendt: 1998, p.237). This
is a very broad remit for one faculty, made broader by its need to
perform two remedies at once.7 These two remedies are, however,
closely-intertwined and an examination of each will reveal this.
Unpredictability is the common cause of both needs of promising,
though it operates in, as it were, two different directions. The ﬁrst
is the agent’s own inability to predict himself because of the basic
“unreliability of men who never can predict today who they will be to-
morrow...[which] is the price human beings pay for freedom”(Arendt:
1998, p.244).8
Continuity of the self from one day to the next is clearly reliant on
promising;
7In spite of the link between promising and plurality in Arendt’s work, which
rather suggests promising ‘proper’ rests on plurality, it is the one aspect of politics
which Arendt introduces as something well-remembered by “our tradition” (Arendt:
1998, p.243). Well, not exactly; the full claim is that “the power of stabilisation inherent
in the faculty of making promises” has not been forgotten (Arendt: 1998, p.243), which
may not in fact be quite the same thing.
8The inward-directed element of forgiveness is a peculiarity in terms of Arendt’s
account of the public, being an element explicitly intended to regulate the inner
workings of the agent whilst also impossible without the presence of others. Even
forgiveness is exclusively oriented to relations external to the agent. Whilst Arendt
does have her actors forgive one another for the sake of both parties, it is, ultimately,
with release from the consequences of actions that forgiveness is concerned (Arendt:
1998, p.241).
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Without being bound to the fulﬁlment of promises, we
would never be able to keep our identities;9 we would be
condemned to wander helplessly and without direction in
the darkness of each man’s lonely heart, caught in contra-
diction and equivocalities—a darkness which only the light
shed over the public realm through the presence of others,
who conﬁrm the identity between the one who promises
and the one who fulﬁls, can dispel (Arendt: 1998, p.237).
Promising here indicates something more substantial than merely sign-
ing up, as it were, to particular small projects; it must, if it is to grant
the political actor any stability across time, be concerned with wider-
ranging commitments. We might also think of the distinctiveness of
action in general to approach the same point; very limited commitments
such as ‘to attend such-and-such a meeting’ will not reveal much at all
about an actor. The kinds of promise which would be revelatory will
feature in subsection 4.2.1, below, as will their relevant qualities.
In one further sense, promising parallels action more generally; it is
deeply personal in so far as it something for which the agent themselves
must be fully accountable. The actor-promiser is responsible for the
beginning and, through promising, such a series of beginnings can be
identiﬁed as products of the same persona.10
Promising is also needed as guard against the unpredictability of
the consequences of action (Arendt: 1998, p.244). This “is the only
alternative to a mastery which relies on domination of one’s self and
9‘Identity’ here is clearly meant to indicate ‘public identity’ or ‘persona’ but to
some degree the following suggests that this is the only sense of ‘personal identity’
she holds to be possible.
10Although the idea of breaking promises does not feature in Arendt’s descrip-
tion, it is obviously a necessary feature of promising that failure be, in some sense,
recognisable. In cases of failure, the promise is just as revelatory of the agent as the
successfully-completed promise. That the same agent must be recognised as promiser
and failure by other political actors means that even the failed promise secures the
sense of continuity promising is supposed to generate—so long as the actor stands in
some relation to the promise they have not fulﬁlled. It will not, however, generate
favourable opinion or fame unless the promise-breaking is accompanied by some
extenuating circumstance. For more on promise-breaking, see subsection 4.2.1.
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rule over others; it corresponds exactly to the existence of a freedom
which was given under the condition of non-sovereignty” (Arendt: 1998,
p.244). Sovereignty cannot feature as a structuring relation between
political actors, as it is inherently opposed to plurality due to its hierar-
chical, or command-based, form (Arendt: 1998, p.234). Command is the
primary means by which the senior part of a sovereignty-relationship
acts upon the other; the only relation it can create is between levels of
commanders and commanded, rather than mutually promise-making
actors.11 Between the two ‘levels’ of sovereignty-relationship, no po-
litical relationship is possible because such a relationship rests on the
equality of the two parties, with neither at the disposal of the will of the
other. The alternative, freedom, rests necessarily on a contrary reaction,
in which the actor’s actions are entirely their own in, at the very least,
the sense of not being so commanded by another.
In this guise, we ﬁnd promising is of beneﬁt to those other agents
with home the promiser must deal, acting as guarantor of some degree
of predictability without reliance on the agent’s obedience to the will
of another. It, rather than Arendt’s later turn to judgment, makes
possible any form of joint action between political equals by binding
agents to speciﬁc, limited matters of common business (Arendt: 1998,
pp.244–245). Those who are so joined must, presumably, enter into
their commitments with some idea of the difﬁculties which they may
face in them; in making promises related to the political, they must
be aware of at least the unpredictability of other actors and take their
(sincere) promising to be a commitment to weathering at least some
degree of this kind of hardship.
Some such reliable means of combining into formed action is nec-
essary, for the sake of other actors and the potential for co-operative
action at all; without being able to take promises as authoritative decla-
rations of intent, the only way to get anything done at all would require
11Of course, entering into a command-relation of this sort may consist of a process
of self-binding promises freely given but, from the moment obedience is pledged, the
success of the promise becomes a matter for the one to whom service is pledged.
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command on the part of the initiator and obedience on the part of as
many bodies as were required to complete the objective. Necessary
for this is a recognisable practice of promising that the actors have
agreed on; minimally, it must be knowable when a promise has been
made. Subsection 4.2.2 will detail this, as we now turn to consider
which qualities of promises are a necessary part of, as it were, ‘public
realm-relevant’ promises.
4.2.1 Kinds of Promise
Not all promises are really relevant for consideration as part of the
public, as not all touch on the self in an interesting way. Some account
of what a publicly-interesting promise would look like is necessary;
these kinds of promise, as should become obvious in due course, share
many characteristics with the foundation-forming kind.
To illustrate this difference, we can turn to an interpretation of
Nietzsche’s account of promising12 which contains a comparison apt
for our purposes. This is Aaron Ridley’s “Nietzsche’s Intentions: What
the Sovereign Individual Promises”, which contains a contrast between
promises or commitments made by ‘the windbag’ who is easily swayed
from them and what is there referred to as “sovereign promising”
(Ridley: 2009, p.186). This sort of promising is one in which the object
will be undertaken even in the face of unforeseen difﬁculties and with
a view that events may very well fail to “pan out, independently of
[the promiser], in a manner conducive to the promise’s being kept”
(Ridley: 2009, p.186). Evidently, without something rather like this last
characteristic, no good-faith promising could be undertaken in relation
12Nietzsche makes a ﬂeeting appearance in The Human Condition as someone who
“saw with unequaled clarity the connection between human sovereignty and the
faculty of making promises” (Arendt: 1998, p.245 n.83); though, between this footnote
and Nietzsche’s appearance in the main text, this mention of him amounts to little
more than acknowledging a fellow-traveller. Perhaps the appraisal was rather higher
than this; the notes written by Arendt in her copy of Schmitt’s The Nomos of the
Earth call Nietzsche, as part of a scathing verdict on Schmitt, “the only German who
understood” the “contract that rests on promise” (Laube: 2010, p.257).
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to public affairs; this danger is, however, attenuated by the existence of
a reliable practice of promising so long as there exists some mechanism,
perhaps shame-based, of penalising the faithless promise-maker.
Marriage vows (properly construed) are Ridley’s example of a
‘sovereign promise’ and exhibit many of the characteristics of promising
relevant to our use of the faculty of promising;
The betrothed make some really quite high-octane promises
to one another and they undertake to see these through, not
just for as long as it is reasonably convenient to do so, but
regardless...so that a marriage might be maintained ‘even
“in the face of fate” ’ (for instance, in the face of temptresses,
boredom, hair-loss, cellulite, football, children, fundamental
incompatibility, menopause, snoring)...Sovereign promis-
ing, then, amounts to whole-hearted commitment to some-
one or something, to executing the relevant intention come
what may (Ridley: 2009, pp.186–187).
We may leave aside that marriage can not itself count as a publicly-
relevant promise of the kind we are interested in. Never-the-less, it
shares many of the qualities of any joint action between freely-acting
individuals. Already noted is the importance of accepting the unknowa-
bility of the problems which may beset attempts to fulﬁl the promise
which, in the longer-term personal commitments which would generate
a strong sense of the individual promiser, could be very great indeed.
Further, the nature of the promise itself has an indeterminacy built
in to the conditions of success as well; whilst it is very easy to specify
what will be considered a successful fulﬁlment of the promise to ‘meet
tomorrow at two’, interesting promises are less easily pinned down in
advance. Ridley claims that the successful completion of a sovereign
promise is not something which can be fully speciﬁed in advance; “the
internal character of the relevant success-conditions...precludes this”
(Ridley: 2009, p.190). Principles relate to political acts, therefore to polit-
ical commitments, in a very similar manner, by providing ‘inspiration’
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without determining what, exactly (or even inexactly) is to be done by
the actor (Arendt: 1993f, p.152). The distinction which Ridley makes
between success in following, on the one hand, the spirit of the promise
or, on the other, merely following the letter of it (Ridley: 2009, p.190), is
similarly pertinent, related as it is to the need to judge the success of a
promise to the manner in which it has been fulﬁlled with reference to
the particular instance of promising which it is.
From Ridley’s article, we can also take an account of the way in
which a promise may be broken, or left partially-fulﬁlled, whilst still
providing a sense of a self’s continuity. The sovereign promiser, as
Ridley points out, may not hold a set of commitments which are all
of the same priority and conveniently mutually compatible (Ridley:
2009, p.191). Most pertinent is the idea of a ranking of commitments;
“narrower commitments...[can be] trumped, in effect, by higher-order
commitments...of which the narrower ones were special cases” (Ridley:
2009, p.191).13 These broader commitments are, in Ridley’s use, very
similar indeed to the role of principles in ‘What is Freedom?’; the
commitment to some particular marriage is itself a speciﬁc instance
of a commitment to “worthwhile human relationships” (Ridley: 2009,
p.191)14. Similarly, the political actor, having once pledged their troth
to some particular arrangement of the political, may come for similar
reasons to turn against it for the sake of its failure to instantiate political
freedom. Of course, just which principles or higher-order commitments
are manifest in any given act is as much a matter of later interpretation
as it is whatever the actor initially takes himself to be doing. Even
the actor may themselves in this position; as they see the results of
their actions, it is near-inevitable that they will have the opportunity to
reassess their initial aims in the light of new facts.
13Ridley also mentions, in a footnote to the same page, that the ‘narrow’ commit-
ments of separate ‘general’ commitments may conﬂict in a like manner.
14In itself, this does not rule out the possibility of other higher-order commitments
being the motive cause for any given marriage; there may be, say, a commitment not
to good human relationship but to raising children well, whatever that might mean.
This would produce not only a different sort of marriage but a different set of reasons
for ending it.
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4.2.2 Performatives and Risk
Arendt’s account of promising lacks any suggestion that a promise, if
it is to be understood, must be recognisable as such by the relevant
group of political actors. There is no recognition on Arendt’s part
that successful promising requires an accepted idea of what, in outline,
constitutes an act of promising. This lack is made evident if we consider
the example of marriage vows above, a performance which can only
make sense against a background understanding of such promises and
their general meaning, even a background made entirely of implicit
understandings.
Bonnie Honig’s work on Arendt addresses this deﬁciency directly, in-
troducing it with reference to a contrast between Nietzsche and Arendt;
the former but not the latter, she claims, has a strictly individualised
conception of promising and forgiving (Honig: 1993a, pp.86–87). For
Arendt, promises are, as we have seen, necessarily relations between
distinct individuals. If they were not, they could not be political, nor
would there be any need for some guarantee that one party can in
broad outline understand the other. This is Honig’s account of this
problem;
The characterisation of Arendtian action as performative ﬁts
nicely with her insistence that action is a combination of
word and deed. But it poses some problems for her equally
central claim that action is a “beginning” with “nothing to
hold on to...as though it came out of nowhere in either
time of space.”15 Surely Arendt’s action must have some-
thing to hold on to. How can her performatives function
without a public subscription to an authoritative discursive
practice? Even a promising that is performative postulates
a community of promisers...[who] share, at the very least,
understandings of what it means to make a promise and
15This quote is taken from Arendt’s account of revolution as a new beginning,
which includes some pretty heady language claiming the revolutionary is in some
sense outside of chronology (Arendt: 1990, p.206).
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of what one must do in order for one’s performance to be
recognisable as a promise (or a founding, a declaration, a
forgiving). In short, promising, even on Arendt’s account, is
a practice (Honig: 1993a, p.87).
When, immediately after this passage, Honig notes that “Arendt gives
no account of this practice” in spite of its importance (Honig: 1993a,
p.87), it is a hard claim to argue against; Honig has identiﬁed a real
deﬁciency in Arendt’s account and apparently corrected it in one move.
However, what she above claims as a consequent problem—the con-
ﬂict with the spontaneity of action—is no problem at all, as becomes
clear once we follow Honig to her more thorough description of the
supposed trouble. This trouble is relevant for our purposes because
Honig believes it stems from the very feature of promising which both
distinguishes Arendt from Nietzsche and makes possible the use of
promising as a part of the political, which is to say that it stems from
its inter-subjective structures, a structure necessarily reliant on norms.
Norms, in this instance, are the problem; the norms of promising
are, or must be, “highly sophisticated, even ritualised” and so they
“belie the moment of contingency that is characteristic of [Arendt’s]
politics” (Honig: 1993a, p.88). On this basis, Honig diagnoses a paradox
in Arendt’s approach to promising. Promises, as kinds of action, are
as risky and unpredictable as actions tend to be whilst at the same
time forming the only admissible check on the consequences of action
(Honig: 1993a, p.88). This may simply be a structural problem, as
it were; nothing more powerful than promising can be found which
does not, by virtue of its capacity to bind agents, reduce agents to
the commands to which they are held. This, however, does not, as it
were, rescue promising from becoming something other than a species
of spontaneous action, if we take Honig’s point seriously. The choice
seems to be between a promising which is ‘internal’ to politics and one
that can tame politics.
At this point, Honig is keen to answer something she takes to
be a potential criticism of her combination of Arendt’s work, which
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centres on “the extraordinary”, with Austin’s, “concerned primarily
with ordinary circumstances” (Honig: 1993a, p.89). Honig imagines that
the reader may complain about this co-mingling of supposed opposites.
To answer this anticipated objection, she turns to Derrida’s “Signature,
Event, Context”, which “suggests that Austin’s theorization of the
ordinary necessarily involves him in a theorization of the extraordinary”
(Honig: 1993a, p.89). This use of Derrida allows Honig’s claim that,
by analogy, Arendt’s focus on the extraordinary commits her, in a like
manner, to theorising ordinary events (Honig: 1993a, p.89). None of
this is necessary in defence of Honig’s description of Arendtian action
as performative speech act;16 an alternative response is possible to
Honig’s relation of the two, which rests on and responds to a confusion
in her approach. In doing so, it makes visible an interesting facet of the
interaction between extraordinary action and the norms of promising it
is dependent on. For this, Derrida need not be invoked.
In order to accept Honig’s false dichotomy, one must accept her
claims regarding the relationship between promising as an established
practice on the one hand and the risks inherent to action on the other.
Successful promising does require, as she claims, that “the operation of
the practice and the meaning of particular promises must be relatively
unproblematic” (Honig: 1993a, p.88). Quite so; it would be impossible to
imagine, for instance, a successful recitation of marriage vows without
(at the very least) the other person understanding what is signiﬁed by
the ceremony. This much is consequent of Arendt’s contrast between,
as it were, promising out loud and the less-real role-play of promising
to oneself (Arendt: 1998, p.237).17
16Though it is structurally interesting as a means of leading into Honig’s approach
to Arendt and the Declaration of Independence.
17Arendt actually says “...no one can forgive himself and no one can feel bound
by a promise made only to himself; forgiving and promising enacted in solitude or
isolation remain without reality and can signify no more than a role played before
one’s self” (Arendt: 1998, p.237). In itself, this seems fair enough, though Arendt’s
psychology may be a little lacking here (due mainly to the focus of her project): it
is not entirely without consequence how an agent conceives of their own internal
relations, even if such conceptions do not make themselves apparent to others. In
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Action ‘in general’ does not directly encounter the same issue in
relation to norms because, except in a very minimal sense, there cannot
be a set of norms which apply to all kinds of action. Speciﬁc kinds of
action, however, must have norms speciﬁc to them in the same way
promising does, if they are to be understood by other actors. One must
be reasonably sure when ‘beseeching’ some particular thing, for exam-
ple, that other actors will understand roughly what it is one is saying
and what the words themselves are meant to achieve. Only within
some general understanding of the function or form of beseeching can
this be possible. The alternative would be words and deeds which
appear meaningless to other actors.
Part of what is at fault in Honig’s analysis is a confusion between
the practice of promising and the instantiation of particular promises
by particular actors. Put another way, she has confused the structure of
promising with its contents; the former only is the business of the norms
which any promising must inhabit. Their existence cannot touch upon
privately committing oneself to a particular task, it is altogether a different conception
of commitment in which one ‘promises to oneself to do such-and-such by the end of
the day’ rather than ‘commanding’ the same.
One who is in the practice of promising, rather than commanding, himself is not
likely take up the habit of command with regard to those others with whom he shares
a common world, so long as he can be convinced to conceive of them as equals.
An agent adopting a model of self-command is liable, as Nietzsche suggests in
relation to willing, to identify himself solely with that internal element which does
the commanding (Nietzsche: 2002, §19), rather than the obedient element. Curiously,
Arendt recognises the link between self-rule and rulership (in place of politics) in the
organising of public business, contrasting the principles based upon promising with
those which would be based on moral standards;
For Platonic rulership, whose legitimacy rested upon the domination of
the self, draws its guiding principles...from a relationship established
between me and myself...until the whole of the public realm is seen
in the image of “man writ large”, of the right order between man’s
individual capacities (Arendt: 1998, pp.237–238).
The direction of inﬂuence in relation to promising, so far as Arendt is concerned,
is entirely the opposite; one learns to perform it it public and, from that, can learn
self-forgiveness and self-promising as derivative acts (Arendt: 1998, p.238). It is
obvious how frustration at the difﬁculty of successful public promising could, when
compared with the ease of the private simulacra of them, turn an agent to adopting a
desire rulership.
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the “moment of contingency” with which a promise begins because
they cannot determine the content of a promise, though they may direct
what is commonly understood to be acceptable content. ‘Direction’ in
this case, if it touches upon content, actually increases the risk inherent
in certain promises by providing grounds upon which they may be
dismissed, mis-understood or taken to be entirely inappropriate, as
well as making explicable a promise’s (or, indeed, any action’s) success
conditions.
Risk, of course, cuts both ways and Honig’s concern with the prac-
tice of promising is that it shields the actors from risk in some manner;
one consequence of “the practice and meaning of particular promises
[being] relatively unproblematic” is that “action as promising cannot
occur ex nihilo and will not be as risky, as contingent and unpredictable
as Arendt says it is” (Honig: 1993a, p.88). It is not necessarily entirely
clear which side of an act of promising Honig takes to be the beneﬁciary
of the risk-reduction of the promise.
Consider a case analogous to that of promising between individuals:
the drafting of a treaty between two states. What is agreed to in, say, a
mutual defence pact is reasonably clear to those who draft it but it does
not follow from this that the acts necessary to fulﬁl treaty obligations
are fully knowable in advance. Both parties are made open to vast
new areas of risk not only in relation to one another’s acts but also
to as-yet-unknowable relations to other states or international actors.
The risks are themselves only taken on as potential burdens of the
states because of the very norms of treaty-making which bind the two
together. These norms themselves, as necessary grounds of promising,
are necessary grounds of the risks of promising.
Without these norms, an act of promising would be a curious and
inexplicable spectacle, effectively a mute and meaningless event. Sup-
pose an actor who, rather than promising in some known manner, tries
to promise in a manner quite unknown to any available to witness his
action. What has he risked? Nothing more than if he had not promised
at all. His sense of self-continuity is not at all in jeopardy, for no witness
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is present who can speak to his success or failure if he has not been
understood. He is, in fact, altogether much safer in this scenario; not
being understood, he cannot be held to anything whatsoever as a result
of his incomprehensible promising because only the actor himself has
any chance of judging his future acts relative to the success conditions
of his promise. The same, of course, follows for our inter-state treaty;
if a treaty is attempted in some manner which does not accord with
either side’s norms of treaty-making, then it will not be binding upon
them.
4.3 Power
In addition to the ways in which a promise conditions a promiser
and stabilises them for others, promising has a further effect which
is relevant to considerations of political foundations. This effect is
the instantiation of power, as Arendt understands the term, for which
promising has a constitutive role; through this, promising lies at the
root of political foundations.
The Human Condition, “On Violence” and on Revolution contain
Arendt’s reﬂections on power. From the ﬁrst two, a very consistent, if
under-described, conception of power emerges18 which is then found
in an ‘applied form’ in On Revolution’s analysis of revolution and con-
stitution. Power is a necessary element of good constitution-making
as Arendt understands it, delivered at the beginning of the venture by
mutual promises.
The ﬁrst step to seeing how this can function is to present Arendt’s
account of power. This will include power’s role in the continuance of
a public. Finally, this section will end, as it must, by relating power to
promising. The next will begin with an examination of power which
treats the Founding Fathers as a ‘case study’, in order to reach the
18The similarity between the two is instructive; The Human Condition was published
in 1958, “On Violence” in 1970 and little difference is visible in the concept of power
as it appears in each.
1084.3. Power
question of power’s continuance beyond the moment of foundation
itself.
As with most of the concepts presented in The Human Condition,
‘power’ is revealed largely by contrasting it with related concepts, in this
case with force and strength,19 in order to emphasise the plural char-
acter of power (Arendt: 1998, p.200); strength is “indivisible” whereas
power is found only within groups of people (Arendt: 1998, p.201). “On
Violence” contains a more direct description of power, though it too
rests in part on the contrast with strength;
Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but
to act in concert...When we say of somebody that he is “in
power” we actually refer to his being empowered by a cer-
tain number of people...In current usage, when we speak
of a “powerful man”...we use the word “power” metaphor-
ically; what we refer to without metaphor is “strength”
(Arendt: 1972c, p.143).
This separation of power from strength and from several other terms is
hardly incidental; the contrast makes evident that Arendt is looking for
some ‘binding’ or ‘unifying’ phenomenon which does not efface politics.
Power fulﬁls this as it designates the potential co-operative interaction
of several free actors; Arendt’s warning that it cannot be calculated
ahead of time aside (Arendt: 1998, p.200), it seems we can happily talk,
with some caveats presented below, of an increase of power attendant
to an increase of co-operating actors.
Power is not coeval with action itself in the same way as Arendt
holds freedom is, continuing ‘in potentia’ whilst actors remain together
(Arendt: 1998, p.201). Between actions, power is a potential and (in a
19The exact same contrast between power and strength recurs in On Revolution;
“In distinction to strength...power comes into being only if and when men join
themselves together for the purpose of action” (Arendt: 1990, p.175). The dissolution
of power with the separation of these men also ﬁgures in this description, as it does
in The Human Condition (Arendt: 1990, p.175). Arendt, then, is consistent with regard
to power across all three works.
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contrast which is not itself convincing), “not an unchangeable, measur-
able, and reliable entity...” (Arendt: 1998, p.200). Power takes on these
particular characteristics not as a result of its “ “potential” character”
but because of the peculiarities of such a potential within a group of
political actors; the unpredictability of action comes from the unpre-
dictability of actors rather than of potentials as such. Until the moment
at which an actor is called upon, there has been no determination one
way or the other how they will act on the power existent between them
and fellow actors. If they were determined by power in this way, then
they would not be free actors but mere functionaries of some group
cause.
4.3.1 The Location of Power
A plurality of actors is required for power for this very reason, as it is
for politics. As with politics more generally, Arendt claims a minimal
role for material conditions in relation to power;
The only indispensable material factor in the generation
of power is the living together of people. Only where the
men live so close together that the potentialities of action
are always present can power remain with them...(Arendt:
1998, p.201).
Not just any common space can do for the maintenance of power, if we
take seriously Arendt’s claim that a loss of power is the beginning of the
end for a political community (Arendt: 1998, p.200). Organisation is a
necessary component of power, else we cannot make sense of Arendt’s
claims relating to “small but well-organised” groups using power more
effectively than more numerous adversaries (Arendt: 1998, p.200).
The relationship of organisation to power is far from clear;
What keeps people together after the ﬂeeting moment of
action has passed (what we today call “organization”) and
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what, at the same time, they keep alive through remaining
together is power (Arendt: 1998, p.201).
The difﬁculty lies in determining what the ‘what’ within parentheses
refers to as ‘organisation’. It could conceivably refer to “What keeps
people together...”, in which case organisation would be an alternative
name for power. For political power, this cannot mean just any form of
organisation which relates people; it must be a grouping which installs
them as equals rather than establishing command-relations. This is
consistent with “On Violence”’s invocation of an alternative tradition,
Roman and Athenian, in which the “concept of power...did not rely
on the command-obedience relationship” (Arendt: 1972c, p.139).
To be effective in generating power, a structure works best if it
includes a division of power, as well as “checks and balances” (Arendt:
1998, p.201). The increase of centres of power allows an “interplay of
powers” (Arendt: 1998, p.201) and, we might add, this must be caused
by multiplying the opportunities and contexts available for action, as
well as the number of political groupings in which any given actor
can move. The mirror image Arendt presents of such a structure is
Montesquieu’s account of tyranny, which “generates impotence” rather
than power because of the manner in which it mutually isolates both
tyrant and subjects (Arendt: 1998, p.202). A properly political set of
institutions, as the other extreme to this, should be structured such
that it creates multiple opportunities for power, perhaps with some
elements provided only for that purpose.
In addition to these ‘structural’ considerations, power must be re-
liant on the self-understanding of the actors involved. By her claim that
“Only where men live so close together...”, Arendt must mean their
living together with some idea of their action-potential. Otherwise,
any old combination of co-existent people will do, whereas Arendt
claims that power “is actualised only where word and deed have not
parted company” (Arendt: 1998, p.200), i.e. only if the situation is
conducive to properly political action and there are actors available
with an understanding that this is so.
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4.3.2 Power and Continuance
This much cannot be sufﬁcient for power, or Arendt’s dire warning of its
tendency to dissipate cannot form part of her analysis; the idea is that
the withering away of the power potential of a group is the ﬁrst sign
that it is in trouble (Arendt: 1998, p.200). Any crumbling of structure
must thus come after in this particular case, which is a description of
what might be thought of as a ‘quiet death’, a withering-away. Another
case, of course, would be the conquest by outside forces, in which the
institutions may well be destroyed, most likely with the aim of making
the generation of power more difﬁcult.
The potential for power to dissipate without such a cause suggests
that power, in the political-organisational sense Arendt means, works
something like an animating principle for politics. Power, by its nature,
cannot be coercive upon individual actors, though they may take them-
selves to be duty-bound to certain kinds of action. Arendt’s example
of power not put to use is university students who do not act against
lecture-disrupters; “the majority clearly refuses to use its power...the
academic process breaks down because no one is willing to raise more
than a voting ﬁnger for the status quo” (Arendt: 1972c, p.141). Clearly,
no obligation exists for the majority to avoid becoming “the latent ally
of” (Arendt: 1972c, p.141) disruption by any positive act; a sense of re-
sponsibility for safe-guarding the educational process would be needed,
a sense that is perhaps discouraged by the very fact of a pedagogical
setting in this case. This may well indicate that power is most fully
realised where some structure of roles exists whereby the responsibil-
ities of actors are apparent, or at the very least, the actor is denied
the sense that some other person is responsible in their stead. To look
to, or for, another person in this manner is to look for a relationship
either of command or authority; quiescence then replaces the mode of
responsible engagement proper to the political actor.
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4.3.3 Promising Power
How does the capacity to make promises touch on the preservation of
power? By prolonging the otherwise-fragile power
generated when people gather together and “act in concert,”
which disappears the moment they depart. The force that
keeps them together, as distinguished from the space of
appearances in which they gather and the power which
keeps this public space in existence, is the force of mutual
promise or contract (Arendt: 1998, pp.244–245).
Actors remain in contact in the relevant manner because an authoritative
promise can count as a reason for them to do so, thereby providing
grounds for power. The promise can do something further than can
mere happening-to-be-together; it makes explicit the responsibilities
of the actors as such in relation to their common endeavour. In this
manner, the keeping of promises acts to guarantee not just the proximity
of actors but also the individualised, human, character of that proximity,
placing them together in a manner conducive to politics and moderately
stable. In On Revolution, the link between promise (in the form of
“covenant and ‘combination’ ”) and power makes the former the basis
of “a body politic” without which the individual “remains impotent”
(Arendt: 1990, p.171). Only promising will serve as such a basis; Arendt
contrasts it as basis with consent-based systems in which the power of
the individual is alienated to somebody of government, leaving them
with the same impotence as those outside the covenant (Arendt: 1990,
p.171). As consent seems a close cousin to the promise-based model,
a comparison of the two will be instructive; for this reason, they are
presented here in section 4.4.
Arendt claims, in On Revolution, that promising, including the
derivative forms of “combining and covenanting”, is “the means by
which power is kept in existence”, which rather suggests it is the singu-
lar method available. It is also apparent that, in promising, the actor
cannot help but create new power between himself and his witnesses.
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Arendt makes the further claim that actors who are thus keeping power
intact are “already in the process of foundation, of constituting a stable
worldly structure to house, as it were, their combined power of action”
(Arendt: 1990, p.175). Any measure of “stability” provided by promises
automatically generates a world.20
Given Arendt’s view of the fragility of power, if no promise func-
tions as such a ‘force’, then the power potential will likely dissipate
regardless of the bare institutional support enjoyed by that particular
public space. The difﬁculty of expecting this sort of support from
promising comes from the most obvious limit of promising; one can
only authoritatively promise for oneself,21 so the promise cannot be
binding beyond those who promise if it is to retain its character as the
common undertaking of free individuals. In order to maintain this char-
acteristic, the promise, including its embedded consequences, must not,
in relation to subsequent joiners, resort to supports of the kind which
were not involved in the initial moment of promising. That is, it must
remain a promise freely entered, without force or other coercive effect
but reliant only on the actor’s commitment to the promise; the next
section, below, is underpinned by this claim, or something functionally
similar.22
20One might be tempted to think that all action does this to some degree, creating a
world even as it is dependent upon the world for a context into which it can manifest.
This is true to the degree that all actions contain an implicit promise, in relation to
the speciﬁc matter with which they deal. Only promising however, has an exclusively
and explicitly future-directed focus, bringing to full light the concern with the future
preservation of the common world in a way not necessarily otherwise present.
21The exception to this is that one can also promise on behalf of those who can
be disposed of at one’s will; for those people, however, it is not a promise which
directly binds them but the command-relationship. In relation to other promisers, the
commanded are the equivalent of any other resource pledged to a mutual goal. At
least in theory, those commanded do not have a say in the contents of the promises to
which they will be committed by their commander. This is obviously not a suitable
basis for politics and this is reﬂected in Arendt’s stipulations of the forms of contract
or promise which can be part of foundations. This stipulation is the subject of section
4.4.
22For the view that a promise, even on Arendt’s account, is restrictive of the freedom
of actors inheriting it, see Keenan (2003), which is discussed below, p.175.
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4.4 Forms of Social Contract
Arendt distinguishes, in both On Revolution and “Civil Disobedience”,
between different types of ‘social contract’, only one of which is really
suitable for politics as opposed to a system of ruler-ship. These social
contracts are differentiated with reference both to the structure of rela-
tions they are held to establish and the means by which that structure
enacted and maintained. One of the two23 forms of social contract forms
the theoretical basis for foundations of a politics of engaged pluralism;
its suitability for the may best be seen using Arendt’s contrast between
it and the unsuitable form of social contract. Curiously, the rejected
form of contract is the one which seemingly creates conditions more
conducive to the exercise of authority, this being a key component of
the continuance of a public realm. Arendt’s reasons for this particular
rejection are themselves therefore generative of a need for a new and
distinctive conception of authority and the way in which it can function
without the support of an anti-political relationship of command.
The two forms of social contract Arendt ﬁnds “in theory...clearly
distinguished” (Arendt: 1990, p.169) are distinct in several respects in
spite of (as she repeatedly mentions) their common name; they “have
hardly more in common than a commonly shared and misleading
23“Civil Disobedience” contains a third form of social contract, one “concluded
between a people as a whole and its God”, (Arendt: 1972c, p.85) which empowers
a theocratic form of government to act on their understanding of that God (Arendt:
1972a, p.86). The reference to a god as the determining factor for action very obviously
makes it suitable for priestly rule rather than politics. While interesting enough in its
own right, this form of social contract does not merit much effort here; it is essentially
rather similar to the ‘vertical’ contract we shall soon enough encounter. Arendt
is of course aware of this similarity between the divine power and the supposed
omnipotence of the ruler to whom power is resigned in the ‘vertical’ contract (Arendt:
1990, p.171). Different between the two is that the structure of Biblical covenant
theological rule has a (nominal) apex external not only to the system of laws but
also to the physical laws of every-day life. A theological covenant without a ‘vertical’
structure other than the link of obedience between God and man is imaginable; an
individualistic Protestantism which referred only to scripture for guidance, looking
something like the kind of non-communicable conscience which Arendt discusses
in “Civil Disobedience”. The nominal apex of command would in fact, be only the
individual’s interpretation, binding only upon themselves.
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name”, as she notes in parentheses when introducing them (Arendt:
1990, p.169). For ease of reference, the account we present here will
combine the account of social contracts Arendt presents in On Revolu-
tion (which itself connects more directly to her account of the American
foundation) with that in “Civil Disobedience” (which employs mer-
cifully succinct nomenclature which we adopt from the off) without
effacing any differences between the two accounts. Where no difference
is indicated, it may be taken that the two are in accord; such differences
as exist will be indicated. This will, if nothing else, demonstrate the
remarkable consistency of Arendt’s writings.
In “Civil Disobedience”, the two models of social contract are re-
ferred to as ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’, with Arendt’s enthusiasm entirely
with the former at the expense of the latter in relation to suitability for
politics. We begin with the unfortunate latter;
the Hobbesian variety, according to which every individual
concludes an agreement with the strictly secular authorities
to insure his safety, for the protection of which he relin-
quishes all rights and powers. I shall call this the vertical
version of the social contract (Arendt: 1972a, p.86).
Immediately, a problem with this form of contract is apparent; it se-
cures only personal safety, rather than a public realm, though it may
conceivably generate one of those at the same time, albeit by accident.
The vertical contract, therefore, fails as a political foundation on account
of its purpose; in the terminology of “What is Freedom?”, it secures
liberation from want, rather than freedom (Arendt: 1993f, p.148). This
particular ﬂaw must be set aside to focus on the structural deﬁcits of
the contract and the way in which ‘consent’ features in the creation and
maintenance of this structure.
The deﬁcit, from the view of the political, lies in the alienation
of ‘all rights and powers’ by all participants other than the sovereign;
whilst necessary for efﬁciently organising a system to meet material
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needs it is entirely antithetical to politics24. This contract only creates,
in theory, a relationship between the ruler on the one hand and the
subjects on the other. This is not incidental in the version of the vertical
contract presented in On Revolution; “it is precisely their isolation which
is safeguarded and protected” (Arendt: 1990, p.171) in leaving the state
of nature for the protections of Leviathan.
Whilst Arendt identiﬁes this sort of contract with Hobbes, his
Leviathan’s subjects do in fact contract with one another to establish
obedience to the common authority which is then brought into begin-
ning (Hobbes: 1994, pp.99–100). Arendt sees the unity of the Leviathan’s
state as entirely the product of an over-awing power (Arendt: 1972a,
p.87) and this is true in the sense that Hobbes’ covenant-makers are
over-awed by fear of the state of nature, if nothing else.
Only at the moment at which the vertical contract is made is there
any potential connection of power between the contractors; this power
in fact manifests itself in that single instance purely in order to undo
the possibility of its own future workings. This is the essential fault
with the vertical contract though Arendt does not spell it out fully; all
of the qualities of the political are deployed in order to prevent their
further usage, even without reference to the aims of the contract, which
are themselves entirely a-political.
The ‘horizontal’ contract, by contrast, uses the same faculties in the
cause of their own potential further use and perhaps does so with with
this fully in mind rather than as accident. Built on mutual promises
which take the form of alliances between the promisers, “who con-
tract for their government after they have mutually bound themselves”
(Arendt: 1972a, p.86). This two-step contracting, which Arendt seems
to think an accurate model of the American experience (Arendt: 1972a,
p.76)(Arendt: 1990, p.169), creates a society as well as a system of gov-
ernment25. Promising, in this form, itself serves as the explicit basis
24The confusion between the two is, of course, a signiﬁcant part of Arendt’s
complaint against modern conceptions of politics.
25In the case of Leviathan, there is only one step in effect; the contract to mutual
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of the body politic (Arendt: 1990, p.171); in directly addressing the
structuring the individual actors in relation to one another, it prevents
them from collapsing into a set of interchangeable subjects.
The most appropriate image for this is of course that of a web,
which appears in The Human Condition as the ‘web of relations’ and
may perhaps be the theoretical underpinning of her Montesquieu-like
understanding of law as establishing relations (Arendt: 1998, p.190fn.17).
Each actor becomes an intersection, held in place by relation to deﬁnite
others rather than isolated in relation to everyone but the sovereign
power. By virtue of this quality of combining without effacing the
differences of the actors, the act of promising continues to generate
power (or at least does not impede it) not just between individual
actors but also, mutatis mutandis, between any such groups of actors,
thereby allowing political bodies to combine without thereby losing
“their identity” (Arendt: 1990, p.171).
In place of the mutually-enacted promises which form the basis
of the horizontal contract , the vertical contract relies on the individ-
ual subject’s “consent” to the sovereign power, a purely private affair
(Arendt: 1990, p.171). By this consent, the individual surrenders all
power, as seen above, rendering them obedient without thereby intro-
ducing them to a public realm. So far as this is understood to be the
functioning of consent, it has no public role.
However, consent appears in a very different manner in “Civil
Disobedience”, which presents us with a case of Arendt treating it
seriously as a part of politics and its institutions. This is something
altogether different from the idea of “tacit consent” to a society to which
one happens to be born, requiring certain other qualities in order to be
meaningfully exercised, though Arendt rather runs the two together
(Arendt: 1972a, p.88).
This is unfortunate because it obscures an important element; the
interaction between power and consent, which itself rests on the way in
which consent is supposed to operate in relation to political communi-
obedience.
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ties properly constituted, including in Arendt’s idea of America. There,
the possibility of dissent is generative of the possibility of assuming, in
its absence, tacit consent;26 “one who knows that he may dissent knows
also that he somehow consents when he does not dissent” (Arendt:
1972a, p.88). Consent here relates not to the level of speciﬁc laws or
policies but with reference to the Constitution itself, (Arendt: 1972a,
pp.88–89), which places it at the same level of generality as the consent
to Leviathan in the vertical contract. The key difference, of course,
is that consenting to Leviathan creates a beast against which future
dissent is in theory not possible. Talk of consent after that moment of
creation is an absurdity for this reason; the subject is no longer able to
meaningfully dissent.
The question is what constitutes meaningful dissent of the kind
Arendt claims is “the spirit of American law and the quintessence of
American government” (Arendt: 1972a, p.88). Because we are here
interested in the possibility of dissent in relation to the political, there
is one obviously necessary quality for the possibility of meaningful
dissent: the capacity to engage in dissent publicly. In turn, there are
several rather obvious requisites for this to occur, amongst them the
guarantees of free speech and association, including some level of
protection form violence at the hands of the state’s agents. In this last
stipulation is seen a further difference between obedience to Leviathan
and a power- and promise-based contract; the latter, as the contrast
suggests, ought only to employ power against its members. Even this
does not quite catch the relevant difference in interaction, which is in
the horizontal contract’s case supposed to be the interaction of those
members conceived as equals, which both generates further power
and maintains the otherwise-inanimate structure in some manner. The
prohibition against employing violence in response to fellow citizens’
use of power is a necessary component of civil political discourse.
No less important to the continuance of this discourse is that it is
26Though, one might well read it as actual consent in the case of a person free to
dissent who does not do so.
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conducted in co-operation even with those on the opposite side of a
particular dispute; no polis can survive without this condition in place.
Once the workings of authority are laid out in full order, the way in
which this is achievable will be much clearer, though for now we may
note that it includes a judgment-like commitment27 to considering the
views of the other, combined with a commitment to the enterprise of
a continuing political community as such which has priority over any
particular dispute.
So long as dissent must remain a political possibility, no non-political
method can legitimately answer its use, nor can anything but the
persuasion and power of fellow citizens exercised on an equal footing.
The structure of the (essentially ﬁctional) horizontal social contract
reﬂects this, in the ﬁrst instance by relating actors directly to one
another. In the second instance, this is suggestive of the political
community itself, operating in a manner based on whatever consensus
can be achieved, working upon the machinery of the state. It does so in
place of the isolated subject of Leviathan interacting with the sovereign,
which is a one-to-one relationship in which the determining factor is
never power, which is to say: never political.
The above considerations affect the following even as they provide
an important component of the interaction between individual and
political institution. The affect will be felt in the manner in which
authority can function within a political community given the equality
of citizens which is necessary to such a community.
4.5 Arendt’s pre-US America
We now turn to Arendt’s account of America, taking in not just the act
of founding itself but also her account of the history which preceded
it, which determines the set of problems which the founding had to
27Judgment, or at least this element of it, is present in outline if not in name in
Arendt’s reﬂections on the relationship between conscience and civil disobedience
(Arendt: 1972a, p.58ff).
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address. This, in turn, affects the plausibility of Honig’s reading of
Arendt’s reading of the Declaration of Independence.
Although Arendt recognises the basically mythical character of the
social contract, her account of the history of America prior to and
including the Declaration reads it as something like the horizontal
social contract as historical fact, including the creation of a political
community prior to establishing its system of government. In relating
the two, Arendt claims “it looks rather as though [Locke] was more
inﬂuenced by the facts and events in America” than the contrary, in
relation to his Treatises (Arendt: 1990, p.169). America is to Arendt the
factual instantiation of the otherwise-theoretical ‘state of nature’ which
is a necessary part of any social contract theory (Arendt: 1990, p.171).28
The “American Revolution”, according to Arendt, did not itself
create the “new power concept” which the colonists had discovered but
merely made it explicit, by instituting “the foundation of a new body
politic, designed explicitly to preserve it” (Arendt: 1990, pp.166–167).
There is some difﬁculty in understanding the sense of ‘preserve’ in
that claim, as Arendt enthusiastically documents the pre-revolutionary
means by which this power concept was practiced. The most likely
explanation is that Arendt is concerned that some alternative system of
government could instead have been created which did not preserve or
even acknowledge power in that form, thereby damaging the practice
by denying the theoretical analogue to it. The practice itself was already
safely established by the Mayﬂower Compact, which, itself forming a
basis for “all necessary laws and instruments of government” for its
signatories, “quickly became a precedent” (Arendt: 1990, p.167) for
further such unifying compacts. This is not to say, of course, that the
28It is a recurrent theme of Arendt’s pre-revolutionary American colonists that they
found themselves practising promising and covenanting without any real theoretical
backing, apart from, perhaps, “the Puritan’s reliance on the Old Testament, and
especially their rediscovery of the concept of the covenant of Israel” (Arendt: 1990,
p.172). Given the vast difference in kind between a covenant between a God and a
people on the one hand and the need to contract between equal individuals on the
other, some signiﬁcant adaptation of theory was necessary for the former to be made
applicable (Arendt: 1990, p.172).
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process of founding cannot be a generator of further power; indeed, it
must because it creates ever-more new relations between ever-more new
bodies, so long as it institutes a system which is genuinely political.
This is not, however, the primary task for the act of founding;
the “binding and promising, combining and covenanting” which keep
power extant pre-date the revolution which they inspire in part (Arendt:
1990, p.175). All of these are, in their way, limited acts of foundation
for so long as the power generated in action is maintained. The act
of founding a political community is more ambitious than this, of
course, because it posits not just a reason for the originating actors to
remain in a power-relation but for future actors to join with it. Whilst
promises, even action as such, must “deal with the future”, (Arendt:
1990, p.175) the founder does so in a manner subtly different, addressing
the following generations explicitly, offering to them something built
only for the sake of their possible involvement in human affairs. For
this, a greater degree of stability is required than need be found in
non-foundational promises; put another way, there must be a robust
way by which the ‘we’ of the original promise can, through the act
of foundation, become a ‘we’ which is expandable, able to take in
people. There is an urgency to attempts to found a political community
which is not present in any more modest political project, since the
founding of a community necessarily includes the introduction of new
members, in the form of the as-yet-unborn members. For this reason,
the founding must accomplish something rather difﬁcult; it must create
something which can be taken to be authoritative enough to make a
‘we’ without thereby subverting the unique character of the political.
Arendt recognises that authority is at stake in the American revolution;
What the royal charters and the loyal attachment of the
colonies to king and Parliament in England had done for
the people in America was to provide their power with the
additional weight of authority; the chief problem of the
American revolution, once this source of authority had been
severed from the colonial body politic in the New World,
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turned out to be the establishment and foundation not of
power but of authority (Arendt: 1990, p.178).
Note that the problem of protecting power has dropped out of the
equation here, to be replaced by a more pressing problem.
This problem of establishing authority comes into view as the main
one which presents itself in the revolution, though power’s continuance
is of course not automatically rendered secure at the same moment.
Understanding the possibility of establishing authority—particularly
a form of authority which is compatible with politics and Arendt’s
diagnosis of modernity—is the central difﬁculty of the following con-
siderations. The Declaration of Independence serves as an example of a
foundation which can do just this but, in order to understand what
exactly is required of it, the meaning of authority and its relationship
to other concepts in Arendt’s work must be presented.
4.6 Authority, Augmentation and Continuation
This is the work of this section, which most take in the concept of
authority as Arendt presents it, along with both the nascent American
republic at the moment of foundation itself and, further, the relationship
between that moment and those who later belong to the republic. This
will involve a mix of both Arendt’s “What is Authority?” (Arendt:
1993e), to pin down her concept in its more general terms, and her
reading of the American experience of foundation in On Revolution,
in order to ascertain if it successfully meets the challenge of establish
authority anew with which we closed the preceding section.
It is perhaps obvious enough that, in order to determine if the
Americans can successfully marry authority to the politics born of their
founding, it must be known what ‘authority’ is. Arendt claims the
concept is “clouded by controversy and confusion”, caused by the lack
of a common “authentic and undisputable experience” of it on which
an agreed conception can be based (Arendt: 1993e, p.91). This claim of
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a particular cause for forgetting the ‘proper’ meaning or experience of
authority, of course parallels Arendt’s thesis regarding politics itself but
there is a difference; the “crisis of authority” is primarily a practical,
rather than a theoretical, problem and one which Arendt claims “has
accompanied the development of the modern world in our century”,
i.e. the twentieth (Arendt: 1993e, p.91). Compared to the loss of the
political, authority is a recent casualty. This is primarily presented as
a problem of politics, which “has spread to such pre-political areas as
child-rearing and education”, areas of activity in which authority is
fundamental to correct execution of purpose (Arendt: 1993e, p.92). In
this is already apparent the potential tension between authority and
the political; it would be a pretty wide-ranging tool which was suitable
in unmodiﬁed form for both a hierarchical system of instruction and
an egalitarian public realm. Arendt matches a few different kinds of
regime with a speciﬁc shape each; for the authoritarian system, she
proposes “the shape of the pyramid [as a] particularly ﬁtting image for
a governmental structure whose source of authority lies outside itself,
but whose seat of power is located at the top” (Arendt: 1993e, p.98).
Arendt presents a brief description of the differences between au-
thority and a small handful of things with which she takes it to be
frequently conﬂated as a result of its conceptual indeterminacy.29 The
most likely confusion is of authority with “some form of power 30 or vi-
olence”, since obedience is an integral part of authority (Arendt: 1993e,
pp.92–93). It is an obedience, however, which cannot call on those tools;
“where force is used, authority itself has failed” (Arendt: 1993e, p.93).
Persuasion is likewise forbidden, as it rests on an “egalitarian order”
quite at odds with the “authoritarian order, which is always hierar-
chical” (Arendt: 1993e, p.93). This structuring, the hierarchy which
underpins authority, is not incidental to authority but the means by
which it functions differently from any of the alternative methods of
interaction just discussed;
29This is followed by Arendt issuing a defence of making distinctions, itself written
in a peculiarly defensive tone against a (perhaps imaginary) tendency for political
theorists to unnecessarily collapse distinctions (Arendt: 1993e, p.95).
30Presumably Arendt has the usual broad meaning of power in mind.
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The authoritarian relationship between the one who com-
mands and the one who obeys rests neither on common
reason nor on the power of the one who commends; what
they have in common is the hierarchy itself, whose rightness
and legitimacy both31 recognize and where both have their
predetermined stable place (Arendt: 1993e, p.93).
In one regard only does this share anything with the political; that it
relates individual people in a deﬁnite way, tying them to one another
by means of a structure which exists between them and is sustained
only by their acceptance of it.
There, the similarity ends, as the structure which Arendt claims
is the basis for authority, or for authoritarian systems, is inherently
inegalitarian in a manner which prevents political interaction between
participants in the structure in relation to any matter which is within
its purview. As Villa puts it, “Authority deﬁned in this way is obviously
antipolitical, predicated as it is on a hierarchical distinction” (Villa:
1999b, p.161). Not only has authority vanished, it was also wildly un-
suitable for politics anyway. Of course Arendt recognises this; she takes
Plato to be the originator of “one aspect of our concept of authority”,
presumably its refusal of persuasion, the basis of the Greek means “of
handling domestic affairs” (Arendt: 1993e, p.93).
The idea of divorcing authority from persuasion is a curious one,
not least because Arendt has left it under-developed. There are several
ways in which persuasion and a practice of authority might intersect,
only one of which would seem to indicate a failure of authority, that
where it becomes a supplement to counteract the recalcitrance of the
commanded. The relationship between authority and persuasion will
be more easily understood (perhaps: ‘must be understood’) in terms of
Arendt’s approach to Plato as an inﬂuence on the concept of authority.
31Whilst the one who obeys must believe in this hierarchy, it is unclear that the one
who commands need have any thoughts at all regarding its ‘rightness’ in order for it
to function. He may simply enjoy the capacity of command, or be accustomed to it in
an entirely non-reﬂective manner, without this jeopardising it in any way.
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She takes much of his approach to authority to derive from an attempt
to justify rulership by philosopher-kings replacing the polis (Arendt:
1993e, p.109), motivated in turn by “the conﬂict between the philoso-
pher and the polis [which resulted] in the trial and death of Socrates”
(Arendt: 1993e, p.107). This brings us to Plato’s opposition to persua-
sion and hence to its supposed incompatibility with authority, with
reference to a slightly fuller account found in Arendt’s “Philosophy and
Politics”. There, the focus is on the inability of Socrates to persuade ‘his
judges of his innocence and his merits” (Arendt: 2004b, p.427) or, for
that matter, his friends that he should not evade punishment (Arendt:
2004b, p.428). In the face of this ineffectiveness, Plato wanted “some-
thing liable to compel [men] without using external means of violence”
(Arendt: 1993e, p.107). The philosopher’s appreciation of ‘the truth’ is
insufﬁcient for this, for it can be binding only on the kinds of people
who ﬁnd the related concerns compelling. For the remainder, some-
thing is needed which does not rest on persuasion (itself ill-matched to
propagating the truths of the philosophers because it necessarily treats
them in the same manner as ‘mere’ opinions (Arendt: 2004b, p.428)).
The frustration, then, for Arendt’s Plato, is not primarily that a system
of authority could be created in which speciﬁc instances of it were
questioned but that accepting the system as such would be placed in
jeopardy if it were to be presented ‘on a level’ with citizen’s opinions.
In both these cases, persuasion is employed in a manner which
is in some sense ‘external’ to the practice of authority, because both
involve questioning the legitimacy of the structure itself and therefore
may only be asked by someone not fully immersed in the structure.
This seems to be the concern Arendt ascribes to Plato in both “What is
Authority?” and “Philosophy and Politics”, since he is proposing a new
valuation, precisely that of the philosopher’s supposed expertise at the
expense of the Greek polis’ persuasion-based means of doing public
business. The question there is, as it were, how to convince a people to
accept a new ordering of the common world and the relevance of this
to considerations of foundings are obvious.
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For the act of foundation to be a political act, it cannot be presumed
to function without the support of persuasion. This is only possible if
we assume that Arendt’s account of authority is not simply identical
with her Plato’s account of the phenomenon save for a difference in
evaluation of it. This particular difﬁculty will be carried forward into
the examination of the American experience of foundation.
With these as the basic characteristics of authority, or, more accu-
rately, an authoritarian system, it is hard to see what role it can have for
politics. On the other hand, Arendt claims, in a remark hardly expanded
upon, that freedom is dependent on the boundaries of authority, with-
out which it “became helpless, defenseless, and bound to be destroyed”
(Arendt: 1993e, p.97). The potentially mutually-supportive workings of
this relationship between authority and freedom will become clearer
with reference to the American founding but a preliminary answer is
possible now; authority can in another sense, one not immediately clear
from Arendt in “What is Authority?”, indicate an acceptance of a given
governmental system itself as authoritative without thereby ascribing
roles to members based on command relationships. A relationship of
equal citizenship may itself be bound to, founded on, an authoritative
system of this type which thereby justiﬁes that equal relationship. We
will soon enough determine if the American founding is an example of
creating a system with something like that character.
4.6.1 The Lost Supports of Authority
First, though, it must be seen why Arendt thinks authority is in a
state of crisis in modernity. She ties it into a trinity with tradition and
religion (Arendt: 1993e, p.93), the latter of the three understood in a very
particular way and all three sharing in the same crisis. Authority is the
latest of the three to suffer from the “general doubt of the modern age”,
which thereby “invaded the political realm” (Arendt: 1993e, p.93). These
are not three separable things which merely happen to share a fate;
the twin losses of tradition and religion together cause the weakness
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of authority. The ways in which these two support authority provide
much of the character of authority as “an obedience in which men
retain their freedom” (Arendt: 1993e, p.106). Whilst ‘tradition’ seems
the easier linked to authority, Arendt’s account of (Roman) religion
forms a vital mediator between the two, so must be the ﬁrst-addressed
of the two here.
Whilst the role of religion in support of authority is perhaps less
obvious than tradition’s, we might assume that it could perform it
by providing a sanctiﬁed support to a government based on that gov-
ernment’s accordance with scriptural teachings. This, however, is
not at all the idea Arendt has in mind when she refers to religion,
which she clears of all explicitly belief-related content of the kind we
might naturally associate with, say, the Abrahamaic religions.32 Indeed,
transcendental justiﬁcations for particular rulers appear in “What is
Authority?” not as a part of the kind of religion she has in mind but as
Plato’s justiﬁcation for philosopher-kings (Arendt: 1993e, pp.107–108).
Instead, Arendt plays on the derivation of ‘religion’ from “re-ligare:
to be tied back, obligated...to be tied to the past”, where this is under-
stood, for and by the Roman citizen, as a reverential tie to Rome’s own
moment of foundation and the history which follows from it (Arendt:
1993e, p.121); those foundations are understood as “enormous, almost
superhuman and hence always legendary attempts” to create a lasting
foundation (Arendt: 1993e, p.121). Religious activity becomes “almost
identical” with political activity, when understood in this way; “The
binding power of the foundation itself was religious ” (Arendt: 1993e,
p.121).
The unity of these two makes sense only once we follow another of
Arendt’s etymological derivations, this one the derivation of authority,
as it “originally appeared”, from augmentation, speciﬁcally the aug-
mentation of the foundation act by those in whom authority was later
vested (Arendt: 1993e, pp.121–122).
32On the other hand, the workings of authority with reference to both tradition
and religion, are essentially adopted by the Christian Church for its own purposes in
Arendt’s account, thereby becoming a religion “in the ancient sense” (Arendt: 1993e,
p.126).
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Religion, then, derives from the same base as authority itself with
a relationship of mutual support between the two in Arendt’s Rome,
with the religious element supplying an affective element of attachment
to the foundation (and hence the practice of authority), which is to say
that it is the religious element which is responsible for the feeling of
‘rightness’ which we have seen Arendt claims is vital to a practice of
authority.
In the case of Rome, it is the Senate which beneﬁts from this recog-
nition, bestowed upon it by virtue of “descent and by transmission
(tradition) from...the ancestors” (Arendt: 1993e, p.122). This is the
content of tradition for Arendt’s Rome and therefore the object of the
religious feeling which supports authority. Tradition, which Arendt
presents as “undeniably” lost for modernity, is not identical with the
past itself, a confusion which Arendt takes to be prevalent (Arendt:
1993e, p.94). Instead, tradition is
...the thread which safely guided us through the vast realms
of the past, but this thread was also the chain fettering each
successive generation to a predetermined aspect of the past
(Arendt: 1993e, p.94).
In the case of Rome, this results in an authoritarian pyramid-shape
formed “as though the peak of the pyramid [reached] into the depth
of an earthly past (Arendt: 1993e, p.124) In the image of the pyramid
as such, Arendt claims the layers of the pyramid “are interrelated like
converging rays whose common focal point is the top of the pyramid”
and its source of authority (Arendt: 1993e, p.98) which, in the case of
Rome, would mean something like a continual examination not of the
past but of the tradition. The difference here must be spelled out; it can
only be that the latter is the ‘processed form’ of the former, providing
the bare facts not only with a layer of interpretation but speciﬁcally
a layer of interpretation which itself had a particular uniﬁed focus
and selective function. At any point, the exercise of any act would in
theory be subject to a question rather like ‘does this augment Rome’s
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founding?’ or to put it as Arendt does, the “whole weight of the past”
was on the shoulders of the Roman at all times (Arendt: 1993e, p.123).
Arendt’s Romans sound almost ravenous for tradition-creating and
-enhancing opportunities; “[a]nything that happened was transformed
into an example, and the auctoritas maiorum became identical with
authoritative models for actual behaviour, with the moral political
standards as such” (Arendt: 1993e, p.123). This cannot be too indiscrim-
inate, or else it would not be a coherent tradition. The past which is
handed down “from one generation to the next [is] the testimony of
the ancestors” (Arendt: 1993e, p.124), so will come to the citizen with
a particular, probably reasonably proscribed, emphasis and point-of-
view. The seriousness with which Arendt’s Romans took precedents
from their tradition as a source of authority was the basis of their acts,
with actions conducted without such a reference “was inconceivable”
(Arendt: 1993e, p.124).
This approach to the past, resting on a religious sentiment in relation
to a particular mythical moment, combined with a uniﬁed tradition
related to the same, does now seem lost. If authority as such necessarily
rests on these two in combination, or even one or the other, then a
reliable source of authority which is also compatible with the political,
is a futile hope.
4.6.2 The Lost Species of Authority
It is very tempting to read “What is Authority?” this way because,
although Arendt starts with the caveat that she is not discussing “
“authority in general” but rather a very speciﬁc form which had been
valid throughout the Western World over a long period of time” (Arendt:
1993e, p.92), she proceeds without any reference to alternate forms of
authority.33 Arendt’s account of authority, then, is supposed to be read
as the loss of a particular form of authority, capitalised on but not
33This is not exactly true: Arendt does mention the ecclesiastical authority of the
Catholic Church; she describes at as inheriting ‘Roman-style’ authority (Arendt: 1993e,
p.125).
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caused by the totalitarian movements (Arendt: 1993e, pp.91–92), even if
it is written in a manner that makes it sound as though Arendt holds
that the possibility of authority as such has passed (or is at least, apart
from the caveat, not unambiguous on this point). The claims that one
particular species of authority has passed are over-shadowed by the more
spectacular opening claims of the essay that suggest authority as such
has vanished, or even that the essay should have been titled “What
was—and not what is—authority?”, as Arendt begins it (Arendt: 1993e,
p.92).
It is precisely these statements which encourage readings of Arendt’s
essay, such as Flathman’s,34 which take seriously the ‘authority as
such’ strain of the essay at the expense of Arendt’s caveat. Flathman
recognises the Roman-speciﬁc quality of Arendt’s concept but treats it
as exhaustive of her concept of authority; “acceptance of these beliefs
[in religion and tradition as found in Arendt’s Rome] eroded away.
Because in authority depended on them, their decline left Western
societies with no more than the appearance of authority” (Flathman:
1980, p.71). Flathman treats tradition and religion in Arendt’s account
as functional supports for authority as such in terms of their being a
“deeply held and widely shared system of values and beliefs” which
are able to ground the “constitutions, rules, procedures” and other
of the manifold phenomena of authority (Flathman: 1980, p.71). The
point at which Flathman departs from a charitable reading of “What
is Authority?”—the same point at which following his reading would
render Arendt’s hope for the American founders establishing both
power and authority quite incoherent—is his claim that the speciﬁc
authority-tradition-religion “constellation is not merely one possible
34Honig criticises Flathman for this (Honig: 1993a, p.102). She altogether misses the
curious fact that, having criticised Arendt’s alleged death knell for authority, Flathman
provides a good account of how authority could function without resurrecting the
‘Roman form’ of it but intends this as a criticism of Arendt’s presumed pessimism.
As we shall soon see, it need not be used that way and can indeed form a basis for
the recovery of authority within terms quite similar to Arendt’s own. Honig’s own
account of ‘modern authority’ (Honig: 1993a, p.103) can itself ﬁt into the framework
Flathman builds as a generalised account of authority.
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set of conditions in which in authority might take root and ﬂourish,
it is necessary to in authority” (Flathman: 1980, p.71).35 Flathman
recognises that Arendt’s link between power and authority makes the
former dependent on the latter (Flathman: 1980, p.263n.6) without
recognising that Arendt’s examples of modern instances of power,
found elsewhere, complicate both this relationship and the dependence
of authority on supposedly vanished authority and tradition.
Leaving aside for the moment the errors in Flathman’s reading
of Arendt, there are other elements of his work which provide the
appropriate framework for addressing the manner in which she can
hold authority in some alternate form to be a possibility for the moderns.
On Flathman’s account, Arendt’s failing is that she supposes a very
exact constellation of beliefs necessary for “genuine or true or real
authority” (Flathman: 1980, p.73);
She is correct that in authority requires values and beliefs
that provide grounds for preferring forms of association
that include in authority over those that do not and for pre-
ferring some particular version of those forms that include
it. She may also be correct in her thesis that certain beliefs
about tradition and religion in fact played such a role in
ancient Rome. But it is implausible in the extreme that those
particular beliefs are a necessary condition of any and all
systems of in authority. The experience of one society (or
the writings of one theorist) does not not legislate to all
future practice. The writ of no in or an authority runs so far
(Flathman: 1980, p.75).
Initially, this criticism of Arendt may seem to miss the point of her
habitual procedure of making strict distinctions, for it seems, on a
35Unless we just assume she held a different view about the constellation of
necessary conditions for authority when writing On Revolution. We do not need this
assumption because of the caveat in “What is Authority?”, though it would in fact be
a perfectly acceptable way of reconciling the two, especially once Honig’s distinction
between ‘Roman’ and ‘modern’ forms of authority is adopted.
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pretty shallow reading, to risk undoing the distinctiveness of authority
as captured by her description.
However, this would be to miss the point: Flathman’s work allows
us to point up the ways in which practices of authority share similarities,
linking Arendt’s accounts of Rome on the one hand and the American
founding on the other in a way not easily manageable with Arendt’s
work alone. Linking the two is a necessary part of treating Arendt as a
consistent thinker simply because she insists on the rigid distinction
of authority from many other things whilst using the term to refer to
elements of two different sets of institutions and attendant practices.
This work must be done before addressing Honig’s account of the
distinctiveness of these two forms of authority, in order to show that
they are indeed phenomena which ought to be captured by the same
conceptual schema.
The bridge between the two is Flathman’s claim that, whilst the
speciﬁc ‘beliefs and values’ of ancient Rome are not necessary for the
functioning of authority, “practices of in authority do require values
and beliefs in terms of which authority can be preferred over alternate
arrangements” (Flathman: 1980, p.75).36 This (perhaps obvious) point
suggests that the Roman and American forms must be broadly identical
in schematic form in order for both to fall into the same category as
Arendt uses it. This is not to claim that there is identity of content
between the two sets of practices but that tradition and religion must
be replaced by some other set of ‘beliefs and values’ in the American
case in order for authority to function, a replacement which, whilst not
obviously possible given the way in which Arendt presents authority,
can hardly be said to have been ruled out by it either. The success (or
otherwise) of this attempt can only be decided by an examination of
the American founding and the subsequent system spawned by it but
it must be borne in mind that the above is the preliminary framework
36Flathman’s claim encompasses both the preference for one particular practice
of authority over another and the preference for some authority rather than none
whatsoever.
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for understanding both what Arendt may be attempting and, to some
degree, the operations of Honig’s reading of this.37
Based on the considerations of this section so far, it can be seen
that the work of a founder in the modern age is especially difﬁcult. A
different relationship between system and citizen is necessary when
all citizens can become direct political participants, rather than mere
electors. In the Roman example, the authority of the senate is, as it
were, exercised in relation to those who are non-senators. For Arendt’s
modern conception of politics, there is no hard distinction of this kind
to create a hierarchical relationship as such, so some difference in the
relationship between citizen and the authoritative system as such will
be evident. Given Arendt’s view of tradition, both in the Roman sense
and more generally, any practice of modern authority must do without
the support of an authoritative tradition as supply of common materials
about which views may be held. The same point is applicable also
to the use of religion for authority; it is hard to imagine a religious
awe in relation to the founding act with quite the same character in
a modern setting (as it would seem to require a Roman-like attitude
to the founding act) and the Abrahamaic faiths, looking mainly to the
heavens, can not perform a comparable service.38
It is possible to generate an understanding of a modern practice of
a speciﬁcally political authority by reference to Arendt’s analysis of the
American founding, centring on the Declaration of Independence. This
must include Honig’s reading of the same.
4.7 The American Founding
The need for some system of authority for the successful functioning
of politics established, it is time to turn to how such a system can
37Though, Honig’s quick dismissal of Flathman suggests that she does not under-
stand her own work in these terms.
38This same difﬁculty also applies if the founding is intended to produce a non-
political system of command relationships, unless some means for restoring them can
be found.
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be created which does not violate the political by robbing it of its
autonomous character as a mode of human life. The appearance of
this problem in Arendt parallels but does not match the standard
problem of how to legitimately found a government, such as one
might ﬁnd in Rousseau, Locke or Hobbes, based on the assumption
that people are, loosely speaking, otherwise in some kind of ‘state of
nature’. The problem is slightly different for Arendt, being instead the
problem of founding a governmental system such that it is taken to be
authoritative in a manner which then enables the practice of politics.
In fact, this problem might not have been apparent at all without, ﬁrst,
the appearance of a crisis of authority in “What is Authority?” and,
second, the way in which she treats the American founding as a means
to create authority anew under modern conditions. Arendt creates a
need within her project for a something which can stand as a generator
of authority, able to stand without prior supports; the correct point to
address this is below, in subsections 4.7.4 and 4.7.5, in which the issue
of the newness of the system comes to the fore in the question of what
is constituted in the act of founding. This forms the background for the
following considerations.
There is a peculiarity in Arendt’s approach to the founding of the
United States of America: she does not identify, as we might expect
her to, the Constitution itself as the primary foundational document
of that system. Although that document does feature in her account,
particularly with reference to the institutional forms and functions after
the act of foundation, the focus in relation to the justiﬁcatory aspect
of authority is on the Declaration of Independence. Arendt’s claim that
“[u]nder modern conditions, the act of foundation is identical with the
framing of a constitution” (Arendt: 1990, p.125) seems as though it
might count against this claim but she continues; “the Declaration of
Independence initiated the writings of constitutions for each of the
American States, [which] culminated in the Constitution of the Union,
the foundation” (Arendt: 1990, p.125). Alone, this does not settle the
matter: it does not establish that the document of the Constitution is
itself the justiﬁcatory source of itself.
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Arendt has a very speciﬁc source in mind for this justiﬁcation;
If we were to understand the body politic of the American
republic solely in terms of its two greatest documents, the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the
United States, the Preamble to the Declaration of Indepen-
dence would provide the sole source of authority from what
the Constitution, not as an act of constituting government
but as the law of the land, derives its own legitimacy; for
the Constitution itself [including the Bill of Rights]...is sin-
gularly silent on this question of ultimate authority (Arendt:
1990, pp.193–194).
Whilst the Constitution itself is not a negligible part of the historical
process, it has been demoted, in essence, to a (signiﬁcant) document of
implementation rather than source. The Declaration takes the position
of originary document, the Constitution itself essentially subordinate
to it, justiﬁed by it in a manner we have yet to explore.
The caveat with which the selection above begins cannot have es-
caped notice: it will become clear that Arendt essentially does wish to
understand the American body politic in terms of these two documents,
though perhaps not exclusively in those terms. The alternative, which
shortly follows this passage, is to construe of the source of authority for
the American government as either the workings of divinely-informed
reason or, even worse, the God who stands as guarantor of reason
thus construed (Arendt: 1990, p.194). This possibility, at odds with
Arendt’s conception of politics, is the root fear against which much of
On Revolution’s account of the American founding is written. It remains
to be shown that the Declaration can ground authority without recourse
to something non- or pre-political: such is the work of the remainder
of this section.
To that end, the account Arendt gives of the American founding will
be considered, with the interpretive approach to it provided by Honig
considered alongside. There are several relevant elements to Honig’s
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approach and this section will deal with each in turn. The immediate
question is ‘what does Honig think can ground a modern, post-Roman
practice of political authority?’, keeping in view the elements she be-
lieves to be novel to the ‘modern’ as ‘opposed’ to the Roman forms of
authority, as well as the similarities between them which justify their
unity within one concept. Honig’s reading, as we shall see, privileges
the differences between the two without addressing the similarities
which seem to underlie them.
A brief examination of Honig’s over-all claim, then, to begin, which
is that there are two recognisably distinct practices of authority to
be found in Arendt’s work: the one in “What is Authority?”, which
is the ‘Roman’, the other a ‘modern’ practice of authority which can
be understood largely with reference to On Revolution (Honig: 1993a,
pp.96–97). Honig’s
Arendt does not simply mourn the disappearance of author-
ity in modernity; she also celebrates it. And, in that spirit of
celebration, she constructs a replacement for it: through her
fabulist rendering of the American revolution and founding,
she offers a powerful account of a practice of authority for
modernity (Honig: 1993a, p.96).
This is how Honig sets up both the ending of the possibility of a
‘Roman’ practice of authority and the possibility of some newer practice
replacing it, noting that the loss of the ‘Roman’ form is in some sense
liberating, marking “the recovery of human worldliness, and new
possibilities of political action” in spite of the difﬁculties it creates
(Honig: 1993a, p.96). These difﬁculties are themselves directly political;
we [cannot] exercise our world building capacities in a world
without authority. If we love the world, if we are committed
to world-building—to politics—we must ﬁnd another form
of authority, one that can be sustained in modernity. Only
then will we experience the privilege of a kind of political
action that is not just revolutionary (Honig: 1993a, p.103).39
39By ‘not just revolutionary’, Honig does not mean ‘merely revolutionary’, for
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This is the framework for understanding Honig’s approach to species
of authority and, coming so soon after viewing her rebuke of Flathman,
we can see the similarities between between the works of the former and
of the latter: in both we ﬁnd a variant on the claim that a non-Roman
practice of authority is possible, though Flathman claims to ﬁnd one
against Arendt, whilst Honig ﬁnds it with her.
Honig provides an interpretation of Arendt’s ‘modern’ system of
authority, one which is worth addressing at length.40 The ﬁrst salient
difference she posits between it and the ‘Roman’ form of authority,
based on the loss of the latter, is that “it requires for its sustenance not a
shared belief in particular deities or myths but a common subscription
to the authoritative practice of promising” (Honig: 1993a, p.103). About
the ﬁrst part of this sentence, there can be no reasonable dispute: a
requirement based on subscription to something mythological and
pre-political would be quite unworkable, indeed ought to be refused
even if taken to be workable. Difﬁculty stems from the second claim,
largely because it is difﬁcult to see how a subscription of that kind can
meaningfully contribute anything signiﬁcant to the political. Honig
claims it must rest on a pre-existing community, albeit one which need
only be united in
common linguistic practices, not even necessarily by a sin-
gle, common, inherited, ﬁrst language (Honig: 1993a, p.103).
The only commonality of membership is that all “under-
stand and subscribe to performative practices. Such a com-
munity should be able to sustain this new kind of author-
ity...assuming that it can see and be satisﬁed with the power
an authority inherent in its own performatives (Honig: 1993a,
p.103).
she cannot and remain in accord with Arendt’s project and enthusiasms. She must
instead, or ought to, mean ‘beyond the revolutionary moment itself’.
40Keenan also provides an interpretation which also centres on the Declaration
of Independence. The deﬁciencies of his account merit their own separate treatment
(found on p.175), as they allow us to establish by contrast some further elements
necessary to an understanding of Arendt on authority.
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Whilst a subscription to some common performative practices is ob-
viously a minimal criterion for any community at all, it does not get
us very far at all towards an exhaustive account of how a modern
practice of authority can be sustained. What it does provide is a basis
on which individual political actors can regard the promises of others
as binding, the same basis on which the community is supposed to be
able to regard itself as a ‘we’ without resorting to a national myth. That
a practice alone can do this is doubtful, if by ‘practice’ Honig refers to
the acceptance of a particular formal manner of promising.
Suppose Honig’s contrast between the ‘authoritative practice of
promising’ and ‘a national myth’ to indicate something more basic: the
contrast between accepting performative acts as such rather than insist-
ing on some constative tether or guarantee for action which somehow
lies outside the political. Honig’s summary verdict of the Mayﬂower
Compact and acts of founding taken together supports this reading;
she claims them as “performatives that are not solipsistic, because they
presuppose a plurality of actors who subscribe to a common practice
of promising and not nihilistic because, by virtue of their own power,
they are the guarantors of their own authority41...Political action has
no anchor” (Honig: 1993a, p.104). The second part of this claim of
this claim gives us some hope that the operational distinction between
‘promise-based authority’, as we might call it, and ‘myth-based’ is the
relevant target of Honig’s efforts, even as the ﬁrst part gives us cause
for concern. The shared commitment, both a particular form of promis-
ing and to promising as such, can generate authority only between
the agents who so relate themselves by accepting it and enacting it in
speciﬁc relationship-creating acts. Of the generations who follow, it has
no claim as yet and some supplementary element must be uncovered
which can extend its reach and some supplementary element must be
uncovered which can extend its reach.
41This formulation exactly parallels Honig’s fuller description of the way in which
the Declaration works as a basis for authority.
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4.7.1 The Role of Promising
Given the way in which promising ﬁgures as basic faculty for the possi-
bility of long-term political projects and commitments, it is perhaps no
surprise at all to see the faculty make an appearance directly in Honig’s
account of the American practice of authority, even if it is relatively
brief. Its appearance is as an alternative to “a shared belief in particular
deities or myths” as a source of “sustenance” for modern forms of au-
thority (Honig: 1993a, p.103). Speciﬁcally, it is as a shared practice that
promising can act as a substitute of this kind; “the modern conception
of authority...requires for its sustenance...a common subscription to
the authoritative linguistic practice of promising” (Honig: 1993a, p.103).
This common subscription is to underpin a community, indeed is to
be, on Honig’s account, the only thing regarded as binding on that
community’s members and hence constitutive of the community as
such (Honig: 1993a, p.103). Practices bind the community but it is
unclear quite what degree of speciﬁcity Honig regards as necessary
for the constitution of such a community as the foundation of modern-
form authority. It is tempting to regard the need to be a need for
some speciﬁc range of practices to be regarded as authoritative, were
it not for the following claim of Honig’s; “The is a community whose
members understand and subscribe to performative practices. Such
a community would be able to sustain this new kind of authority in
Arendt’s view” (Honig: 1993a, p.103). This makes it sound that merely
recognising the possibility of performatives as such will be sufﬁcient,
which is not only a low standard but also a particularly loose basis
for a community, making it hard to understand how anyone could
fall outside it (barring certain neurological disorders). However, it is
something Honig presents as the danger facing this loose conception of
community which is the crucial point;
that it can overcome its nihilistic craving for a law of laws,
for a source of authority that is transcendent or self-evident,
assuming that it can see and be satisﬁed with the power and
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authority inherent in its own performatives (Honig: 1993a,
p.103).
What makes this element, presented almost as secondary, crucial to
the practice of political community? It is that, whilst every conceivable
community has managed to understand the operation of performatives,
very few (perhaps none at all?) have managed to treat performatives
unsupported by some absolute ‘law of laws’ as sufﬁciently authoritative.
Even this runs up against a problem: it is not clear how even a fully-
accepted practice of promising would take the place of religion and
tradition in order to ‘sustain’ authority. All the reliability that promis-
ing can generate does not necessarily convert to authority, though an
understanding that tethers for authority of a certain kind cannot be
sought can itself function as a means of tethering the system of au-
thority. It throws the actors back upon themselves, forcing them to
confront themselves as the only resource from which authority can be
generated. This would act as a basis for the reading of Arendt which
Honig engages in, whilst the promise-based part of the passage above
is insufﬁcient and, probably for that reason, disappears from view
reasonably promptly. Honig’s reading does not ultimately place either
the linguistic practices or the absence of transcendental foundations
at the centre of Arendt’s practice of authority, placing ‘fable’ in that
position instead, though it is a fable about promising exercised in the
founding.
4.7.2 Roman and American Alike: the Religious Ele-
ment of Founding
When Arendt discusses the role of religion in the Roman foundation, it
is the point at which her twin accounts of Roman and American prac-
tices most nearly become identical. The religious element of authority,
as it appears in “What is Authority?” has already been discussed above
and, with this in mind, may now be compared to the short passage
in On Revolution in which Arendt retreads much of the same material.
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The object of reverence in the American case is the Constitution itself,
which “strengthens the American Government ‘with the strength of
religion’ ” (Arendt: 1990, p.198). The most important element of the
religious element of Roman authority was that it had now faded from
the world and could not again function. However, the attitude towards
the Constitution which Arendt attributes to the Americans after the
founding is ‘religious’ only as
understood in its original Roman sense, and their piety
would then consist in religare, in binding themselves back
to a beginning, as Roman pietas consisted in being bound
back to the beginning of Roman history, the foundation of
the eternal city (Arendt: 1990, p.198).
The American religious experience of the Constitution is identical in
form with the Roman religious experience of their founding; since the
Constitution is, as the object created in founding, the product of the
American founding, it is fair to say that the American ‘religion’ is also
substantially identical with the Roman. It might be said, perhaps, that
the former focuses on the result of the act of foundation, whilst the
latter turns its gaze to the moment of foundation itself but this seeming
distinction is one without substance. The founding of Rome could only
be known, in any real sense, through familiarity with the governmental
system it birthed, especially if one takes seriously Arendt’s claim that
the practice of authority—as augmentation— was a practice of continual
refounding.42 With this particular attitude taken to the structure of
authority comes the concomitant thought the structure is, or ought to
be as far as is possible, in accord with the foundational act, in order to
be continuous with it. When Arendt concludes this passage relating
authority to its source, she does so with the claim “that one is tempted
42One likely inspiration for this thought in Arendt’s work is Machiavelli’s Discourses;
as part of a favourable comparison of the character of the people with that of princes,
Machiavelli says that “the populace is so superior in sustaining what has been
instituted, that it indubitably adds to the glory of those who have instituted [laws,
codes of civic life, statutes and new institutions]” (1970, p.256).
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to claim that it was the authority which the act of foundation carried
within itself, rather than [several alternative sources], that assured
stability for the new republic” (Arendt: 1990, p.199). The act itself is
invoked as ‘what one is tempted’ to claim is the ultimate source of
authority, in discussing the document which eventually resulted from
that act.
What of the claim, though, that the Constitution-worship functions
as a substitute for the “act of beginning” which could not be conceived
of “except as something which must have occurred in a distant past”
(Arendt: 1990, p.198)? Through Woodrow Wilson, Arendt claims that
the worship of the Constitution was derived from the knowledge of its
origins as not-too-distant (Arendt: 1990, p.198).43
4.7.3 American Judicial Authority and the Senates
The Roman concept of authority re-appears as part of Arendt’s discus-
sion of the modern form, which suggests that she does indeed intend
the latter as something distinctive from the former. The separation does
not prevent the “great Roman model [asserting] itself almost automati-
cally and almost blindly” in the minds of the Founding Fathers as they
began to shape their new constitution(Arendt: 1990, p.199).
Arendt does not claim, however, that the Founding Fathers copied
exactly from their Roman model; both the location of authority’s prac-
43In its way, this would make the Constitution, including the act of constituting as
well as the object, a more ﬁt subject for exemplar-creation and political emulation. Its
nearness robs it, potentially at least, of mythologised status, so that it may be more
easily realised as the free political action which it was or, to put it another way, the
project which it announces could more easily be seen as one in which the inheritors
had a more equal say. The Romans’ distant mythological founders, being more
remote, perhaps more easily approach a Legislator-ﬁgure, bestowing the principles
of a governmental system in an unalterable manner which cannot itself be easily
altered. This thought leads in two directions; ﬁrst, to Keenan’s claim that foundings
are also restrictions of freedom, addressed below, beginning p.175; secondly, the ways
in which Honig treats Arendt’s own analysis of the American Founding as engaging
in fable-construction. If the link to the latter is not at ﬁrst clear, it is this: Arendt’s
own work presents the Founding Fathers certainly as heroic ﬁgures but not heroic in
a way which the rest of her work suggests is unobtainable by others, providing they
take on the risks of political action.
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tice and the object upon which it operates change in the adaptation of
the Roman model. Both of these changes are signalled in Arendt’s brief
introduction of the Roman concept; “[it] was not versed in laws, and
the validity of the laws did not derive from an authority above them. It
was incorporated in a political institution, the Roman Senate” (Arendt:
1990, p.199). In the American practice, the need for authority to rest
with a “concrete institution...especially designed for the purpose” is
recognised in deference to the Romans, though it is now the Supreme
Court (therefore becoming a part of the judiciary branch) rather than
the Senate with which it rests; they remained, on Arendt’s account,
true to the spirit of their model even if they did not align names and
functions of institutions identically with it (Arendt: 1990, p.199).
The relationship between law and authority in the American case,
absent for the Romans, is one of the key contributors to the shape of
authority in the American system. The political authority of the Romans,
which “consisted in giving advice” differs in that regard from the
Americans’ “legal” authority, which “consists in interpretation” (Arendt:
1990, p.200). Perhaps more curiously, the speciﬁc characteristics of
the Supreme Court which “signal” it is “the true seat of authority
in the American Republic” are characteristics which simply could not
have belonged to the Roman Senate: “lack of power, combined with
permanence of ofﬁce” (even if Arendt does trace the Founding Fathers’
understanding of the separation of power and authority to the Romans)
(Arendt: 1990, p.200). Or, as Arendt claims earlier on the same page;
“its very authority made it unﬁt for power, just as, conversely, the power
of the legislature made it unﬁt for authority” (Arendt: 1990, p.200).
A curious transformation has taken place here: authority, in moving
from the Roman Senate to the American Supreme Court, has shifted
from being something directly addressed by the political to an entirely
different beast, a judicial matter; this Court’s “authority is exercised in
a kind of continuous constitution-making” (Arendt: 1990, p.200).
The Court’s function presents us with one dis-similarity and one
similarity between Roman and American systems, the two taken to-
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gether supporting both the claim that two distinct concepts of authority
are at work and that they are variant of the same fundamental practice.
The dis-similarity is the more obvious, which is the transformation
by which power and authority become mutual anathema, making them
unsuitable for combination within the same institutions. The same
is not true in the Roman working of power in relation to authority.
The Senate must have been involved the generation and exercise of
power, being the seat of Roman politics. Arendt’s account, however,
also places it at the effective top of the pyramid of authority, via its link
to the Roman ancestors, thus combining the two in a way avoided by
the Founding Fathers.44 Is it plausible to describe the Supreme Court
as ‘powerless’ even in Arendt’s special sense? It certainly has power,
so long as the system survives, in the sense of being able to alter the
behaviours of others through the medium of the laws it adjusts. This
is true even with law conceived as Arendt, following Montesquieu,
does, as a matter of establishing relations between things and people
rather than lists of prohibitions (Arendt: 1990, p.188–189). Power-as-
leverage was concerned with modifying behaviours or acts: modifying
the relationship between any two things, when at least one of those
things is a person or group of persons, is an attempt to modify the way
in which that side of the pairing interacts with the other. In the sense
of combinatory power which Arendt designates with the term ‘power’,
it is not quite so clear that the institution as such has power; more
importantly for assessing Arendt’s claims is the question of whether it
actually lacks power. There is perhaps power between the constituent
members, as there is between the members of any institution, unless
it can be said to be lacking some quality vital to the creation of power.
The only viable candidate for this is the spontaneity of action, as the
Court is bound to consider only those things put before it.
The two forms of authority share as central concern the past of the
44Arendt quotes Hamilton on the place of authority; “the majesty of national
authority must be manifested through the medium of the courts of justice” precisely
because of this powerlessness (Arendt: 1990, p.200), a claim quite inconceivable in
relation to the Roman Senate.
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system, more obviously for the Romans than for the Americans, espe-
cially their respective foundational acts. Although exercised through
differing bodies, the one political, the other legal, they share a particular
similarity in relation to how they address this past: both can be seen
as attempts to ‘augment’ it. As the Roman Senate’s self-understanding
was of a body which perpetually refounded Rome by a process of
augmenting the original act of foundation (see above and Arendt (1990,
p.201)), so the Supreme Court exercises itself in relation to “the Consti-
tution as a written document”, upon which it itself works through a
process of interpretation (Arendt: 1990, p.200). Arendt takes a phrase
from Woodrow Wilson to summarise how she takes this Court to relate
to the Constitution; “a kind of Constitutional Assembly in continuous
session” (Arendt: 1990, p.200). Demonstrating the essential similarity
of this to the Roman practice of continual augmentation rests on the
passage which follows that, in which Arendt speciﬁes some of the
differences between the judicial authority of the Americans and the
political authority of the Romans;
For auctoritas, whose etymological root is augere, to augment
and increase, depended upon the vitality of the spirit of foun-
dation, by virtue of which it was possible to augment...the
foundations as they had been lain down by the ancestors.
The uninterrupted continuity of this augmentation and its
inherent authority could come about only through tradition,
that is, through the handing down, through an unbroken
line of successors, of the principle established in the begin-
ning. To stay in this unbroken line of successors meant in
Rome to be in authority...(Arendt: 1990, p.201).
All of this applies directly, of course, only to Rome. However, Arendt
holds to her claim that the Roman concept of authority was inﬂuential
on the American Founding Fathers, claiming they had been “nourished
by the classics and [had] gone to school in Roman antiquity” (Arendt:
1990, p.202). It seems fair also to treat the Supreme Court as engaged
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in augmentation of the Constitution and, therefore, of modiﬁcation of
the inheritance from the founders. In this, it mirrors the function of
the senate by providing an unbroken line to the originary act which, in
theory at least, maintains the spirit of that act.
One difﬁculty remains: the change from ‘political’ to ‘legal’ author-
ity: the change from ‘political’ to ‘legal’ authority. This fundamentally
alters the character of authority, obviously in relation to the political,
changing the availability of being ‘in authority’ by narrowing it quite
dramatically.45 This is not to suggest that the practice of Roman author-
ity was in principle open to all: indeed, it only could have functioned
as an authoritative body with regards to those who were not currently
members, i.e. those who were not able to be treated politically. How-
ever, the Supreme Court takes the stem of authority out of the political
itself, though it is in effect exercising it at least nominally in a form
deriving from a political process. In both the original founding and
the acts of re-founding which take the form of amendments, it is the
political which has generated the document or the change within it.
In theory at least, though this allows of an admittedly broad range of
possible answers, the work of the Court is merely interpretive, therefore
not generative but revelatory of meaning. This last claim is perhaps a
naive one in relation to the work of courts, particularly if statutes are
unclear in their wording, or confused in their relations to other law. In
these cases, interpretation may well need to verge on invention in order
to make a decision at all.
Perhaps what stays the hand of the Supreme Court, in the manner
in which it permits the combination of novelty and stability, is the
religious element: the regard it has for the founding may well keep it
from presenting anything new itself, in order to maintain the structure
through novelty can be generated by others.
45Although Arendt doesn’t, the authority-related function of the Supreme Court
might be considered to extend downwards through the subsidiary courts in each
instance where the highest does not contradict their rulings. They are, after all,
working on the statutes within their limited domains in the same way that the
Supreme Court works on the Constitution itself: interpretation focused on an ever-
smaller range of statutes or law.
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4.7.4 Constative 1: Arendt’s Banishments
Honig’s treatment of Arendt is couched in terms taken from J. L. Austin,
via Derrida: that is, she talks in terms of ‘performatives’ and ‘consta-
tives’, both when discussing promising, as above, and when she turns
to the functioning of the U.S. Founding (Honig: 1993a, p.104). This is
entirely apt, a neat way of presenting and analysing the distinctions
animating Arendt’s discussion of the same. As it is perhaps not entirely
clear quite what the distinction between performative and constative ut-
terances amounts to, the two terms shall now be detailed using Austin’s
original description of them, in sufﬁcient detail to understand Honig’s
use and no further.
Austin describes a ‘constative’ statement as one which admits being
either true or false (Austin: 2009, p.3). The term is chosen, in preference
to ‘descriptive’ because Austin takes there to be statements which
may be judged true or false which are themselves descriptions of the
conditions under which reports are made, or intended to produce some
effect other than that of conveying a fact (Austin: 2009, pp.2–3). The
performative, on the other hand, is not an utterance which admits of a
truth-value (Austin: 2009, p.5); instead, each “is, or is a part of, the doing
of an action, which again would not normally be described as, or as
‘just’, saying something” (Austin: 2009, p.5). It is already apparent that
Austin’s ‘performatives’ and Arendt’s ‘action’ have much in common.
The performative utterance is not itself a description of what one has
done or is doing but is instead, Austin tells us, the doing itself (Austin:
2009, p.6). This is the case even with those performatives which sound
otherwise: to say, in the right formal circumstances, ‘I will my fortune
to you’ is to will my fortune to you, not to say that I have done or
currently am doing so separately to my saying so. Or, more similarly to
our current interest, saying that one is promising X is to promise X. In
some sense, it is fair to call ‘I am promising X’ true, though it is so only
in the most trivial sense, for it cannot be otherwise. Performatives can
indeed be deﬁcient but it in an altogether more interesting variety of
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manners than mere falsehood, the possibilities including: deﬁciencies
of form; inadequacies of conditions necessary for some performance to
be initiated; or an insincerity which, in the case of the promise, is the
closest of Austin’s list of ‘infelicities’ to simple falsehood (Austin: 2009,
p.18).
A substantial element of Honig’s analysis of Arendt treats her in
these terms. It is an attempt to address the role of the ‘constative’
element of the Declaration and Arendt’s attempt to excise it from the
centre stage of her account of the American Revolution. To appreciate
Honig’s reading, which amounts to the re-insertion of a novel (to
Arendt’s account) constative element into the Declaration, it is necessary
ﬁrst to see which constative elements of it Arendt banishes and how
she achieves this. Arendt develops, to that end, a very speciﬁc (and
creative) reading of the Declaration, emphasising certain elements at the
cost of others. Understanding this reading and the role it can play for
Arendt’s understanding of both politics and the American founding
rests on the way in which Arendt uses two particular elements of the
Declaration, both of which are found within the ﬁrst two paragraphs
of the document. This section begins with the reading of the second
paragraph, before returning to the ﬁrst paragraph of the Declaration.
Many of the points which will be raised in relation to the ﬁrst-addressed
of these elements might just as well have been raised in relation to the
second; the greater relief into which Arendt’s treatment of the ﬁrst-
addressed is thrown by its proximity to those elements which she
wishes to throw into the shadows makes it the more salient contrast,
thus the easier location for much of this work. An understanding of
Arendt’s reading thus established, Honig’s alternative constative will
then be examined in order to see if the problems it raises are merely
purported and how they might impact upon Arendt’s work.
The ﬁrst element of Arendt’s reading to be addressed is her ap-
proach to the second paragraph of the ‘Preamble’ of the Declaration, in
particular her treatment of
[a] sentence which relates to a transcendent source of au-
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thority for the laws of the new body politic...Jefferson’s
famous words ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident’,
combine in a historically unique manner the basis of agree-
ment between those who have embarked upon revolution,
an agreement necessarily relative because related to those
who enter it, with an absolute, namely with a truth that
needs no agreement since, because of its self-evidence, it
compels without argumentative demonstration or political
persuasion (Arendt: 1990, p.192).
Jefferson’s phrasing evidently presents Arendt with a difﬁculty (as well
as an opportunity), one she recognises; “[absolutes which are truths of
the self-evident kind] are no less absolute than the revealed truths of
religion or the axiomatic verities of mathematics”, putting them beyond
debate and therefore beyond the reach of politics (Arendt: 1990, p.192).
For this reason, her reading of the Declaration, supported by her
reading of other works of Jefferson, seeks to emphasise what she above
refers to as the ‘relative’, at the expense of the ‘absolute’, element of the
document. Arendt quotes Jefferson to demonstrate his awareness of the
same claim, who calls them “the opinions and beliefs of men [which]
depend not on their own will, but follow involuntarily the evidence
proposed to their minds” (Arendt: 1990, p.192). This seems, on the
face of it, to repeat in a slightly different form the ‘despotism of truth’
Arendt’s Plato wishes to establish (Arendt: 2004b, p.428) in order to
tame politics, even if, in this case, the truths chosen are not especially
difﬁcult to grasp. The difﬁculty remains that they are, in theory at least,
quite outside of modes of meaningful political interaction because of
their supposed self-evidence.46 If this is what the Founding Fathers are
offering, then they seem not to be producing either a properly political
act or a structure predicated on the possibility of engaging with their
46It is perhaps obvious to point out that, being a relatively vague and far-reaching
set of “unalienable rights” (Jefferson: 1776, p.102), great latitude of interpretation and
therefore of political contestation is possible even in the event of their total acceptance
as truths.
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project as something which is open to political discourse. This last
concern is what necessitates the particular reading of the Declaration
which Arendt employs, the validity of which will be addressed as that
strategy is unveiled.
Arendt’s reading of the way in which Jefferson presents the ‘unalien-
able rights’ of the Declaration relies on establishing a difference between
the truths there listed and truths of another kind, namely mathematical
(although matters of religious revelation might also have been used
in this place) and ascribes the same understanding to Jefferson. She
describes the ‘laws’ of mathematics as irresistible even for God (Arendt:
1990, p.192) and therefore “sufﬁciently irresistible to check the power
of despots” (Arendt: 1990, p.193). They are not, however, at all “of the
same nature as the laws of a community, [nor could they] somehow
inspire [the same]” (Arendt: 1990, p.193). The kind of compulsion, to
use her example, which operates in the case of a statement like “two
times two make four” is that it “is rooted in the physical structure of
the human brain and therefor is ‘irresistible’ ”(Arendt: 1990, p.193).
Though perhaps not put by Arendt as plainly as it might have been,
she must mean something like the claim that the truth of this particular
sentence is immediately clear to anyone capable of understanding the
words so employed and thus the relations between them: there is no
room for reasonable debate as to the validity of the result so long as
the sentence is understood.
On the other hand, the claim that “all men are created equal”, an
example from the Declaration that Arendt uses, is not immediately
and uncontroversially clear in the same way; Arendt refers to it as “a
reasoned statement which stands in need of agreement” (Arendt: 1990,
p.193).47 The two kinds of ‘law’, mathematical or scientiﬁc on the one
47This is not really a statement of the kind which is open to political discussion as
such, by Arendt’s reckoning, so makes rather an odd example for her to draw from
the Preamble. Instead, a relationship of ‘artiﬁcial equality’ is essentially a practical
postulate, a very minimal one at that, for the continuance of political engagement
between given persons. It cannot be open to reasoned disagreement without thereby
excluding some persons or other from the discussion of its own reasonableness.
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hand, societal or legal on the other, are, or must be treated as, entirely
different things in spite of the shared term employed by both.
The difference between the two laws, having been established as
part of Arendt’s view, is of no consequence to an analysis of the Declara-
tion unless it can be incorporated as some part of the Founding Fathers’
understanding of their own project. By claiming that Jefferson was
himself “dimly aware” of this difference between mathematical truths
and the truths listed in the Declaration, Arendt is able to address the
“somewhat incongruous phrase, ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident’”
(Arendt’s emphasis Arendt: 1990, p.193) in a manner which underplays
the truth claim-related element. She claims, as evidence of Jefferson’s
‘dim awareness’, that an entirely different phrasing would be appro-
priate if he had without reservations regarded the ‘truths’ forming the
second paragraph of the Declaration to be genuinely self-evident in the
same manner as axioms in mathematics;
These truths are self-evident, namely they possess a power
to compel which is as irresistible as despotic power, they are
not held by us but we are held by them; they stand in no
need of agreement (Arendt: 1990, p.193).
If something like this were taken to be the intended message of the
Declaration, the result would be a ‘ﬁxed’ and non-negotiable basis for
the system it generated and, therefore, one which was not itself the
object of political discourse so long as its status as set of constative
statements was taken seriously. Instead, in claiming that Jefferson’s
choice of language reﬂects a doubt about the kind of truths he was
listing, Arendt seeks to place the emphasis elsewhere, demoting the list
of unalienable rights from the position of ultimate source of authority.
On Arendt’s account, the authority of self-evident truths, found by the
Arendt might have in mind that some other sense of equality is intended in the
Preamble, though it is not clear she does, or that Jefferson’s text means by it anything
other than a kind of moral equality inhering in birth as a human as such. Quite what
sense of ‘equality’ was intended shall become clearer, below, with reference to more
of the list of ‘self-evident truths’ and the way in which they are presented in relation
to governments.
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light of “divinely inspired reason”, are but one small step from the
“authority of an ‘avenging God’ ” (Arendt: 1990, p.194).48
Arendt has two good reasons to avoid establishing the self-evident
truths of the Declaration as the authoritative grounding of the action.
The ﬁrst is that it would install as ‘higher law’ a “divinely informed
reason [whose] truths enlightened the conscience of men so that they
would be receptive to an inner voice which still was the voice of God”,
which would command them (Arendt: 1990, p.194). This is the reason
which Arendt acknowledges in On Revolution.
There is a second reason for emphasising the method of the Dec-
laration rather than the content, one which does not feature in On
Revolution; the list of unalienable rights, being an answer in part to an
economic dispute as much as a political one, contains few claims which
directly touch upon Arendt’s concept of politics. In spite of the foun-
dational role she expects the Declaration to perform for the American
republic, the list of rights is mainly related to, in the language of “What
is Freedom?”, ‘liberation’ rather than ‘freedom’ proper (Arendt: 1993f,
p.148);
We hold these truths to be self-evident: That all men are
created equal; that they are endowed by their creator with
certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty,
48The seriousness with which Jefferson takes these rights as themselves transcendent
in relation to politics, hence beyond discussion, may be seen with reference to his
letters, a resource that Arendt almost certainly had access to, given that she draws
her version of Jefferson largely from his correspondence. The bibliography to On
Revolution contains three collections of his writings: The Complete Jefferson, The Life
and Selected Writings and The Writings. The last, Arendt notes, is in ten volumes
(Arendt: 1990, p.334). In an 1816 letter, Jefferson writes; “Our legislators are not
sufﬁciently apprised of the rightful limits of their power; that their true ofﬁce is to
declare and enforce only our natural rights and duties...this is all the laws should
enforce...the idea is quite unfounded, that on entering into society we give up any
natural right (Jefferson: 1816a, p.143). This suggests that, far from being aware of
the open-to-debate ‘nature’ of the unalienable rights, Jefferson regarded, or came to
regard, them as pre-political in a way quite contrary to Arendt’s design. Further, it
seems the ‘We hold’ of the Declaration may just as well be read as ‘We have discovered’,
which is to say that the phrasing is not incompatible with an idea that the self-evident
truths constitute something quite non-negotiable; leave aside for this purpose the
difﬁcult matter of quite what constitutes adequate fulﬁlment of those ‘natural rights’.
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and the pursuit of happiness; that, to secure these rights,
governments are instituted among men, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever
any form of government becomes destructive of those ends,
it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and
to institute new government, laying its foundation on such
principles, and organizing its power in such form, as to them
shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness
(Jefferson: 1776, p.102).
It is hardly surprising that, with this content, that Arendt should wish
to focus on the method of inter-personal combination, the subscription
to ‘we hold’, in preference to the content, most of which can on her
account stand only as the minimal precursors to freedom proper. In
particular, the claim of basic rights relates speciﬁcally to ‘safety and
happiness’ where we might expect a ‘right to public life’ or something
similar to be pre-requisite of a Declaration which accorded with Arendt’s
conception of politics.
This expectation is not necessarily thwarted by the language of the
Declaration, however: regarding it as thwarted would require a reading
which took the right to ‘the pursuit of happiness’ invoked there to refer
unambiguously to ‘private welfare’ rather than the enjoyment of public
life. Arendt’s Jefferson though, is not so unambiguous; she draws on a
1774 work of his, “A Summary View of the Rights of British America”
in an attempt to establish this. This includes a Whiggish reading of
history which links the revolutionary cause to a supposed original
reason for the emigration to America of “free inhabitants of the British
dominions in Europe” in order to seek to establish societies “likely to
promote public happiness” (Jefferson (1774, p.65) used in Arendt (1990,
p.127)).49 As Arendt says, if “Jefferson was right” in ascribing this
49Jefferson relates the emigration to the colonies to an even earlier supposed
occurrence, the emigration of Saxons to Britain from “their native wilds and woods
in the north of Europe” (Jefferson: 1774, p.65), presumably in order to establish by
analogy a greater legitimacy for the American efforts.
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goal to the initial migration to America, “then the colonies in the New
World must have been the breeding grounds of revolutionaries from the
very beginning” (Arendt: 1990, p.127). Rather a lot of historical import
might well rest on determining the accuracy of Jefferson’s claim as it
certainly affects how the original emigrants relate both to their country
of origin and how their goals align with those of their descendants.
More interesting, however, is whether Jefferson actually takes this to
be the case, i.e. whether or not he takes the then-pending revolution
to grow out of the same rights, understood to include a right to public
happiness. There is no reason to believe that Jefferson’s Whiggish
account of American history is not at least sincere.
In Arendt’s account, Jefferson’s work of historical interpretation
serves to show that the American colonists could have conceived of the
‘happiness’ which appears in the Declaration as ‘public’, the right to
engage in public life and therefore as a right claimed even greater than
merely to be left alone in private pursuits (Arendt: 1990, p.127). This
right, “as distinct from the generally recognized rights of subjects to
be protected by the government in the pursuit of private happiness
even against public power...[something] only tyrannical power would
abolish” is the right “to be a ‘participator in the government of affairs’,
in Jefferson’s telling phrase” (Arendt: 1990, p.127).
Arendt’s link between happiness and public engagement not only
makes possible some interpretive leeway in the Declaration; she also
takes it that it “indicates strongly that there existed in the coun-
try...such a thing as ‘public happiness’, and that men knew they
could not be altogether ‘happy’ if their happiness was located and
enjoyed only in private life” (Arendt: 1990, p.127). Public engagement,
“prior to the revolution” (Arendt: 1990, p.127), is something considered
necessary for the fully-realised life in itself, not merely as a guard of
some other element of life.
There is an interesting consequence of taking this particular part of
Arendt’s description seriously. The ﬁrst is that it allows us to see Jef-
ferson and his colleagues as seeing themselves not as engaged in some
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entirely ex nihilo enterprise when they found but engaged instead in
an act of continuance.50 The existence of promise-based consociations
and power prior to the Revolution give its form and an awareness of
this on eh part of the Founding Fathers is especially evident with this
additional text by Jefferson’s in view to show Jefferson’s understanding
of American history. With the ﬂourishing of public power and the
enthusiasm for it preceding the Revolution, however, the failure of the
Revolution to create a maintainable public space seems a more spectac-
ular failure; it seems as though an opportunity has been squandered
and pessimism about the prospects of the political perhaps entirely
justiﬁed.
There is a second important element of the Declaration, one which
performs two roles as part of Arendt’s reading of it. The ﬁrst is the
one familiar from above: the performative character of the document.
The other is to contribute towards establishing the Founding Fathers’
enthusiasm for ‘public happiness’, a form of happiness Arendt believes
quite contrary to then-usual understanding of public engagement as
burden, or duty (Arendt: 1990, p.128). Acknowledging Jefferson’s
oft-stated desire to quit the political matters of the day for the quiet
of his home, Arendt dismisses one such quote and its like as “not
carry[ing] much weight”, as not really representative of the Founding
Fathers’ “[a]uthentic experiences” of public engagement (Arendt: 1990,
p.129). Plato is partly to blame; “with the possible exception of John
Adams” their thought was generally lead astray by his work even as
they complained of it (Arendt: 1990, p.129). The ‘general’ tendency to
be so lead astray by theory hostile to politics is not taken to be complete
by Arendt, a claim which contributes also to her reading of the ﬁrst
paragraph of the Declaration (see below);
50This is implicit in earlier referring to Jefferson’s “A Summary View of the Rights
of British America” as a Whiggish history. Arendt makes a similar claim about the
element of continuance present in the founding but with reference almost exclusively
to the Founding Fathers’ understanding of Antiquity. In focusing on this, she is able
to make the rhetorical strategy of the Founding Fathers as a means of psychologically
shielding themselves from the novelty of their action much more prominent and
easier to claim.
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...there are more than a few instances when their pro-
foundly revolutionary acting and thinking broke the shell of
an inheritance which had degenerated into platitudes...
Among these instances is the Declaration of Independence,
whose greatness owes nothing to its natural-law philosophy
- in which case it would indeed be ‘lacking in depth and
subtlety’ - but lies in the ‘respect to the Opinion of mankind’,
in the ‘appeal to the tribunal of the world...for our justiﬁca-
tion’, that inspired the very writing of the document, and
it unfolds when the list of very speciﬁc grievances against
a very particular king gradually develops into a rejection
on principle of monarchy and kingship in general (Arendt:
1990, p.129).
The ‘revolutionary’ element in question, the acceptance of the public
realm not as burden but as joy, really only obliquely (at best) present
in the selection which Arendt above takes from the Declaration. If it
is present at all, it is in the relationship which the document implies
between its signatories and their intended audience. Seeing quite why
requires a little examination.
Much of what has been said above about the strategy of Arendt’s
reading could be repeated here; there is perhaps a slight difference
possible in the treatment of the above passage. It would in fact be
entirely compatible to read it as a genuine query to the ‘tribunal of
the world’ even if the ‘we hold’ was taken to indicate truths held to
be self-evident. It is an invitation to treat those claims and, from the
phrasing by which it is presented, it reads as the invitation of one
to an equal other. In privileging this, Arendt makes apparent the
implicit attempt to, in the phrase of Kant’s claim of judgment that
she would later repeat, ‘woo the consent’ of the other members of the
human species. It might be thought unnecessary to present the cause
of the Revolutionaries to a world considered as a tribunal if they were
indeed convinced both of the unalienable rights and the evidence of
their usurpations. The phrasing used, however, might instead indicate
157Chapter 4. The Act of Founding
that the crimes of the British Crown were known to the colonists but
in need of presentation in much the same manner as in a criminal
court; the particular standards to which the accused is held are not
themselves an object of negotiation but are presented there merely as
the ﬁxed thing against which particular deeds are measured. That is,
we might regard the colonists as convinced of their case, conceiving
of the world-tribunal as an audience or jury, one it would be better
not to be punished by. On this reading, the colonists would not take
themselves to be open to the possibility of being convinced otherwise
but only interested in convincing others. If they are attempting to
convince the remainder of mankind of ‘self-evident’ truths, then they
return to something analogous to the philosophers’ presentation to
the polis of truths which are supportive of their presumed authority.
If, however, they sincerely take their audience to be mankind in an
opinion-holding, rather than truth-apprehending capacity, then they
aim at persuading their fellow man of the rightness of their cause in a
manner which does not include attempted compulsion. This is perhaps
the more plausible treatment of the language of the Declaration, one
which also supports Arendt’s treatment.51
What of list of speciﬁc grievances against the crown? By containing
many elements which clearly differ in kind, it does support the claim
that the Founding Fathers did wish to protect public engagement,
even if they did not consider it a ‘happiness’, which they had already
tasted in combining to write the Declaration. The list is a very mixed
affair, containing as it does complaints relating to military matters,
trade, civil and criminal justice and constitutional concerns (Jefferson:
1776, pp.103–104). This last grouping of complaints has some claim
also to being the primary concern, more directly connected as it is
51The link between persuasion and authority, discussed above, may muddy the
waters somewhat. However, so long as we do not take the Declaration to be a
persuasive text of the sort which would then operate the authority-relations which
featured above, we do not run into this problem. Certainly, it does not say ‘and
having decided upon these truths for ourselves, you had better join in’ but we are
already ahead of ourselves here; Honig’s treatment of ‘we hold’ will deal with this.
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to the introduction to the list, which claims “a history of repeated
injuries and usurpations, [by the Crown] all having in direct object
the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these states” (Jefferson:
1776, pp.102–103). The grievances listed are presented as proofs of
this (Jefferson: 1776, p.103), making them supporting claims to the
narrative of a growing encroachment of tyranny. Particularly interesting
are those ‘constitution-related’ concerns, such as the arrangement of
representation and the convenience of access to any forum of public
business (Jefferson: 1776, p.103). We might have been free to regard
these as instrumental concerns only, had the insistence of the Declaration
against tyranny not suggested otherwise (especially considering them
in combination with Jefferson’s reading of the pre-Revolutionary history
of the American).
4.7.5 Constative 2: the ‘We’
Honig complains that the above constative-downplaying manoeuvres
on Arendt’s part “rest on [a] too-easy dismissal of the constative mo-
ments of the Declaration” (Honig: 1993a, p.104). Instead of refuting
those particular moves, Honig wishes to show the importance of the
constative element of that document by insisting on a constative ele-
ment within it which Arendt has not noticed, one which she claims to
ﬁnd in the very phrasing which Arendt privileges. The performative of
the ‘we hold’, she claims, is itself a constative which Arendt has not suc-
cessfully disposed of; at issue, then, is not the presence of ‘self-evident
truths’ within the Declaration but that there is a ‘we’ able to hold them
(Honig: 1993a, pp.105–106). Since Arendt relies on this phrase, using
it as the grounding for a government system in the political act itself,
some care must be taken to make sure that it can so function without
thereby smuggling anything unwanted into the public realm. The main
concern is to ensure that the ‘we hold’ is either not itself a constative or,
if it is, to make sure it can do no harm.
Two sets of considerations exist in relation to this claim; ﬁrst is
159Chapter 4. The Act of Founding
the question of accuracy, second the question of impact. The former
touches on the substance of Honig’s claim whereas the latter relates
to its consequences for political practice. As Honig’s claim seemingly
returns the signers of the Declaration to “Sieyès’ vicious circle”, in which
they lack the authority to create the system because the system does
not yet exist which can authorise them (Honig: 1993a, p.105), there are
potentially very great consequences for the founding of an authority
based upon the Declaration. The question of accuracy must be addressed
before this, as it may yet save us from negotiating the consequences.
Honig’s Arendt addresses the ‘we’ as a constative as follows: in a
manner which parallels the relationship between an individual action
and its actor, “the “we” does not exist as such prior to the Declaration”
(Honig: 1993a, pp.104–105).52 Now, this interpretation of Arendt en-
counters a difﬁculty: the people doing the constituting at this point do,
in fact, already exist as a people, by dint of the history of promising and
organising leading up to the moment of the Declaration. Perhaps this is
a bit hasty as an attempt to dismiss Honig’s point; it is certainly still
an open question whether or not ‘a people’ as such exist immediately
prior to the signing of the Declaration, just as it remains open whether
Arendt holds the same. Her account of the pre-revolutionary history of
America suggests she sees more of continuity than perhaps she tends to
admit to, though this is not the same thing. The best way to get some
sense of the ‘right’ answer is to examine the two alternative possibilities
separately, one and then the other. Note that what follows is a treatment
not of something which Honig thinks is the real problem with the ‘we’
of the Declaration but a separate issue, which follows naturally from the
52Is it possible to read this postulated constative which is in the Declaration—
according to Honig’s Derrida a structural feature of language (Honig: 1993a, p.106)—
back into action as such? Curiously, the constative element is much more apparent
in relation to the foundational case than it is in relation to, say individual acts of
promising and again, more salient in that case than in the case of other performatives.
Isn’t it the case, though, that any act, whilst it does not postulate a ‘doer’ as such, does
postulate the possibility, or ambition, of a self formed through a coherent narrative?
One key and obvious difference remains between those who act in the instantiation
of a life and those who act in the instantiation of a republic: the former has a rather
more deﬁnite end, in which death takes the place of the last or ultimate signatory.
1604.7. The American Founding
claim with which this paragraph began. An attempt to address Honig’s
own claim begins on p.165.
Suppose for the sake of our ﬁrst argument that the people as such
do exist at the moment in which they sign themselves over to the
Declaration. In this case, we are entitled to ask just what secured or
created them as a people. They cannot as yet be the ‘people of the
United States’, for that body does not as of yet exist; not existing, it
cannot have members. This leads us only to postpone the ‘creation’ of
the people a step, as we would then need to account for their existence
as some people or other prior to signing. In Arendt’s account of
America, as seen above, another promise pre-dates the Declaration and
another that one, with the earliest on her list the Mayﬂower Compact.
In each case, the question recurs; what makes this a people before
they have signed to this promise? In each case, it seems only that the
answer has led to some prior voluntary arrangement which has shaped
or bound them. Prior even to these may be some other commonality,
such as either religious ties or ideas of nationhood; if these are present,
they cannot be admitted as constative for the political group created
as a people by an act of promising without thereby undoing the work
Arendt puts into banishing the constative elements she identiﬁes in
the Declaration. They may very well coincide with a particular political
realm, though they must be treated by the political actor as if ‘by
chance’ only; if otherwise, the ‘what’ of the actor would determine the
criterion of membership and impose a condition upon the revelation of
a ‘who’ in public. It might be objected that, in almost every known case,
membership which is not so limited de jure will in fact be limited de
facto merely because of historical happenstance. To allow the limitation
to be formalised would prevent or retard the future expansion of the
public realm and do so on entirely unsavoury grounds.
The creation or formalisation of a people as a collective group is
a special case of promising in general. In any promise, the implicit
structure of the commitment creates a group; it may well be as trivial
a group as ‘those who will meet on Thursday next week’, in which
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case the group’s existence as a current concern will be dissolved on
that Thursday, at the completion of the relevant promise. The same
feature ‘scales’ with the scope and depth of the promise in which
persons engage, even found as part of one of the indeﬁnite-duration
promises which can form the basis of an ongoing project which touches
more closely on the persona created through enacting it. Marriage is a
promise most deﬁnitely of this character, creating a new legal entity of
the persons thus combined. It does not matter that, before the vows,
the ‘we’ constituting the marriage is not yet a legally-recognised entity;
there is, however (except in the most ill-advised of marriages), already a
recognisable ‘we’ constituted by the parties which contract to marriage.
What the typical marriage does is essentially a peculiar hybrid of two
elements: it creates a new ‘we’, to which it commits its members but it
does so (and can only do so) because of the pre-existence of a ‘we’ which
has maintained itself without the legal structuring into which it now
places itself. In deliberately making it an object of law, the character of
the partnership has changed, though much of it is continuous with that
which preceded it. In this regard, at least, the act of foundation is like a
marriage, though with the key difference that it is explicitly left open
to the possibility of further members signing themselves to the same
promise, whereas (most) marriages do not. This continuity between the
two types of promise is the best way to make sense of Arendt’s use of
so many promises as parts of her reading of American history and her
insistence that the Revolution made explicit a new power concept born
of the colonists’ experiences (Arendt: 1990, p.166).
This quality of expandability is in fact the one which saves the
constative element of the ‘we hold’ from damaging the Declaration as a
foundation for politics. So long as the people forming the ‘we’ is not a
closed unit, there is not a harm of this kind to be found. Treating the
‘we’ in this form, whilst directing it towards something which seems
rather more in keeping with the proper character of Arendt’s politics,
also subtly alters its character away from the constative Honig presents
it as. It also alters its relationship towards the future in a way which
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parallels the incompleteness of any ongoing action. The lack of ‘last
instance’ to secure the moment of authority ﬁnds its opposite in the
lack of ‘last instance’ of perfection of the ‘we’: it is never a complete
‘we’, never one which in principle cannot take on new members or alter
the way in which it conceives of the fundamental truths which in theory
constitute it.
The lack of perfectibility of this ‘we’ is something which is raised
to the level of discourse by the existence of the speciﬁc political docu-
ment which creates and deﬁnes it. Rather than creating an additional
constative, it takes the existing mute constative of the pre-political ‘we’
and makes of it something more open; it is, in principle at least, a
contestable claim who the ‘we’ can contain. Expansion of the ‘we’ is ex-
plicitly present both in the power-concept Arendt claims to ﬁnd at work
in the American colonies, with its form indebted to the combinatory
capabilities of promising. The same is true in relation to the appearance
of the ‘federal principle’ and of the council system of government in
On Revolution, both examples of the power of such combination.
This is not, however, the problem which Honig believes she has
found in the use of the Declaration as a source of authority, though
it seems something which one ought to be concerned with. Honig’s
concern is instead with the mechanism which makes possible the use
of the Declaration as an anchor, reliant on the constative element of the
‘we’. Honig’s analysis relies on the claim that, for Arendt, the ‘we’ does
not exist prior to signing and, Honig claims, therefore cannot “stand
as the guarantor of its own performance” (Honig: 1993a, p.105). The
Founding Fathers “lack the authority to sign until they have already
signed” and it is their awareness of this—an understanding of the limits
of performatives rather than awe at the constatives used—which causes
them to invoke “the laws of nature and the name of God” (Honig: 1993a,
p.105) in order to escape the vicious circle of instantiating authority
without possessing authority. The coupling of the non-existence of a ‘we’
and the non-existence of an authority is curious; the difﬁculty is created
by Arendt’s grounding of the authority in the ‘we’ which, Honig says,
163Chapter 4. The Act of Founding
“stands as the guarantor of its own performance” (Honig: 1993a, p.105).
This necessitates a “counter-signatory” who can stand as guarantor,
hence the invocation of pre-signature constatives as groundings (Honig:
1993a, p.105).
It is not clear, ultimately, either that we should desire a source of
ultimate authority for our system of government, or that such a source
is ever in fact a possibility. To the ﬁrst point ﬁrst: Arendt’s work relies
on asserting the power of the performative but the real work, the actual
functioning of a system of authority, results not from the performative
which began it but from the efforts of those who later accept it. No
singular moment but instead a multitude of individual negotiations
forms the actual basis of the authority system; this much seems an
obvious claim in relation to the working of authority as such. It is raised
to an explicit part of authority’s functioning in the case of ‘modern’
systems, whereas prior institutions, such as Arendt’s Romans, will have
focused on some object for this consent as the basis for the system,
rather than on the consent which is itself the animating force, such as
Arendt’s Romans, will have focused on some object for this consent
as the basis for the system, rather than on the consent which is itself
the animating force. This claim is a natural corollary of treating the
constitution as a renewable document which is the object of active
consent. Perhaps nothing else is ultimately needed for the anchoring of
a system ‘suitable for modernity’, for a politics which does not rely on
any non-political methods, either in the form of violence and force or
pre-political authority, to sustain itself.
As for the second claim, which is perhaps the stronger, we say that,
just as it is not clear that the Declaration is dependent on the existence
of a ‘we’ prior to the moment of signature, it is not even clear that
such a signature or ‘we’ is even possible in any substantive sense. The
performative, even in cases which take themselves to be founded on
some substantive constative or other, is the real binding agent of any
group; the declaration of the ‘we’ is the birth of the ‘we’ even if the
‘we’ in question is a community of believers. Only the performance
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can make it so (even if we assume the constative to refer to something
true). This does not touch the constative element of the ‘we’ itself rather
than of the claim to which it cleaves. Not only is the constative in
itself mute, as Arendt suspects and Honig notes, it is also very far from
being effective at all without the performance which is its acceptance
by actual individuals. That is, it must be taken to be effective in order
to be effective.
Rather, it seems most sensible to think of the workings of authority
of that event—indeed, of any relevant event—as an entirely retroactive
process, casting authority’s success into the hands of those at the base
of its pyramid rather than the origin. It is, on this account, the living
citizens who really exercise power53 and, for that matter, create the
authority which they exercise themselves, even if they do feel a need to
generate it out of some constative, or tale, or—as in the next section—a
fable. Hong’s answer is different to that we shall develop here; in order
to see it, we must know what her Arendt puts in place of the constative
elements she wishes to do away with. This is the ‘fable’, which will
also be crucial to our own approach.
4.7.6 Fable
Arendt, on Honig’s account, addresses the problem of the constative
element of founding by concealing it; creating a fable out of the Declara-
tion, to address the “moment or place the system [of authority] cannot
account for” (Honig: 1993a, p.108). The link between ‘constative’ and
this ‘moment or place’ may not be entirely obvious at ﬁrst: it is that
the constative element of the founding which Arendt works so hard to
banish “delegitimates the...moment of pure legitimacy” (Honig: 1993a,
p.107) is that which “enable[s this authority-system] but is illegitimate
from its vantage point” (Honig: 1993a, p.108).54
53Note how similarly this ‘matches’ to the structuring of the federated council
system as described by Arendt (see chapter 5).
54Hypothetically, we might imagine some alternative to a constative which anchored
the system but did not share in those feature of the constative which Arendt rules
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The fable which Arendt constructs around the Declaration functions
as the “placeholder” which secures the system with, as Honig quotes
Derrida, a “fabulous retroactivity” (Honig: 1993a, p.108). It is this
fable-building effort that shapes Arendt’s version of the American
Revolution and founding, especially the excision of constative elements
of the Declaration (Honig: 1993a, p.108). This allows her to, as Honig
summarises, “treat the performative element as “a sufﬁcient guarantor
of the authority of the new republic—in order to ﬁll the place [of the
constative] with a fabulous faith” that no constative was needed (Honig:
1993a, p.108).55 To the same end, Arendt does not take seriously the
Founding Fathers’ search for Ancient precedents; “her criticism of the
American founders for their inability to conceive of a beginning that
was not rooted in the past must be in the service of her fable, for she too
proves to be unable to conceive of such a totally present event” (Honig:
1993a, p.108).
One way in which Honig glosses this part of Arendt’s approach is
curious, perhaps even unwarranted; “the effect of Arendt’s fable is the
same as that of all legitimating fables; to prohibit further inquiry into
the origins of the system and protect its center of illegitimacy from the
scrutiny of prying eyes” (Honig: 1993a, p.109). This does not seem a
primary feature, either of Arendt’s fable of America, or of fables as
such. Although the fabulist obviously does direct the reader certain
elements at the expense of others—no story at all could otherwise be
told—it is no necessary part of the tale that other interpretations are
out of the political. If such a thing can be imagined (which is difﬁcult enough) then
Arendt would presumably not need to banish it; her complaint is speciﬁcally against
the characteristics which make the constative moments of the Declaration alien to
politics: their claimed immunity to discussion, their non-negotiability. The difﬁculty
of imagining the one without the other is the result of the way in which the moment
outside of a system relates to those persons within it; being beyond questions of
legitimacy, it is itself quite immune to discussion whilst the system stands.
55We have seen as much above, taking the erasure of the constative but treating it ‘in
good faith’ as Arendt’s actual view of the event. Honig treats Arendt as recognising
what she does by way of interpretation of the Declaration, linking this is to the ‘impasse’
at the end of the ‘Willing’ volume of The Life of the Mind and the turn to judgment
(Honig: 1993a, p.109).
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refused out-of-hand. If it did so, a fable would take on not the character
of a political tale or event but that of a constative in itself.
Two further features prevent the fable from seriously restricting the
inquiry into origins.56 The ﬁrst is that constructing a fable about the
origins of a system, particularly a fable of this character, hardly seems
the best strategy for obscuring the origins of the authority-system. A
different kind of fable might work well enough in this regard; it would
need to be of a character such that it placed all of the event beyond
reinterpretation. To some degree, the existence of the Declaration itself
functions as a means to guard against this kind of fable, though a non-
explicit founding may lack such a defence. This brings us to the second
objection to the idea of Arendt’s fable functioning as an obscuring
device; if it is to seriously be a political matter—that is, if it is to be a
functioning authority of the kind suitable for modernity—then it must
invite the citizen onto its ground, acknowledging the ways in which
it is deﬁcient or negotiable. If it does not, then the fable becomes a
constative itself, even if its entire content is the presentation as virtuous
some heroic performative. Adoration is ﬁt conduct for an audience
but hardly for the citizen; that or its contrary would become the only
responses possible in relation to the purely non-negotiable fable.
But the fable, any fable, provides something for the citizen to work
with and against in the public realm. At this point, our account must
approach Honig’s, which it approximates rather closely. The methodol-
ogy, or how the citizen is invited to act, is very closely similar between
the two. The object of their operations is not, as should become clear
shortly enough. For Honig, it is the very thing which Arendt’s fable
obscures which is the proper object of political discourse: the constative
(Honig: 1993a, p.109ff.). On Honig’s reading, “the fact that one cannot
56An attempt to claim much efﬁcacy for it in this regard is itself undermined by
Honig’s own ability to write against it, uncovering easily enough the elements of the
American founding banished from Arendt’s fable. In itself, this does not count for
much; it may be the fable still does well enough as obfuscation amongst those who
are not political theorists, which would be enough in practice, one suspects, for it to
achieve dominance.
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decide which sort of utterance [the Declaration] is, constative or perfor-
mative” (Honig: 1993a, p.106) is the fact about it (obscured if we rely
on a fable) which makes it a political act; “the American Declaration
and founding are paradigmatic instances of political acts (however
impure) because of this undecidability, not in spite of it” (Honig: 1993a,
p.107). What Honig objects to in the use of a fable is that it obscures
the constative, fore-stalling the possibility of it as political material.
Honig’s rehabilitation of the constative element for politics relies
on her focus on the “notion of resistability [which] is at the center of
Arendt’s re-covered conception of authority for modernity” (Honig:
1993a, p.109). The resistance is to the constative, to its attempts to
become a law of the kind ‘above man’; “the law will always resist
[the actor’s] resistance” (Honig: 1993a, p.110). The resistance the actor
(and Arendt and Derrida by their theorising) must work against is, in
Derrida’s words, the tendency “to present performative utterances as
constative utterances” (Honig: 1993a, p.110). By deploying Derrida thus,
Honig does not mean to indicate that the whole business of the political
ought to become the cataloging of utterances into one list or the other.
Rather, she means that the political will be engaged in resisting the
law’s tendency towards command-type law modelled on divine law, by
attempting to keep present the performative elements of any law, of
any political act. Each political act is therefore an attempt to force back
into conscious awareness; whatever else it may do, it destabilises by its
resistance of the existing order. Any action which did not, at least to
some degree, work against the existing, not being a new beginning in
any sense, would hardly be action at all. However, the link between this
and distinguishing between ‘performative’ and ‘constative’ is not quite
so clear. It is also far from clear that a politics which spent itself entirely
on the resistance to reiﬁcation would be recognisable as an endorsable
practice: a practice of pure resistance would look like an unappealing
attempt to avoid learning the lesson of King Cnut commanding the tides.
A politics which was only so oriented would also be no freer than one
which was engaged with its past only reverentially, determined instead
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to act in the opposite direction by continuously denying one particular
aspect of the given. On Honig’s part, the constative is something to be
feared, her description of it making it co-existent with truth-claims of
the kind which damage the political;
Remember that in [Arendt’s] view, constatives are violent,
despotic and disempowering: they are not the products of
shared public agreement; they demand an isolated acquies-
cence to a truth. They are not held by us, we are held by
them. In short, they silence us; hence Arendt’s insistence
that they are illicit in the realm of action, the realm of speech
(Honig: 1993a, p.107).
There are two points on which this particular reading can be questioned.
The ﬁrst is the question of the degree to which they are co-extensive
or, to put it another way, the question of whether all constatives share
in those qualities Honig attributes to them and therefore require, on
Arendt’s view, removal from the public realm. It might be that, in-
stead of the perfect overlap between ‘constative’ and ‘despotic and
disempowering’, we can imagine some constative such that it invited
political engagement in a manner which denied not its structuring as a
constative but its particular constative content.
With this suggestion in mind, it becomes possible to look more
seriously at the way in which Honig conceives of all constatives as
‘despotic’ and amenable to means of private, rather than public, adop-
tion. It isn’t clear that Arendt actually holds all constatives to be of
this character or that it would even be intelligible to hold such a view.
Arendt’s turn to judgment may offer the easiest demonstration of this;
the judge who makes public his view is engaged in a performative, true
enough but it is (must be) one which has a signiﬁcant ‘claim element’
to it. To say ‘Achilles is brave’, in so far as it is a performative, places
the judge (and his audience) in a certain relationship to Achilles but,
by the same act, it claims something about Achilles in such a manner
as to invite discussion. It is a constative from the moment it is uttered,
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one that opens itself to discussion. The answer appropriate from other
political actors is not to resist the constative elements of the statement
(whatever that might mean) but to offer alternative constatives as part
of a discourse focused on the meaning of the judgment uttered. Judg-
ments cannot be purely performative in the sense of ‘lacking a claim’
or else they could not be attempts to ‘woo the consent of’ other actors,
a feature which is central to the performance. The ‘constative’ element
is a necessary feature of politics, though note in the mode which Honig
claims it to be.
It might be wondered, against the above, why Arendt’s writing
focuses on the performative elements of the Declaration if the constative
(or certain examples of it) can be safely admitted to the political. There
are two answers to this which need consideration. The ﬁrst is that
Arendt’s interest in the Declaration as political act requires her reading
to down-play the constative elements of it in order to show that the
political can ground itself; she operates, so to speak, at one step re-
moved from the hypothetical ‘ordinary actor’ who might work within
such an understanding of politics. She needs to show the self-grounding
elements in the way the actor does not: the system in place, he is free to
address himself to the speciﬁc elements of the Declaration as claims, re-
sisting or reforming them as part of a political process. Arendt doesn’t
have this freedom because her project includes the demonstration of
politics independent of truths of a certain form. This, the ‘certain form’,
is the real difﬁculty of the constative elements and the second reply
which this paragraph promised to deliver. The judgment-type consta-
tive, to put it in relatively unsophisticated terms, is still a constative
just as the ‘truths’ are; only the mode of accession differs. The judge
may revise, indeed invites revision whilst the dogmatist cannot. The
problematic element is this, the mode of its coming-to-be-held, rather
than that it is held at all.
On Honig’s reading, the thing resisted is the transformation of per-
formatives into constatives; this reading is still hostile to the constative
elements, resisting them not for their content but their form. With
1704.7. The American Founding
this suggestion in place, the second objection to the reading can be
addressed: it is conceivable that a constative such as the ‘we’ is one of
this nature, malleable enough that it can be addressed in terms of its
content. Instead of resisting the descent of a founding performative
into a mute constative, this approach would also see the constative as
an invitation, albeit one to a different kind of politics, one modelled
on Honig’s suggestion that Arendt has made a fable of the American
founding.
The use of a fable, as above, to “ﬁll the gap in [Arendt’s] theorization
of a politics of founding” (Honig: 1993a, p.108) points us towards
another use of fables, one which brings the American founding closer
as a practice to the Roman founding whilst making obvious one further
difference which makes the former suitable for ‘modern conditions’.
Honig’s work does not take this route as such, turning instead to
her account, presented above, of how the constative elements of a
founding can be incorporated into a subsequent political practice in
a way which encourages, rather than limits, it by casting it as part
of a practice of resistance. As an alternative to Honig’s politics of a
‘practice of resistance’, something must be said of the similarity between
Arendt’s appropriation of the Declaration and the way in which the
citizen can be expected to relate to the same. This forms the basis of
our understanding of the operations of a political system which has a
foundational moment to tell a fable about.57
The fable-element of the way in which Arendt takes the American
57Many of the same points might very well be made in relation to any political
community which did not have a moment of system-foundation to point to; this
is a consequence of placing so much of the sustenance of a system in the hands
of whomever happens to be a current practitioner within it at any given moment.
Jefferson’s use of pre-Revolutionary American history might be classed as an action
of this sort, reading back into the historical events whatever the actor needs, either
as support or as opposition. Indeed, the Founding Father’s appeal to Antiquity as
a means of understanding their own foundational enterprise as a continuity would
also ﬁt this pattern. This can also be done within an existing system, essentially
subverting it to serve the political better (or worse, as the actor desires); something
like the incorporation of works such as Bagehot’s into a working understanding of
the British constitution would ﬁt this description.
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founding to operate as the basis of a system of authority establishes
a decisive difference between it and the Roman practice, if ‘fable’ is
taken to indicate something similar to the usual meaning. To treat
the moment of foundation itself as a fable is to make of it something
which is negotiable, open to discussion, no longer functional as a mute
constative, a ﬁnalised event. Treating it in this way is different from
the self-understanding of the citizen who takes the inviolability of the
founding moment as a non-negotiable act of the past to which they are
tied by a sense of religious obligation. The latter attitude, whilst it may
actually modify or re-interpret the founding act, does not take itself
to be permitted do so. The very idea of acknowledging the fabulist
element of a foundation as such, on the other hand, leads naturally
enough to the idea of its revisability: the retroactivity of the fable which
features in Honig’s Derrida’s reading makes explicit the functioning
of legitimacy as a speciﬁcally retroactive phenomenon. An unrefuted
system of this kind which relies only on the continued sense of its
legitimacy for support is therefore a legitimate system, so long as it
remains retroactively revisable in this manner.58 The possibility of
revision, as a form of the possibility of dissent, proves the legitimacy
of whatever narrative is current (or, it at least establishes the passive
indifference of the citizenry).
Is something which is a fable and accepted as such a ﬁtting basis
for a system of authority at all? Certainly, the fact of its being a fable
which lies at the centre of political attention is not a problem itself;
it is very hard to take the founding of Rome as anything other than
fabulous or mythological. Rather, it is when the fable becomes an
acknowledged fable for its political actors that the question arises.
The anxiety is something like this: the functioning of authority must
fundamentally rest on something which is accepted as authoritative or
58This is an alternative answer to Keenan’s anxiety about particular projects as
foundations: acknowledgment by the citizenry that they freely deal in a fable protects
them from treating the particularist element of the project as too binding. In a way,
it as though political freedom has surreptitiously made itself the actual principle,
operating behind the particular goals of the founders.
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legitimacy-bestowing by the participants. To reject whatever is taken
as the anchoring fact, be it event or theory, is to reject the system as a
whole. Something treated as a re-interpretable fable becomes a thing
open to negotiation and all negotiations or re-interpretations, if they
are to be freely undertaken, necessarily involve elements of refusal as
part of that adaptation: no emphasising of one element can take place
without thereby promoting it above some other element, which is then
treated as somehow inessential. Refuting elements of the ‘act itself’
which created the system must have consequences on the character of
the system which follow from it; whatever ﬂows from the downplayed
elements cannot, during a period of their demotion, command the
citizen. From this comes the fear that a fable-based system will be
too unstable to really function as an authority-system at all. If it were
admissible to say anything at all, without restriction, about a founding
act, then this fear would be quite valid. This however, is not really
the case; the particular act of founding—the Declaration and the U.S.
Constitution in this case and other deeds in other cases—itself remains
authoritative for its interpreters.
Further, the negotiation of interpretations—the interplay of conﬂict-
ing stories about some action which started the whole system—can
only, if they are political events in themselves, be settled by means of
persuasion, else reinterpretation is not a political possibility. We have
already seen that persuasion cannot be a part of the functioning of
authority on the Roman model and of authority as such.
Much here depends on how far, so to speak, the persuasive element
of the relationship between citizen and fable can be said to reach. It cer-
tainly cannot, given Arendt’s differentiation between fact and opinion,
reach the events themselves at a basic level: an opinion about what is
meant by the Declaration, say, is supportive, rather than destructive, of
a functioning system derived from that document. If undertaken in a
constructive spirit, one which takes the act itself as support rather than
opposition, it maintains the system, augmenting rather than replacing
the origin.
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It is of course conceivable that some should interpret the originary
act as ‘bad’, refusing its authority altogether. This is also quite possible
for the act which is conceived of as inviolable or non-interpretable foun-
dation myth: in that case also, the consequence of taking the founding
to be illegitimate exists with the same result, that of placing oneself
without the system. This is not any more likely when the founding
experience is presented as fable instead of unalterable fact; indeed, it
seems rather less likely when some greater latitude of response to the
founding is permitted.
It might also be though that the relationship between fable and
citizen is not different in kind from that between citizen and other
‘placeholder’, save for the acknowledgment of the interpretive element.
That is to say that, just as the citizen may respond to a fable but down-
playing some elements to the beneﬁt of others, any system necessarily
features the possibility of such manoeuvres as part of citizenship. Or,
as Honig has it, “all placeholders, according to Derrida, including
those that are constative in structure, are fables” (Honig: 1993a, p.108).
We are simply trapped with them, therefore with the problem of our
own self-determination, however keenly we might apply ourselves to
constructing some tale to escape this burden.59 Acknowledgment of
the quality is the substantive difference; without this acknowledgment,
the ﬁxed meaning of the founding act can ossify into one speciﬁc
approach or negotiation, presented as ‘authoritative’ in a manner which
excludes other interpretations to make itself the privileged statement
of the founding events. Although this seems to remove the matter from
politics, it does so only in the sense of seemingly putting it beyond
debate; changes become harder to effect once the ‘despotic power’ of
truth is accorded to some interpretation or other.
59This has something of a reverse effect upon Arendt’s fable: it is a fable unlike other
fables, one which ostensibly points up the incapacity of fables to provide anything
better than a merely-false security against the burden of freedom. It pointedly refuses
the use of precedent by the Founding Fathers, in order to create a precedentless
precedent for future actors.
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4.7.7 Keenan and The Duty of Remembering
Keenan offers a different account of the division of effort necessary for
a political foundation to work, a division which we now examine. The
element of Keenan’s reading which is of interest is the way in which
he relates promising to the fragility of action (Keenan: 2003, p.88). The
consequences of his reading appear after the reading itself, below.
This division of effort between founder and later citizen is in
part determined by the way in which Keenan supposes the action
of foundation-laying to be different from action of other kinds. Actions
which are foundational are supposed by Keenan to be extended across
time in a manner seemingly unique to them, by means of their basis in
promising (Keenan: 2003, p.87). Keenan has a peculiar anxiety about
the possibility of action’s remembrance without the use of promising,
which leads him to focus on Arendt’s claim that action and speech
“create their own remembrance” (Keenan’s emphasis Keenan: 2003, p.87),
treating this in a peculiar manner, as though the action itself were
responsible for the performance of its memory. Based on this, Keenan
asks; “How could the most ﬂeeting of activity be preserved even as
they remain “materially futile” and have their “end” in the activity or
performance itself?” (Keenan: 2003, p.87). The answer, for Keenan, is
that promising extends the action;
Speech-action can “endure” in the form of “remembrance”
only because of this “force” of promise. Promising60 is
speech-action’s way of remembering itself; it institutional-
izes, or textualizes, the merely “potential” nature of free
speech-action. (Keenan: 2003, p.87).
The force of promise [of this kind] lies in its ability to form a
new political community, or “space”, where none had been
before, by deliberately leaving a trace or mark, in the present
60There is no reason that promising ‘as such’ need create new institutions, though
clearly the kind of promising which is relevant to foundations must.
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that immediately becomes past, on whose basis the iden-
tity and the freedom of the community can be measured.61
(Keenan: 2003, p.88)
Keenan’s concern with material futility seems to indicate a desire on his
part that a foundation be made fast by the founders alone, bequeathing
through their promises a stability which is inheritable and, frankly,
quite at odds with the description of action. In Keenan’s account, the
mismatch here is masked by his insistent addition of promising as a
means of prolonging the action.
By Keenan’s reading, the order of effort has become reversed be-
tween founder and successor.62 Somehow the act of foundation has
become something which ‘remembers itself’, which is somewhat differ-
ent from Arendt’s claim that the Declaration is a particularly signiﬁcant
example of an action which creates “its own monument” (Arendt: 1990,
p.130). It is perhaps trite to note this difference: a memorial, however
well-crafted, does not guarantee (or have a prescriptive ability related
to) the action of which it is a trace of remembrance. Keenan’s phrasing
instead suggest an action which is extended well beyond the life-spans
of its actors; whilst Arendt’s project relies on the effects of action having
the possibility of being so extended and hence remembered, (even
where they are not examples of promising) this is not at all the same
thing as to say that the original action has itself survived as monument
in a literal equivalence.
Keenan’s expression of this is that the “Declaration of Independence
works as a promise of freedom [in spite, we may add, of the actual
content of its promise] only by the immediate memorialization and
insitutionalisation of its action, by which it promises its own continua-
61Accepting this particular claim actually requires us to disregard Arendt’s narrative
of pre-revolutionary America; better to claim, instead that promise of this kind permit
the continuation of a community, which is achieved by the creation of a new ‘space’
which they may share in.
62This is not to say that the founders have no need to exert themselves at all; indeed,
it is evidently part of founding that it is as difﬁcult and as perilous as action tout
court.
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tion” (Keenan: 2003, p.88). Even with the reservations related to prior
statements by Keenan in mind, it is obvious this captures neatly the
functioning of a promise, or of the promise forming the central pillar of
a foundation. It also reveals what must be seen as a key anxiety related
to such a pillar, which we may think of rather as an anxiety as to the
means by which a promise takes on the form of a pillar: pillars are,
after all, sturdy supports rather than negotiable relations. The promise
out of which one has been made becomes, to those not included, an
object when it takes on the form of an institutional arrangement.
An action which did survive in this manner, ‘remembering itself’
(pretending this to be possible), would not be reliant in the least on
future political actors.63 There are three possible ways in which we
might imagine this.64 The ﬁrst is that no efforts at all are required of
these actors once the motor of the action is running, which sounds
ﬂatly ridiculous. The other, which is at least imaginable, is to suppose
that the later actors are somehow compelled to remember the action
in question, to refer to it, regard it as unalterable; should they alter it,
it will of course have been subject to their action, which in altering it
destroys the purity of its self-remembrance. It is obvious that this is
quite unsuitable for the political, binding into passivity the following
potential actors and thereby prohibiting action to them so long as they
regard it as authoritative; it would become for them something alien,
imposed, non-negotiable, effectively a transcendent thing to which they
could only function as audience. It may be, of course (this being the
63As a matter of classiﬁcation within Arendt’s project, it would also become an
example of ‘work’ rather than ‘action’, a transmutation which is summary of the
problems listed in the following lines. If the founder is a workman, whose blueprints
are successfully implemented in the form of a stable structure, then this makes mere
labourers of his inheritors, maintaining the structure in the face of decay, bound to
the blueprints in a reverential fashion.
64These considerations also apply, for the most part, with respect to the relationship
between the founders and their contemporaries. If the exclusions which are detailed
are ﬁt for future generations, they may just as well be ﬁt for contemporaries of
whoever devises the planned foundations. In practice, this would look rather similar
to either the sovereign of Leviathan, or Rousseau’s legislator, which ought to indicate
just how dim a view Arendt would take of the idea.
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most plausible interpretation), that the actors merely regard something
as such when they in fact do the work of remembrance themselves, in
a state of false consciousness. This at least has one advantage over the
prior two suggestions: it is intelligible. It is still problematic, however,
as a part of political practice, for the same reasons as the second. For
non-political authorities, such as within some technical specialisation,
it would be perfectly acceptable: the worst it would do is to stall
innovation if the attitude were not successfully restricted to matters of
tuition.
These considerations amount to the claim that the act of remem-
brance is for each generation of a ‘we’ which accepts a founding an
action they themselves begin anew, even if they do not take themselves
to be novel in this regard. Each would bring, almost unavoidably, some
element of themselves and of the generations between them and the
founders to the renewal of the foundations. The alternative would be
a stasis which entirely denied the opportunity for meaning-creation.
Honig’s alternative account of the relationship between a public and
its foundations does not fail on these grounds, so must be counted
preferable to Keenan’s.65
Above, it was promised that a problematic consequence of Keenan’s
reading would be addressed, one which, as it happens, would not
be a possible consequence of Honig’s. Keenan claims that, in effect,
foundations cannot be secure so long as they accord with the “logic of
freedom and action” (Keenan: 2003, p.89). As a consequence, he claims,
acts of foundation must “limit all subsequent “free” acts (Keenan: 2003,
p.89). The sharp delineation between foundational and other actions is
65This is not to say that Keenan’s work is without merit altogether; it shares with
Honig’s an awareness that the promise of freedom relies entirely upon the memory of
that promise in order to function. More problematically, Keenan’s exact claim is that
“the possibility of maintaining freedom rests on the possibility of memory” (Keenan:
2003, p.87). If this were straight-forwardly true than no new beginning would be
possible at all once the world had fallen into collective amnesia. Whilst we might
accept this, Arendt clearly would not, since it would rule out the act of promising
freedom, which is itself a free act. His work also has the merit that it makes obvious
the quite great efforts needed in founding.
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the root cause of this claim, which need not otherwise have been made:
all actions condition or limit future actions in some way, via the web
of relations which is created and modiﬁed by actions. The alternative
parallels Arendt’s account of the difference between those bound by
promise and those who are not so related to others. Keenan is also
aware of this dependence of freedom on the presence of others (though
without applying it to the claim in question here); “freedom...can only
be found in the midst of plurality” (Keenan: 2003, p.81). For this to
mean anything substantive, it must mean that the actor is born into
a world of existing relations and conditions, determined by the past
actions of others, which provide the bulk of the material with which he
will have to work in his project of self-revelation.
This counts against Keenan’s claim that “to the extent that the
freedom of the political realm is founded on a speciﬁc project, it cannot
be entirely free” (Keenan: 2003, p.89), a claim which can rest only on
a notion of freedom entirely at odds with Arendt’s conception of it.
Within her use of the word, freedom must always be found in some
context, some speciﬁc world into which the potential actor is born.
Even without a speciﬁc foundational project as referent, the actor is
necessarily so conditioned. It may be that Keenan has in mind a claim
something like ‘the existence of a political foundation which is a speciﬁc
project places illegitimate constraints on the political actor’. However,
this ignores both the necessary existence of limits which result from
any action forming part of the context of an actor, and the potential
to overcome those limits, either by reinterpreting them or by resisting
them.66 Keenan claims that a promising of the kind which founds “can
effectively lay down the law of freedom only by immediately violating
that same law”, leaving Arendt’s attempts to describe foundations
“caught between freedom and foundation” (Keenan: 2003, p.89). We
66Keenan cannot be entirely ignorant of the irreversibility of action, which makes
an appearance earlier in his work; “what is freely done can neither be predicted
beforehand nor undone once started” (Keenan: 2003, p.81). Possibly, Keenan only
realises this with regard to the actor themselves, rather than the potential sufferers of
the deed.
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have already addressed the relationship between the foundation and
the restriction it places on the ﬁeld of intelligible actions by being the
promise of a particular project.
Separate to this is the relationship between the later actor and the
method of beginning the project of foundation: the promise rather than
the project is the guarantor of freedom. By its example, it commits the
character or spirit of the institutions it forms, at least initially, to an
abstention from non-political means of preventing alterations. The act,
as much as it sets the initial project which will inhabit the public realm,
also sets out an initial understanding of how it and other projects can
justiﬁably be undertaken. That is, it operates as an exemplar of co-
operative action, one which could provide a powerful reference point
when discussing the limits of political methods even after the initial
project (which, in the American case, is reasonably loosely-deﬁned
anyway) has mutated signiﬁcantly. Perhaps this contrast between
‘method’ and ‘content’ places too much faith in the power of the former
to shape the latter once in the hands of those who follow after an
act of foundation. Arendt’s reading of the Declaration suggests she
holds something like this as a hope, downplaying as it does the speciﬁc
project of the founders to concentrate on the method by which it was
achieved.
This brings us back to our consideration of Honig, for whom Arendt
is a teller of fables about acts of foundation, her work as much a model,
it could seem, for citizenly engagement as it is an historical appreciation
of the Declaration of Independence as a foundational act.
4.8 Conclusion
In both Keenan’s and in Honig’s work, the act of foundation becomes a
‘dead act’, a fait accompli which forms an inert backdrop for future actors
to resist, or to overturn entirely. To do so is to treat the foundation as
if it cannot conform to the description of action found in The Human
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Condition but Arendt already has an account of a foundation of that
character: the polis.
The American example, however, is of an interactive foundation,
which is not ﬁnished until the system it spawns is, as a whole, ﬁnished;
only the open-ended nature of the promise which forms its basis makes
this possible and it does so because it leaves open the question of what
it means in exactly the same way as the description of action undertaken
without control over other actors.
The call for resistance to the foundation, to the system which results
from it has the further side-effect that it makes it sound as though the
political could, so long as it did nothing one objected to, be left to its
own devices, as though it had become an agent in its own right; if the
political is taken to be an entirely automatic process, it is no longer
something for which anyone living takes responsibility.
Institutions which protect individual responsibility for politics by
making engagement obviously meaningful are the subject of the next
chapter.
1815
The Council Systems
On Revolution is not just the story of the American Revolution, or even
just of its comparison to the French Revolution. It is also the story of
the assorted councils, soviets and räte; these arrangements of politics,
alternatives to representative or party democracy, appear independently
in the wake of several revolutions and in Arendt’s account of revolution.
Whereas the previous chapter presented a political phenomenon—
the relationship of a polity to an identiﬁable, contestable tradition—this
chapter is concerned with a phenomenon which does not form a stable
tradition at all. The disparate events which Arendt draws on for her
discussion are not part of a conscious tradition; in drawing on them,
Arendt makes them into a recurrent struggle between two forms of
political organisation and, thereby, makes them available for judgment
in the same way as the founding act made itself available.
The other source Arendt draws on to discuss institutions of this form
is Jefferson; this is not the Jefferson of the Declaration of Independence, as
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in the last chapter, but the later Jefferson, who developed an enthusiasm
for a very ﬁne-grained federal system of government. This ‘ward’
system, which appears in his letters of 1810–1816, is presented in a
period long after his engagement in the revolution; it is, in effect, theory
informed by practice.1
What is it that Arendt hopes to achieve when she describes the
councils and links them to the Jeffersonian ward system? One candidate
answer is that they are meant to be read as a straight-forward alternative
blueprint for political organisation.
This would be to understand the relationship between theorist—
especially in the ﬁgure of Arendt’s own work—in the same terms she
explicitly refuses in a 1972 conference exchange with Christian Bay. Bay
is “disturbed when Hannah Arendt said that her desire [as a theorist]
is never to indoctrinate”; on his account, the point of theory is to enter
the “pluralist universe” to argue in order to improve things (Arendt:
1979, p.307). Arendt denies the likely effectiveness of such efforts:
Arendt holds that theory only inﬂuences action at one step’s remove;
theory works on changing consciousness and that, in turn inﬂuences
action (Arendt: 1979, pp.304–305). The difﬁculty comes, Arendt thinks,
because of the sheer number of people one would need to inﬂuence to
make much difference (Arendt: 1979, p.305). It is not even predictable,
she thinks, what direction one’s conversion efforts could push others in
(Arendt: 1979, p.309).
There is one more passage from that conference which is worth
examining, Arendt’s answer when she is asked how she ‘as a theorist’
would instruct a political actor;
I wouldn’t instruct you, and I would think that this would be
presumptuous of me. I think that you should be instructed
when you sit together with your peers around a table and
exchange opinions. And then, somehow, out of this should
1The practice in question is that of the American experience of federalism; for the
link between this and the abrupt end of the councils, see below, section 5.4.
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group should act (Arendt: 1979, p.310).
This response contains both the discarded relationship of ‘theorist
instructing actors’ and its alternative, the discourse of peers with the
aim of making a decision. The latter corresponds, in a basic form, to
the description of how councils operate.
This conference aside, the idea of the councils as blueprint would
be a poor match for the concept of action which plays out in Arendt’s
work; a blueprint for political organisation, taken from a theorist’s
work and imported in a straight-forward way, would assume in relation
to the political the same position as anything else which was merely
given to political actors. The reduction of politics to skilled conformism
to a particular plan—even one which adequately reproduced the ba-
sic features of the practice of politics—would remove the element of
‘plurality’; it would also be, in this particular instance, to corrupt the
nominal aim of the blueprint itself. It would also ignore the way in
which Arendt sets up a strict opposition between council-members and
the ‘professional revolutionary’.2
Related to this view of the relationship between theory and practice
is one ﬁnal reason to avoid treating the councils as if they are intended to
be a straight-forward blueprint: to do so would cast Arendt as a utopian
thinker. Sitton addresses this concern in his article on the council
system, taking Canovan (1978) and Sternberger (1977) as representatives
of the claim that Arendt’s discussion of councils constitutes one form
or another of “utopianism”.3 (Sitton: 1994, p.307) In Sitton’s view,
Arendt has two plausible reasons for this neglect of structure (Sitton:
1994, pp.307–308). The ﬁrst is Arendt’s claim (in an interview) that no
need existed for her to specify the structure of councils; “...important
studies on this subject have been published in recent years in France
2See below, p.191ff.
3And, as is happens, Arendt herself uses the same term, though not without
reservation; “Whether this system is a pure utopia...I cannot say” (Arendt: 1972d,
p.231).
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and Germany, and anyone seriously interested can inform himself”
(Arendt: 1972d, p.232). Sitton’s second defence is to point to a different
aim for Arendt’s use of councils;
Her purpose instead is simply to sketch a political structure
to illustrate the possibility of realizing alternative political
principles: direct democracy, the experience of public free-
dom and public happiness in the modern world, an arena
for proper opinion formation, and a polity not based on the
notion of sovereignty (Sitton: 1994, p.308).
There is something peculiar, perhaps self-defeating in the move Sitton
performs to avoid the ‘utopianism’ charge. He leaves this in place and
turns to expounding the above ‘principles’ in its place. Even if we
do not regard this as begging the question against Arendt, it leaves
something of a problem: if the councils remain utopian, then this too
seems to hold for the list of principles Sitton gives. It suggests—even
if it does not impose—the thought that those things Arendt uses the
councils to illustrate are doomed to the same limited lifespan as her
historical examples.
What of the contents of Sitton’s list of principles? Much of this is in
place already by the time Arendt writes On Revolution; much of what is
not is also well-represented in that book by the American Revolution.
The one element in Sitton’s list which is unique to the councils is the
institutional element, comprised of ‘direct democracy’ and the ‘arena
for proper opinion formation’ together (the latter is, to some degree
preﬁgured by the judgment-like elements of The Human Condition).
This purpose accounts for the looseness of the description, as well
as the level of generality in which it is given by Arendt. As for the
‘principles’ in question; these turn out to be very similar to the concerns
which animate her description of action. The councils are an embodi-
ment of the characteristics of political action. In particular, the contrast
between them and representative democracy, which develops below,
speaks to Arendt’s concern with the centrality of ‘rule’ as a concept
even within democratic politics, as seen above.
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lems of On Revolution as a book; the volume of material presented gives
a full view of the phenomena presented at the expense of detailing
one particular facet, such as the councils.4 Were the councils the sole
concern of that book, then they might have been better-detailed. How-
ever, Arendt also presents several related phenomena; the ‘failure’ of
the French Revolution and its contrast with the American, the effects of
goodness and hypocrisy as political concerns, and the deﬁciencies of
representative government. This creates a tightly-linked nest of concep-
tual concerns, each dependant to a degree on some other with which
they are contrasted.5
With so much else ﬁtting alongside the councils, Arendt focuses on
developing what she takes to be their essential characteristics, rather
than an exhaustive blueprint.6
Hansen understands Arendt’s project for On Revolution as an “histor-
ically-informed ontology of action” which details “what action has
actually meant, and can mean, under certain conditions” (Hansen:
1993, p.193).7 The idea of the book as an ontology of this sort is a
curious one; if taken in isolation, it is not entirely clear that one could
work backwards to the ontology of the vita activa Arendt develops
elsewhere. Nor does On Revolution need to be read alongside Arendt’s
work to become comprehensible; the most obvious candidate for this
position would be The Human Condition. Each book stands apart from
the other; though they share many common themes, there is no order
4Canovan describes the book as “rambling and discursive” and as the book by
Arendt “in which formal organisation is least apparent” (Canovan: 1978, p.13).
5For a similar summary of the sheer diversity of topics covered in On Revolution,
see Miller (1979, pp.177–178); that list also refers to emotional responses to the book
and to the complex way in which the elements of the work inter-relate.
6This also leads to Medearis’ complaint that Arendt downplays the differences
between each historical occurrence (Medearis: 2004, p.453).
7Hansen gives the history of his own reading of On Revolution; he came to regard
the book this way as a response to his own earlier dissatisfaction with the work. This
dissatisfaction is on the grounds that, in his initial reading, Hansen did not ﬁnd
an explicit account of ontology, or of “what it means to be fully human” (Hansen:
1993, p.193). Hansen’s description of On Revolution as ‘historically-informed ontology’
represents the fulﬁlment, rather than abandonment, of this earlier hope.
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of dependence between them.8 The relationship of On Revolution to The
Human Condition is that it echoes its themes, repeating (not always in
the same terms) any conceptual apparatus needed for it to stand alone.
With the caveats about vagueness in mind, we may now proceed
to examine what substance there is to Arendt’s description of councils.
We can expiate this vagueness not only by the myriad of content in On
Revolution but also with reference to the sheer number of disparate or-
ganisations there captured under the name ‘council’. Medearis presents
a catalogue of the several differences between councils, in terms of aim,
structure (Medearis: 2004, pp.450–452), culminating in the claim that
“the actual councils of history...never constituted a sort of separate and
homogeneous political system, or a distinct form of state” (Medearis:
2004, p.454). Arendt does not present the councils in terms which
contradict this claim.
Arendt’s list of councils is indeed presented by her with the caveat
that it does not constitute a conscious tradition. However, it is pre-
sented as a list of things which belong to the same set (Arendt: 1990,
p.262), without much reference to any differences between them. As
Hobsbawm has it; “[Arendt] talks in the same breath of politically very
different organisations” (Hobsbawm: 2007, p.273). We may compare
this to the level of differentiation afforded the councils by Medearis in
an attempt to rescue the councils themselves from three theorists of
them, one of whom is Arendt herself (Medearis: 2004, p.447). For this
reason, his work presents the differences between the various councils,
whereas Arendt;
constructs herself an ideal type, deﬁning her subject matter
accordingly, excluding what does not measure up to her
expectations (Hobsbawm: 2007, p.269).
Hobsbawm’s review, in particular, makes it sound as though Arendt
is acting in bad faith in stripping out all the details she considered
8The only one of Arendt’s works to appear in the bibliography of On Revolution is
The Origins of Totalitarianism (Arendt: 1990, p.331).
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to be a part of understanding it, then Arendt’s description of the
councils fails as such a description.
Hobsbawm also criticises Arendt for her selection of revolutions,
which excludes those prior to 1776 and any which took place outside of
Europe or North America, claiming this makes possible some sweeping
claims at “the price of making a serious study of the phenomenon of
revolution” (Hobsbawm: 2007, p.269). Instead, Arendt’s interest is with
the principle of ‘public happiness’ (Arendt: 1990, p.221), which she sees
as a signiﬁcant commonality across these disparate events.
This includes, as it must, the way in which this principle manifests,
both in revolution and in the councils (and perhaps wards) as the
completion and perfection of revolutions seen in this light (Arendt:
1990, p.221). Therefore, the following reﬂections on councils will also
reveal some of the characteristics of this underlying principle.
What follows for the remainder of this chapter is a reading of
the councils, including the way in which they can contribute to an
understanding of Arendt’s work. Based on the above, it is clear both that
Arendt cannot intend them to stand as blueprints but also that treating
them as ‘merely utopian’ distorts them. What follows immediately
below is an examination of the contrast between council-systems and
party-systems of politics. After that, the structure of the councils
is illustrated, mainly with reference to Jefferson’s ward system; that
something fairly substantive can be spun out of Arendt’s description
shows that. This will also show the ways in which the councils reﬂect
on (and illuminate) Arendt’s conception of political action. Finally, the
elements of Jefferson’s ward system which Arendt ignores, combined
with the way in which she takes the membership of the councils to
be composed, will address the problem of ‘elitism’. In combination
with the earlier demotion of the polis, a demonstration that Arendt is
not—in regard to the councils—straightforwardly ‘elitist’ will detoxify
her work. This is not to suggest, as it might be taken to, that Arendt
is not interested at all in the rare, the historically-important, or the
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glorious; instead, it is to suggest that she holds anyone capable of deeds
with just those qualities.
5.1 Arendt’s Anti-Theoretical Theorising
One of the most striking contrasts which Arendt develops through her
use of the councils is between those involved in such ‘spontaneous’
organisations and those who cling to theorisations of revolution which
pre-date their experience of the actual event. (Arendt: 1972d, p.231).
The contrast between the two rests on Arendt’s claim that the council
organisers do not hold to theories to help organise and respond to their
circumstances.
This theory-blindness is a repeatedly-referenced characteristic of
the council-founders. This is partly responsible for the difﬁculty in
separating each council from the chaos preceding it; this chaos, rather
than pre-existing theory, is the impetus for each movement. Arendt
describes councils as “occurring in every genuine revolution” of the
last two centuries (Arendt: 1990, p.249) and, indeed, we shall see that
her description of their formation could make no real sense outside of
such events.
This is largely due to Arendt’s insistence that councils “sprang up as
the spontaneous organs of the people...” (Arendt: 1990, p.249), as “new
revolutionary organs of self-government” (Arendt: 1990, p.247). Both
of these descriptions occur as part of establishing a contrast between
council and party, something we will return to below. We may, now,
attempt to determine what constitutes the spontaneous character of
the councils, which we might expect to match in some regard the
same characteristic as it forms part of action. Lenin and Marx are
both, on Arendt’s account, unable to properly come to terms with
the councils; “they were confronted with a repetition unaccounted for
by any conscious imitation or even mere remembrance of the past”
(Arendt: 1990, p.256). This ‘blind’ recurrence in isolation is clearly
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important to Arendt, who repeats the claim when she presents her list
of occurrences of council movements (Arendt: 1990, p.261).
This deliberate denial of precedent is an interesting element of
Arendt’s description, which plays into the idea that she expects action
to be de novo in some strong sense, though it hardly entirely licences
that claim. If Arendt demanded pure novelty of political action, then
much of the chapter preceding this would not be possible; instead, her
emphasis on the independence of council-formation shows that, per-
haps, this basic level of organisation which we detail below is possible
even without coercive effort or domination under law.
This makes best sense of the ‘professional revolutionary’ as a con-
trasting ﬁgure, especially their relationship to theories of revolution.
This group includes Marx and Lenin, as examples of the “professional
revolutionist”, who was “an entirely new ﬁgure on the political scene”
from the French Revolution onwards (Arendt: 1990, p.258). This ﬁgure
is not an exclusively Marxist one; theorists of all stripes were unable
to categorise, therefore unable to cope with, the councils. They were,
in this, “utterly unprepared for the actualities of revolutionary events”
(Arendt: 1990, p.258). These theorists are creatures of a recognisable
tradition and of a matching practice of theory, these being the main
qualities separating the professional from the council-founder. The for-
mer ﬁnds himself ‘locked’ into patterns of theory which radically fail
him when contemplation is set aside for action (Arendt: 1990, p.258).
It should be fairly obvious that this opposition between council-
founder and professional revolutionary maps onto several other ele-
ments of Arendt’s work. Firstly, the most obvious match is with the
comparison of political actor on the one hand and the political theorist,
conceived of as something like a craftsman, on the other. But this match
rests on another: the professional revolutionary’s trouble stems from
the way in which he attends to events as if they are opportunities to
deploy pre-existing solutions, i.e. as if they need not do anything but
implement what is already known. The council-founder instead attends
to the events as opportunities for political action, grounded only in
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responsiveness to the situation itself. This clearly echoes the earlier
discussion of initiative as a component of action in section 2.4.
In effect, Arendt’s work acts as a supplement to the council move-
ments, trying to capture in one account the essential characteristics
uniting the different incidents. In so doing, something like a ‘theory of
revolution’ is being constructed.
In line with our earlier work, we may account for this as follows;
Arendt is offering something other than a comprehensive theory, a
picture of particular historical moment as demonstrations of alternative
forms of political participation which are compatible with Arendt’s
already-existing description of politics. Accepting this, it seems the
relevant difference between Arendt’s work and theory ‘in the pejorative
sense’ is that she sees herself as offering something better-grounded in
political events rather than abstract frameworks.
This dissimilarity is in part one of circumstance; Arendt has his-
torical materials with which to work the revolutionist evidently does
not. Even with this list of past revolutions, Arendt does not create
an explicit generalised structural prescription for post-revolution or-
ganisation based on a pre-existing theory. It also helps Arendt that
she writes with a view of several revolutions, whereas the professional
revolutionist either has no material to work with, having yet to see
revolution, or has neglected previous revolutions. This is a necessary
part of Arendt’s claim against the professional revolutionist. They also
differ from Arendt in terms of aim, working as they do with a mind
only directed to the revolution to come; in this, they differ markedly
from the ‘responsiveness’ which is so central to Arendt’s concept of
action. One problem with this exclusively forward-looking perspective
is that it takes it for granted that one need not seriously attend to the
acts of others once they have occurred.
Arendt’s aim is rather different, oriented towards past revolutions
instead, attempting to shape them as a resource available not just for
future revolutions but for the study of politics as such. On Revolution
also serves part of the role which Arendt gives to poets at the end of
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that book. There, she refers to “memory and recollection” as the only
compensation for the eventual failure of the councils (Arendt: 1990,
p.280). In doing so, Arendt’s testimony provides (at least in bare out-
line) exactly that testament which was absent, by uniting the disparate
historical events as exemplars. This exemplar-building provides only
historical details and evidence of a non-sovereignty form of political
organisation; the lack of programmatic content in Arendt’s book pre-
vents a straight-forward repetition of the sort that results from simple
enactments of party doctrine. Perhaps not very much more than the
mere possibility of public freedom can be gleaned from the book. Even
if the councils were presented in great historical detail, minutely cata-
logued with an exactness to which Arendt is not inclined, no attempt
at straight-forward replication could be undertaken in good faith.
5.2 The Structure of Councils and Wards
There are, as it were, two council systems in Arendt’s work (primarily
Arendt (1990) and Arendt (1972d)); one is Arendt’s account of the
doomed post-revolutionary movements, the other the “new state con-
cept” (Arendt: 1972d, p.230) of which these are the rudimentary form.
These two generally occur together, although the extrapolated version
can be found straying further from historical background towards the
end of On Revolution. These ﬁnal few pages, bereft as they are of any
pretence to historical record, can be read in conjunction with Arendt
(1972d) to show that the councils do function as prototypical state form.
This posited organisation, which Arendt admits may be “a pure
utopia” (Arendt: 1972d, p.231), is a federated system of government. In
each instance, she claims the councils discovered anew
...the federal principle, the principle of league and alliance
among separate units...[forming] a new type of republican
government which would rest on ‘elementary republics’ in
such a way that its own central power did not deprive the
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constituent bodies of their capacity to act and form opinion
(Arendt: 1990, p.267).
Such is the sort of federated structure which Arendt thinks she sees in
the organising councils found in “the February Revolution of 1917 in
Russia [as well as] the Hungarian Revolution of 1956” (Arendt: 1990,
p.266). These are joined by the Paris Commune, which Arendt presents
as an early example speciﬁcally of the conﬂict between this way of
organising politics and an organisation based on lines of sovereignty
(Arendt: 1990, p.266). This conﬂict is brought out explicitly in the
Commune, in spite of, Arendt claims, the lack of evidence at the time
that “the spirit of revolution and the principle of federation” are related
(Arendt: 1990, p.266).
In each of these examples, it is the geographical element which
is emphasised, rather than the participants’ socio-economic unity, as
the basis for each council. Arendt does not ignore the relevance of
socio-economic similarity so much as treat it as merely incidental;
...councils of writers and artists...students’ and youths’
councils...workers’ councils in the factories, councils in the
army, among civil servants and so on. The formation of a
council in each...turned a more or less accidental proximity
into a political institution (Arendt: 1990, pp.266-267).
These councils, based on occupation or work-place, are assimilated
to the “neighbourhood and so-called revolutionary councils” (Arendt:
1990, p.266). The explicit work-based connection—also the implicit
social homogeneity of neighbourhoods—is presumably demoted in
importance because Arendt’s interest is not in the objective world so
much as it is in the example of its being organised in this particular
manner.
The immediate reason for this focus is, as Medearis points out, to
make the set of councils a closer approximation to Jefferson’s ward
system (and to one another) (Medearis: 2004, p.470).
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Jefferson’s ward system, which appears in his letters, takes a much
more deﬁnite speciﬁcation than the councils; this is as we would expect,
given it appears as a theoretical account of an idealised system. The
smallest unit of public governance is the ‘ward’, a unit of around six
square miles in area (Jefferson: 1824b, p.385), or “of such a size that all
the children of each will be within reach of a central schoolwithin it”
(Jefferson: 1810, p.183). The population within the boundaries of such
a ward is to approximate one hundred households (or men); Jefferson
refers to them as “hundreds” in one letter (Jefferson: 1810, p.183) and
as equivalents “to the hundreds of...Saxon Alfred” (Jefferson: 1824b,
p.385).9
One reason for Arendt to prioritise geographic, rather than occu-
pational, councils in order to assimilate councils to wards is that it
allows her to avoid treating workplace roles as determinant of political
form. (Councils organised for entirely workplace-related business, such
as the management of a factory, do not address her main interests.)
Treating occupation as a prerequisite for participation would amount
to the social shaping the boundaries of the political. There is nowhere
to be found in Arendt an alternative basis; it is difﬁcult to imagine any
criterion could avoid this difﬁculty. Even a geography-based system
seems to fall, de facto into this so long as we are not blind to the fact
that similarly-situated people will tend one way or another to be found
together. This issue will be addressed more fully in section 5.5.10
With geography as the basis of what we might call jurisdiction,
though Arendt does not, we can more fully understand the federated
structure based on the councils. As Jefferson admits, such a system
inevitably falls prey to practical geographic limits;11 the advantage
of the ward system is the convenience of local access to meetings, an
advantage which is impossible to transfer to any larger unit than a “New
9Jefferson is, of course, reasonably free to specify both population and area in his
descriptions, thereby specifying also the approximate density of population.
10This is also consistent with Arendt’s interest in revolutionary, rather than workers’,
councils in Arendt (1964, p.498).
11This is perhaps not so inevitable with the development of information technology.
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England Township” (Jefferson: 1816b, p.207). This is not something
Arendt directly considers. Each more general unit encompasses several
of the councils, enjoying authority over an area encompassing them. At
the end of On Revolution, the idealised form of a council system thus
takes on the ‘shape’ of a pyramid, which “is of course the shape of an
essentially authoritarian government” (Arendt: 1990, p.278). That there
is a pyramid rather than trapezoid indicates Arendt intends there to be
many such levels.
The groupings of the wards are, as one might expect with a planned
scheme, laid out rather more clearly. A group of four wards together
form a county (Jefferson: 1824b, p.385). Wards here retain a great
number of competencies in this relation, though a “subordinate” of
these (Jefferson: 1824b, p.385).
The same relation is repeated in the relationship between county
and state, though not again between state and federal levels; Jefferson
groups federal and international business into a single separate body
(Jefferson: 1824a, p.229).
5.2.1 Authority as Function of the Councils
Authority featured prominently as part of the way in which a found-
ing act can contribute to a polity. It should hardly be a surprise that
authority should feature in Arendt’s discussion of councils. The term
features in a slightly different way in that context because of the change
in focus; it is, in relation to the councils, a question of the procedural
arrangement which ensures the different stages of the council organ-
isation relate properly. The question of the ‘ultimate’ authorisation
provided by the founding event remains in the background, licensing
that which follows immediately below. For now, this is a question of
how any given council can come to have authority over the more-local
councils within its purview. The membership of the ward-level councils
is itself a more fundamental issue; it is in effect the question of who
can be a part of the political at all, question is addressed below (see
p.209ff.).
1965.2. The Structure of Councils and Wards
The meaning of ‘authority’ in relation to the councils, then, refers to
the authority of councils within the context of a particular established
system; what is at question is how a particular council can come to be
authorised as a proper organ of the authority-system to which they
belong. For Arendt, the solution is based on the method by which mem-
bership is determined. On each level, a council consists of members
present by virtue of election by “their peers” in the subordinate council
of which they are the deputies (Arendt: 1990, p.278).
This changes, on Arendt’s account, the way in which authority is
generated for organisations within the system; it instead comes to be
generated anew at each level. It is obscure how exactly this differs
from other democratic practices of authority, except in the presence of
many such authority-generating relationships. This is not, in practice, a
negligible difference; a simple model of representative democracy might
consist of only one such relationship, that between constituent and
representative. In the councils, this relationship is recreated between
any two adjacent levels, with no word on authority-generating relations
beyond this. It seems obvious that the authority of any given level is
itself dependent on the levels preceding it possessing authority to act
as authority-generators, something Arendt does not mention.
There is one further difﬁculty, that of the practical application of
authority in disputes between layers of councils. Arendt provides no
guidance for how these might be resolved. Sitton makes some attempt
to explain how this might function in practice but his description only
supports the initial intuition that something important is missing here;
it would appear that the councils would be related through
mutual respect, coupled with the practical recognition that
coordinated action is necessary. No single council would
have to be persuaded that the course of action upon which
the others had decided was the correct one. Rather, each
council would have respect for the opinions of the others
and realise that certain things must be done, whether that
particular council agreed or not (Sitton: 1994, p.314).
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This, perhaps, is where the council system starts to sound utopian. It is
far from clear how a contentious issue could be settled, based on the
way in which Sitton presents the relations between councils. What is
missing is the frank admission that, for a system to continue working,
persuasion must come to an end somewhere. The last sentence of the
passage quoted obscures this; it leaves unsaid the coercive element—not
necessarily that of sheer force—occasionally necessary. There is at least
something in favour of the councils on this point: their constitution is
such as to discourage this possibility; treating political business as, in
all but the last instance, a matter of persuasive discourse, goes a long
way to ensuring that coercion of any form is considered the last resort.
5.2.2 Equality
The election of deputies by their peers is also meant to impact on the
functioning of equality in the council system. Because each deputy
is selected by their peers, equality is preserved even as authority is
generated (Arendt: 1990, p.278). This claim is peculiar if by it Arendt
means anything more substantial than a contrast in selection-method
between council and party. This is certainly part of the description but
it seems Arendt does have something more substantial in mind as well;
Once elected and sent in to the next higher council, the
deputy found himself again among his peers, for the deputies
on any given level in this system were those who received a
special trust (Arendt: 1990, p.278).
It is hard to see this either as preserving equality as such or as reconcil-
ing authority and equality as Arendt claims (Arendt: 1990, p.278). In
discussing the problems with this, we shall leave aside the membership
criteria of the elementary councils as a problem which belongs in sec-
tion 5.5. It is the peer-quality of the deputies which is most curious; in
the council made up of them, it is their having been deputised which
makes equals of them. Nothing substantial is said of the way in which
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they come to differ from those who are not deputies. It is safe to as-
sume that the deputy continues in some political relationship with their
elementary council, else there would be no real link between levels. In
that role, they must continue to regard themselves as equals to those
who remain in that council. In this case, the deputy is equal to different
sets of people at different times, groups which are not in effect equal to
one another.
Quite how this functions is not entirely clear; at some layer ‘n’,
each council-member will be amongst peers. Is she to regard herself
as amongst peers also at n-1? This seems formally plausible if not
psychologically convincing. It is clear the promoted come to exist in a
different relationship to their n-1 level peers even as it is unclear quite
how this difference may legitimately manifest.
Because of these difﬁculties, it is not easy to take seriously Arendt’s
claim to have found a system which reconciles equality and authority
while, at the same time, treating the ‘special trust’ placed in the deputies
as anything substantial. Perhaps the best interpretation is to take this
trust as recognising some other equality than the treat-as-if-equals
characteristic of politics. Instead, it is an equality of politically-relevant
talents which is recognised, rather than some entitlement. This would
retain the character of their promotion as reﬂecting elementary council-
members conﬁdence in them, as in Arendt’s description (Arendt: 1990,
p.278). For each deputy so elected, this also includes some faith in their
own ability to elect wisely to any level more general than that which
they now occupy.
Continued membership within one’s subordinate councils will also
cause an accumulated shortage of time for the delegate as promotions
accumulate. No upper limit is proposed for the number of tiers of
councils; in her anti-formulaic mode of thought, Arendt may simply
demur on the point, leaving it to experience to determine the maximal
practicable value of ‘n’.
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5.2.3 The Distribution of Initiative
In referring to ‘initiative’ here, we refer to the capacity to legitimately
initiate some new political process or event, as that quality can be
ascribed to parts of a political system.
Related to the practice of authority in Arendt’s description is the
way in which initiative is distributed between layers. Our search for this
detail is, in part, hindered by the short lifespans of Arendt’s examples
and the absence of detail on inter-level relations. However, we are not
completely without guide; in the description of Hungary 1956 and that
of Russia 1917, the co-ordinating councils which develop do so after
several councils have independently organised themselves (Arendt:
1990, p.266). These federating bodies organised themselves as “league
and alliance among separate units...in such a way that [their] own
central power did not deprive the constituent bodies of their original
power to constitute” (Arendt: 1990, p.267). This form of federation,
Arendt claims, derives from the “elementary conditions of action itself”
(Arendt: 1990, p.267), such that no other system could be built which
better matched those conditions.
Whilst this gives us reason to prefer federated councils over other
means of organising politics, it does not necessarily lead us to prefer
federating our councils instead of keeping them isolated. Arendt clearly
regards the co-ordinating effort as more than a convenience, since she
links the principle of federation to the “spirit of revolution” (Arendt:
1990, p.266) and regards federation as the logical outgrowth of the
councils themselves, as linked to their attempt to attain an enduring
character as spaces of freedom (Arendt: 1990, p.264).
This last claim makes federation sound more like a matter of con-
venience than it perhaps ought to. This does not settle exactly how
the alliances expressed in federating-councils are to function. They
might be less active than the elementary councils, which are themselves
then left with a high degree of independence. Something like a min-
imal co-ordinating role is suggested by the context in which Arendt
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mentions the council-system in Arendt (1972d). There, it is a discus-
sion of international conﬂict and the need for an inter-national rather
than super-national body to mediate which causes Arendt to mention
councils (Arendt: 1972d, pp.229–230).
Jefferson has a clearer idea of this relation; he describes wards as
“little republics, with a warden at the head of each” (Jefferson: 1813,
p.189). The only detail provided of the wardens’ role with this intro-
duction of them is that they are to enact a “general call [for the ward
to meet to] produce the genuine sense of the people on any required
point” (Jefferson: 1813, p.189). An equivalent ofﬁce is suggested in a
different letter, a “foreman” who functions for the ward as a sergeant
does within an army, to whom “General orders are given out from the
center” (Jefferson: 1810, p.183).
The two roles are essentially the same; consider the nature of the
‘general call’ enacted by the warden. It is to be held at the same time
in each of the several wards within the same state (Jefferson: 1813,
p.189), which suggests both that the capacity to initiate this sort of
event lies with the higher-level body and that an ofﬁce exists which
confers the responsibility of facilitating it. This differentiates ‘warden’
and ‘deputy’ and suggests the former takes on a merely organisational
function. There is nothing in this account to suggest this initiative
belong entirely with that body, merely that the organisation of the
wards in order to ascertain opinions lies without the wards as units.
That such a body is open to petition from ward-members is clearly in
keeping with Jefferson’s plan for the system.
Keeping the resolution of public business as local as possible will
reduce the anonymity-generating tendency of large-scale organisations
and allow more individual engagement in politics ‘proper’, another
reason we might suppose the higher-level councils to be as minimally-
active as possible. This, in turn, answers to Arendt’s desire to impede
the growth of mass political movements. Because higher-level councils
are themselves composed of acting individuals, however, we should not
expect them to become cipher organisations for their related more-local
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councils, which would convert them into representatives. Each would
become a functionary of the council which had deputised them, rather
than a political actor in their own right.
This last quality also works to protect the seriousness of the local-
level councils’ political engagement; it prevents that council degenerat-
ing into a steering committee to rule a particular individual deputy.
5.2.4 The Role of Deputies
What is it the deputies do, if not act as representatives? To determine
this, we will begin by considering the rather clearer account of elections
in the wards, which seem to function rather more like actually-existing
representative governments than Arendt might have liked. The wards
are intended to function as ‘building blocks’, confederating for any
more general matters of business whilst each forms in itself a ‘pure’
republican system; ‘republican’ is taken by Jefferson to signify the
involvement, of citizens “directly and personally” in the business of
their government without delegation (Jefferson: 1816b, p.207).
For larger units and inter-ward matters, Jefferson recommends the
election of representatives, albeit as a necessary evil rather than with
any great enthusiasm (Jefferson: 1816b, p.207). These representatives
are to be
either pro hac vice or for such short terms as should render se-
cure the duty of expressing the will of the their constituents.
This I should consider as the nearest approach to a pure
republic, which is practicable on a large scale of country or
population (Jefferson: 1816b, p.207).
Representatives of this sort are to be used for “affairs of the larger
sections, of counties, of States and of the Union, not admitting personal
transactions of the people...” (Jefferson: 1816d, p.219), whilst the wards
reserve to themselves all those concerns which are intelligible locally.
Jefferson consistently aims at this maximisation of direct engage-
ment, noting with equal consistency its practical limits (Jefferson: 1816d).
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In relation to elected ofﬁcials, the wards do have a role to play: their
existence as “regularly organised power” is to make the ejection of bad
elected agents easier to achieve without recourse to full insurrection
(Jefferson: 1816d, p.219).12 Jefferson’s instruction is that “the people
[retain] organised means of acting on their agents” (Jefferson: 1816d,
p.219) by means of the wards. Although this is a recurrent feature of
the wards, it is not one Arendt mentions.
There is a signiﬁcant difference between Arendt and Jefferson con-
cerning who plays the active role within the localised body of gov-
ernance; Jefferson has all called together by the warden or foreman,
whilst no mention is made of such a ﬁgure in Arendt’s councils.
Arendt’s description of the deputies is ﬂeeting and focuses on the
means of their promotion. Of their subsequent relationship with the
council of which they are the deputy, Arendt claims that, in a manner
similar to elementary council-members, “they were not subject to any
pressure either from above or from below” (Arendt: 1990, p.278). This
particular description is connected to the problematic discussion of
deputies as equals. However, it is also found alongside a description of
the councils to which deputies are sent as “higher councils” (Arendt:
1990, p.278), so it is clearly the pyramid structure which is meant
here. The ‘pressure’ in question may thus be taken to refer to Arendt’s
attempt to distinguish the councils from any sort of command-system
operating in either direction. This seems to preclude any sort of recall
or expulsion method for deputies and also suggests again our claim that
the election of them is a matter of recognising some elevated quality in
them. Whilst this last claim is not incompatible with Jefferson, what
12The relationship between this element of Jefferson’s work and Arendt’s opposition
to ‘rule’ is complex; the two do not ﬁt comfortably together. The ‘ejection’ mechanism
belongs to the idea that ‘the people’ rule but delegate functions to their representatives;
as they remain the participant in command, they retain the right to do away with the
services of negligent employees. But the relationship, in this one case, between ease
of ejection and avoiding the need for insurrection brings to mind Arendt’s avoidance
of sovereignty. What Jefferson captures in this comment is that, once a relationship
of sovereignty is established, the only way to do without it is some form of outright
opposition.
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immediately precedes it is. His representatives, the people he has the
wards send up to more general units, remain strictly the agents of their
electors, whereas the deputies of the councils are not.
This would leave the deputy a reasonably free hand, able to act, as
suggested above. Quite what he does, then, will be broadly similar
to the description of political engagement formed in our chapters
on action and judgment. Whilst the function of the former is clear
enough, the function of the latter requires some additional explanation.
The deputy’s role is, in part, a conduit between council levels for the
opinions and acts of other members. In this manner, he integrates
the sensus communis of the lower-order council with a wider audience,
permitting a form of access to wider ranges of opinion and engagement
than individual councils otherwise could manage, without overloading
the imagination to the point of losing awareness of individuals. In
this manner, the system will prevent parochialism without losing the
individuated character of politics. Sitton suggests that the councils, or
small groups in general, do not “necessarily encourage the multiplicity
of opinions” which Arendt desires of them (Sitton: 1994, p.312). He
would be correct were it not for the deputies acting as links between
councils.
This results in a structure fundamentally rather similar to a recog-
nisable federal system, albeit with both a different emphasis and signif-
icantly smaller base units.
5.3 What Councils Are For
There are, broadly speaking, two sets of purposes which Jefferson
details for wards. We shall begin with the set neglected by Arendt by
consequence of her own theoretical commitments: the actual substance
of public business.
Some sense of the difference between the two theorists may be
garnered by considering the very smallest unit Jefferson lists in the
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subdivision of his idealised republic; “the administration of each man’s
farm by himself” (Jefferson: 1816c, p.205). Administration of this kind,
which is purely private, is not mentioned as part of public business by
Arendt. The closest analogue is the ‘ﬁxed property’ element of stable
private property which tethers the Athenian political actor to some
deﬁnite place in the world (Arendt: 1998, p.61). The differentiation, for
Jefferson, is largely a matter of degree, rather than of kind. The degree
to which some item constitutes public business is the degree to which it
impinges upon others, becoming general business of interest to many.
Arendt’s attention regarding the object of wards’ business could
charitably be described as ‘ﬂeeting’; she refers to Jefferson’s claim that
one ought to “Begin [wards] only for a single purpose; they will soon
show for what others they are the best instruments” (Arendt (1990,
p.279), original in Jefferson (1816c, p.206)). She does not mention,
however, that list of purposes which Jefferson has in mind.
These purposes are all local ones, forming a reasonably stable set of
concerns whenever given by Jefferson. The following is a representative
example of such a list;
impart to these wards those portions of self-government for
which they are best qualiﬁed, by conﬁding to them the care
of their poor, their roads, police, elections, the nomination
of jurors, administration of justice in small cases, elementary
exercises of militia...all those concerns which, being under
the eye, they would better manage than the larger republics
of county or state (Jefferson: 1813, p.189).
A substantially similar list is found in Jefferson (1824b, p.385), show-
ing the consistency of Jefferson’s thought on this point. This includes
the criterion by which duties are allocated: those given to the wards
are, fundamentally, local matters.
Arendt’s speciﬁcation of business matters for the councils is largely
negative. The exclusion is consistent with her earlier distinctions be-
tween action on the one hand and labour and work on the other. With
205Chapter 5. The Council Systems
councils, she replicates a difference of phenomena in institutional form
by treating councils as wholly unsuited for ‘social issues’ such as the
management of factories (Arendt: 1990, p.274). When Arendt does
admit that some councils did take part in factory-management, she
treats it as them as having failed in their self-understanding; in the case
of the factories it is the ‘workers’ councils’ that are at fault (Arendt:
1990, p.274), trading public happiness for control of production. The
‘revolutionary councils’ remain unsullied, concentrating as they do on
purely political matters.
The councils’ dalliance with factory-management is the result not
only of them ‘misunderstanding’ themselves but also that they “were
incapable of understanding to what enormous extent the government
machinery in modern societies must indeed perform the function of
administration” (Arendt: 1990, p.273).
There is some question as to how seriously we ought to take Arendt’s
claim that the councils’ involvement in means of production represent
an aberration of their proper course. Hobsbawm’s review of On Rev-
olution contains the claim that social matters were dealt with by the
councils from the very start of each instance (Hobsbawm: 2007, p.275)
and, indeed, that they did not really distinguish between social and
political issues (Hobsbawm: 2007, p.274). Medearis makes a similar
claim (Medearis: 2004, p.471) and, further, claims that Arendt’s ability
to understand the councils was foiled by her division of social from
political matters (Medearis: 2004, p.469).
This kind of exclusion does point to a difﬁculty: all of the council-
like organisations Arendt describes fail to outlive the crises in which
they are born, so there is no real indication of what business they would
engage in ‘normally’. Evidently, this is not a problem for the historical
councils; immediately after a revolution, there is more than enough
political organisation to occupy everyone. Hobsbawm complains that
“Arendt is misled by the fact that at the peak of revolutionary crisis
all organizations discuss politics much of the time” (Hobsbawm: 2007,
p.274, fn.8). Once the sheer urgency of this scenario has passed, because
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enough political decisions have accumulated to form a power structure,
the number of people that need directly engage in political issues will
presumably rapidly diminish.
Whether we can impute this view to Arendt is much less clear. Many
of her examples of politics are short-term, ether because they take place
against a short-term backdrop of disorder or because they centre on
particular attempts to alter who or what is included in politics (e.g.
the civil rights movements). Given the character of contingency that
Arendt emphasises for action, it will always require some effort and
luck for the actual practice of politics to continue. It can never become
the automatic repetition of the already-given; nor can it ever turn away
from the same.
5.4 The Ends of the Councils
Arendt provides a reason for the demise of the councils which is
extrinsic to them: competition with party systems willing to resort to
violence (Arendt: 1990, pp.262–263). This conﬂict arises not just because
the councils are spaces of freedom but because they are rival centres of
power;
The councils, moreover, were always as much organs of
order as much as organs of action, and it was indeed their
aspiration to lay down the new order that brought them
into conﬂict with the groups of professional revolutionaries
who wished to degrade them to mere executive organs of
revolutionary activity (Arendt: 1990, p.263).
This link between action and order informs the conﬂict; it also shows
Arendt’s consistency regarding the possibility of combining the two.
The rebellious independence of the councils from party programmes
shows, if nothing else, a plausible example of stability without rule. It
is also a case in which political engagement is about—more so than
it is about anything else—political action itself. With this in mind, it
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seems possible to imagine a council movement which, without the
opposition of the parties merely organised themselves on a short-term
basis without any mind to the future or the possibility of new political
foundations. This would only be possible so long as the councils were
under no external pressure whatsoever, with only a dim sense of what
was different about the way in which they were conducting politics.
Being spaces of freedom, then, is the end of the councils in the sense
of both goal and their termination. There is nothing to suggest either
that Arendt holds this conﬂict to be inevitable, or inevitably lost. Nor,
if the councils are to stand as historical examples of an ‘ideal type’, is
their destruction a necessary element of their charm.
Against this claim, we can ﬁnd Tassin (2007), in which it is claimed
that the doom of the councils was a necessary part of their symbolic
value. Tassin’s reading does not claim that Arendt was attracted to
the councils because of a romantics’ attachment to failed causes but
is a more subtle work. His claim is, instead, that “[f]or revolution, to
succeed was to fail” (Tassin: 2007, p.1123). This is to say that the abrupt
end of the public freedom which accompanies a failed revolution in
some sense protects it from the disappointing lapse into ‘mere’ limited
government and party politics which would otherwise follow (Tassin:
2007, p.1123).
However, the ‘gradual failure’ which might have come about had
the councils been allowed to thrive as a state model would still have
provided the same example as a contrasting picture of the possibilities
of politics. It would also provide a more directly accessible tradition
from which future actors could draw exemplars. Something like this
is present in Arendt’s work: Jefferson’s ward system is a response
to the concentration of powers and responsibilities with American
federal government and the subsequent loss of opportunities for public
engagement (Jefferson: 1816c, pp.204–205).
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5.5 Prerequisites of Membership
One element of the councils as an historical phenomenon remains to be
discussed: the membership of councils, which was deferred above when
discussing the nature of promotion ‘within’ the system of councils. The
issue which remains is how one might be inducted into the system to
begin with. Arendt’s account of this is that participation is in principle
open to all; the councils are made up of ‘the people’ themselves, or
rather an elite proportion of them of whom “one is almost tempted to
say they selected themselves” (Arendt: 1990, p.278). In the historical
examples, those who participated are, as point of fact, those with some
hand in establishing them (Arendt: 1990, p.278). The full meaning of
this ‘in principle’ openness of participation is best illustrated by one last
turn to Arendt’s appropriations from—and alterations of—Jefferson’s
theorisation of the ward-system.
There is an optimism in Jefferson’s account which is immediately
apparent; he genuinely seems to think that the people as a whole will
generally do well when permitted a full share in government of their
own concerns. This rests, though, on the supposition that the ward
system be adopted alongside a system of general education; the former
routinely occurs in his work alongside the creation of free schools and,
on two occasions, the wards are centred on their schools (Jefferson:
1810, p.183)(Jefferson: 1813, p.189).
This particular optimism is not necessarily so easy to see in Arendt’s
work; the short lives of the councils, if taken to be a necessary element
of their constitution, would serve as evidence of pessimism on her part
regarding the potential for ‘non-elite’ governance.
The contest over the composition of those able to engage in public
business relates to the discussion, above, of the end of the councils
and does so because taking a pessimistic view of the distribution of
political talent contributes to a similar view of the hopes of councils
to be effective units of governance. What is at stake is the degree to
which ‘elites’ must take control of the councils, a view which is not
straight-forwardly Arendt’s;
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[witnesses to the council movements] looked upon the coun-
cils as thought they were a romantic dream, some sort of
fantastic utopia come true for a ﬂeeting moment to show,
as it were, the hopelessly romantic yearnings of the peo-
ple, who apparently did not yet know the true facts of life
(Arendt: 1990, p.263).
This pessimism is reported not in Arendt’s own voice but as the view
taken by contemporary witnesses who stood outside of the council
movements. The ﬁgure of ‘the people’, as it features in this reported
view, can function here only on the presupposition that some special
knowledge or talent is a necessary precondition for effective involve-
ment, a view Arendt does not hold; this much is obvious from her
avoidance of Jefferson’s link between engagement and education.
It may be that Arendt and Jefferson have different expectations of
attendance underlying the differences in their descriptions of public
participants. Jefferson certainly expects the involvement of all who
are not infants, female or enslaved (Jefferson: 1816d, p.220), whilst
Arendt’s councils are made only of and for those with a particular
enthusiasm. They may actually be describing the same set, the set
of people interested in public business. Jefferson expects this to be a
populous set, whilst the sad history between them informs Arendt’s
description of self-selected elites and disengaged others. This is the
real peculiarity of her account; she must hold that anyone is capable
of political engagement, including some quite serious contributions,
though seldom actually do. It seems this optimism, as it stands in
Arendt, is free-ﬂoating. In Jefferson, there is a link between a greater
degree of involvement and the need for general eduction; no such link
is posited by Arendt.
The nature of the ‘elite’ which Arendt believes would emerge to do
public business in a council-like system is, to say the least, curious; the
only thing which makes someone a member of it is that they choose
to be so (Arendt: 1990, p.280). The sense in which it constitutes an
‘elite’, then, is this: its members are those who have made the effort,
2105.5. Prerequisites of Membership
an effort which is far from automatic or easy. Not even education is a
necessary qualiﬁcation for membership; to stipulate that would come
too close to claiming that knowledge of a particular sort, or a particular
outlook on the world, was necessary, which would already be to decide
in favour of some outcomes and against others, by limiting the kinds of
person one could encounter in public. If particular items of knowledge
become prerequisite, then it would be on the basis that politics required
a certain kind of expertise, would approximate to craftsmanship; if
one had to see the world in a particular way, then this would act as
a forceful constraint on the kinds of viewpoints could gain a public
hearing.
This element of Arendt’s work suggests a theorist comfortable with
mass participation, with public engagement as a common possibility.
Canovan detects another strain in Arendt’s work, which conﬂicts with
this: “she can also be read as an elitist of almost Nietzschean intensity”
(Canovan: 1978, p.6). Canovan’s paper includes the (older) reading
of the Athenian polis which treats it as an ideal form of politics for
Arendt, with the slaves guaranteeing the possibility of freedom for their
masters. Though this has already been set aside, Canovan’s paper does
not rely exclusively on it; instead the weight of demonstrating an elitist
tendency in Arendt must be borne by the other works which Canovan
draws from: Origins of Totalitarianism and On Revolution.
The ‘democratic’ strain of Arendt’s work is represented in Canovan’s
paper by, as well as other sources, the ﬁnal chapter of On Revolution
(1978, pp.15–17) from which the account above was generated. Canovan
claims that, for Arendt, the virtue of the council system is ‘that it would
extend to the many—indeed to anyone who chose to take part in it—the
inestimable blessing of political action” (Canovan: 1978, p.16).
Canovan presents, as evidence of the elitist tendency in Arendt, a
selection of ideas from On Revolution; the ﬁrst of these is Canovan’s
summary of the difference between the French and the American revo-
lutions, to account for their early divergence;
The French Revolution was, according to [Arendt’s] account,
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similarly concerned with public freedom in its early stages,
but was rapidly deﬂected by the irruption into politics of
the social question, the problem of the hopeless misery of
the Parisian masses, and the compassion for their misery
which led the Jacobins to justify tyranny in the interests of
social betterment. The foundation of freedom in America
was possible not only because...the pressure of misery was
not inescapable, as it was in Europe, but also because the
Founding Fathers’ enthusiasm for liberty was not diluted by
irrelevant compassion for the poor (Canovan: 1978, p.14).
This is not an unfair characterisation either of Arendt’s account of the
French Revolution or of the Americans’ differing fortunes. This is not to
say that Canovan has established Arendt holds personal want to render
them unsuitable for public life, only that the difﬁculties of poverty are
difﬁculties which make other concerns, such as the establishment of
stable government, say, impossible to attend to.
Canovan gives two short quotations from On Revolution.13 Arendt
claims in the ﬁrst that, once “the poor became wealthy”, they succumb
to boredom rather than take up opportunities for action. In the second,
Arendt characterises the poor thus: “ abundance and endless consump-
tion are the ideals of the poor” (Canovan: 1978, both p.15). Canovan
combines these quotes with Arendt’s claim that ‘elites’ have always
needed to “protect themselves from the many” in order to enjoy their
freedom to read Arendt as giving the impression of a “kind of inherited
distinction between the noble and the base” (Canovan: 1978, pp.14–15).
The inheritance-effect is so strong, Canovan thinks Arendt thinks, that
it conditions descendants of those used to poverty even once they are
prosperous.14
13She takes these from the 1963 edition of the book; the ﬁrst quote is from p.64 of
that edition, the second from p.135; p.70 and p.139 respectively in Arendt (1990).
14In the case of “overly wealthy communities”, Arendt holds, the risk is “apathy and
disappearance of initiative” (Arendt: 1998, pp.70–71). This supports the contention
that it is not the socio-economic status which causes problems but the manner in
which the agent regards their want (or, in this case, luxury).
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Does this really make Arendt an ‘elitist’ in the pejorative sense which
would (occasionally) oppose her to her own inclusionist, democratic
tendencies? There is no reason to believe this; for one thing, there is
no explanation of the mechanism by which the ‘unsuitable’ ideals of
the poor outlive actual poverty and, thus, no indication of fatalism in
this regard on Arendt’s part. The problem is the persistence of certain
attitudes; there is nothing to suggest that they are ingrained in a manner
which makes them inescapable. In fact, the continuance of values
antithetical to public engagement ﬁts rather well with Arendt’s account
of a ‘self-chosen elite’ populating the councils; the sole determinant of
participation is, nominally, the desire to do so.
It would be obviously false to think that Arendt holds there to
be no correlation between an actor and their background, given the
relationships between action and context, but quite another thing to
claim that she thinks socio-economic background determines suitability
for public life; the occupations of those who feature in the historical
councils themselves go some way to suppose that politics requires no
speciﬁc training. This, combined with the particular bar—essentially,
willingness—Arendt sets for involvement in councils suggests an op-
timism which could be characterised either as anti-elitism or as the
belief that a genuine elite, something like the ‘natural aristocracy’ of
Jefferson’s letters, is open to almost anyone. What this perhaps leaves
out of the picture is the possibility of ideological indoctrination, of
exclusion from public life based on persuasion rather than any form of
force.
5.6 Conclusion
What does Arendt’s work on the councils reveal about her concept
of politics? As organisations, they match or enable several of the
characteristics of action and a review of them in that light will reveal
the links.
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Most obviously, the councils are organisations in which the ability
to involve oneself in public business is maximised; the councils and, by
dint of their internal organisation, their members, retain a great deal of
free initiative. The differences which Arendt describes between council-
and party-systems of government all rest on this distinction: where
the council is organised from the ground up, the party imposes order
from without; where the discussion of council members is free, the
party system relies on ideological conﬂict. The opposition to ideology
is also seen through the difference between the model of action and the
ﬁgure of the professional revolutionary: action is backwards-looking
and founded in responsiveness to events; the professional revolutionary
has his ideas ready to hand and is merely looking for an opportunity
to deploy them.
The professional revolutionary also points towards the question
of the function of the councils within Arendt’s work. Though there
is an elegiac quality to the end of On Revolution, this does not show
Arendt’s aim to be merely funerary description of an inevitably-doomed
effort. This can be seen in two elements of her description: ﬁrst, that
Arendt presents the cessation of councils as the result of extrinsic events;
second, that she unites the short-lived historical examples to Jefferson’s
ward system. The latter is forward-looking, in the sense that it treats a
council-like federated system as a distinct possibility, an alternative to
the centralising tendency of American federation.
But, even as an ‘ideal type’, the council-system cannot be intended
to serve as a blueprint for future constitutions; instead, the councils
and the wards together constitute an exemplar, a means of distilling
certain features of distinct political events into an ad hoc tradition from
which future actors may inspiration but not instruction.
214If men wish to be free, it is precisely
sovereignty they must renounce
(Arendt: 1993f, p.165).
6
Conclusion
Taken together, the above chapters show Arendt’s work to be a consis-
tent response to the distortion of politics understood as a kind of work,
or the identiﬁcation of freedom with free will. Each aspect of Arendt’s
work discussed here has formed part of an extended answer on her
part to this particular conception of politics;
[The] identiﬁcation of freedom with sovereignty ...leads ei-
ther to a denial of human freedom...or to the insight that the
freedom of one man, or a group, or a body politic can be pur-
chased only at the price of the freedom, i.e., the sovereignty,
of all others. Within the conceptual framework of traditional
philosophy, it is indeed very difﬁcult to understand how
freedom and non-sovereignty can exist together or, to put
it another way, how freedom could have been given to men
under the condition of non-sovereignty......freedom and
sovereignty are so little identical that they cannot even exist
simultaneously (Arendt: 1993f, p.164).
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The alternative to this is exactly that politics which can be described
on the basis of the concepts by which Arendt redescribes politics; this
alternative takes in, as well as the conceptual base Arendt deploys,
the results of it: the relationship between the citizen political system,
expressed both in the description Arendt gives of political foundations
and the qualities of the councils.
Totalitarianism, the phenomenon Canovan persuasively demon-
strates is at the root of Arendt’s interest in political theory (1995, p.2 ),
is a speciﬁc case of this general phenomenon. It is not the only example
we have encountered in Arendt’s work of something outside of politics
taken as the appropriate base for politics on the model of an assigned
telos; the same structural relationship recurs for anything which is taken
to be the determining base for politics, whether that is a philosophy
of history, a theory of rights or sovereignty, wherever located. Whilst
Arendt was lead to her understanding of politics and to the problematic
interpretation of it which her work undermines by her analysis of total-
itarian regimes, the same also lead her to the more general problem of
a sovereign grounding for politics external to politics.
Action as a ﬁrst step in the response to this problem, to this concep-
tion of politics as if it were either work or ‘about’ the laws of history, is
perhaps an obvious step (in hindsight). Arendt began at the level of the
basic elements, offering a reminder of the differing characteristics of
human experience, emphasising those set to one side by the conception
of politics on the model of work. The most basic element of this is the
return to the phenomenon of politics, in an attempt to see it almost as
if with new eyes undistorted by political philosophy.
Perhaps it is less clear how judgment relates to concerns of this
kind. Its relevance lies in the features of it which match the ‘refounding’
element of the act of foundation, features which oppose it to the role
that a sovereign (as either sovereign body or as telos) would assume.
What judgment does, in taking the differences of perspective seriously,
is to force the interpretation of events and the generation of opinion
both to remain open, revisable by future citizens. Habermas’ reading
216of Arendt undoes this and, in effect makes the aim of a consensus
into a (weak) pseudo-sovereign by prioritising consensus over dissent.
Judgment, or rather a commitment to it as manifestation of plurality,
leaves an open space, refusing a ‘ﬁnal answer’ of the kind that could
be provided either by a plan or by a sovereign acting as, in effect, the
highest judge.
Within Arendt’s work, the focus is on the given at the expense of
the end point; the way in which she structures action and judgment
leads ultimately to the conclusion that there can be no end point, no
ﬁnal judgment, so long as humans exist in the form in which we would
recognise them. The commonality of judgment which features in her
work as an element of politics, a sensus communis, is the commonality
of common assumptions and subjects rather than of submission to a
common verdict.
There remains the question of Arendt’s position in relation to both
theory and politics, which is at the same time the question of what she
expects to be done with theory in general and her theory in particular.
We are already familiar with her claim not to be offering a plan, yet
it is clear that the councils do function as an ‘ideal type’ of political
organisation. But to call them this is to stray too close to the conception
of them as if they are a kind of blueprint; they are, in fact, exemplars
of political organisation and of engagement. Exemplars feature as
resources for the political actor to draw on, as Jefferson does in his use
of American colonial history; Arendt shades from theorist to actor in her
presentation of the councils and, for that matter, in her presentation of
Jefferson. Arendt assumes a strange hybrid position, discussing politics
in the mode of a theorist whilst explicitly refusing to give directions
from ‘without’ politics.
What, ultimately, Arendt’s work reveals—even if she cannot insist
on it as a model—is that a post-sovereign politics is a distinct possibility,
an attractive one which does not suffer for its lack of ultimate arbiter;
it is possible, on this basis, to combine the existence of distinct selves,
including their distinct projects, with the stability which inheres in the
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orderly public realm.
To remain consistent with her own commitments, Arendt cannot
insist on this model of politics so much as offer it as an attractive
alternative; she can only, in the manner of the Kantian judge, woo the
assent of others.
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